Peterkin v. Jeffes

• Decision Date: 04 May 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-304.
• Citation: 661 F. Supp. 895
• Parties: Otis PETERKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Glen JEFFES, Commissioner Bureau of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

661 F. Supp. 895

Otis PETERKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Glen JEFFES, Commissioner Bureau of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 83-304.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

May 4, 1987.

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Stefan Presser, American Civil Liberties Union, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Maria Parisi Vickers, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

McGLYNN, District Judge.

This is a class action in which individuals under sentence of death and currently confined to "death rows" at Pennsylvania's Correctional Institutions at Graterford and Huntingdon challenge the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The inmates also challenge restrictions on their first amendment right to the free exercise of religion and their sixth amendment right to access to courts. Original jurisdiction is vested in this court by 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1343 (West Supp.1986).

There were eleven days of hearings including two days of testimony at Graterford, at which death row inmates from both Graterford and Huntingdon testified. In addition, the court visited the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) at Graterford on two occasions, first in June, 1986, and then again in December, 1986. The court also heard extensive testimony about the conditions of confinement in the RHU at Huntingdon. This Memorandum of Decision represents my findings of fact and conclusions of law.

For the reasons that follow, I find that the conditions of confinement for capital inmates at Graterford and Huntingdon are not constitutionally infirm. Similarly, I find that the plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of their first or sixth amendment rights.

I. Parties

A. Plaintiffs

By order dated June 2, 1986, the court certified the plaintiff class to represent all inmates under sentence of death and confined to administrative segregation at the State Correctional Institutions at Graterford, Huntingdon, and Pittsburgh during the pendency of this litigation.

B. Defendants

The defendants in this action, named individually and in their official capacities, are: Glen Jeffes, Commissioner of the Bureau of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford; Charles H. Zimmerman, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon; and George Petsock, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh.

II. Role Of The Courts In Eighth Amendment Challenges

The eighth amendment prohibits prison conditions that inflict cruel and unusual punishment. It is well established, however, that incarceration necessarily entails the withdrawal or limitation of rights and privileges. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Indeed, sentenced inmates may even be subject to punitive conditions. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The eighth amendment applies to this case because confinement in a state penitentiary is subject to eighth amendment scrutiny. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1083-84, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986).

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), represents the first Supreme Court decision to set the boundaries of an eighth amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement. Drawing on a long line of eighth amendment decisions, the Court in Rhodes held that the eighth amendment proscribes conditions that result in an "unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain, including practices that are "totally without penological justification." Id. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 2929, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)).

The Rhodes Court construed the eighth amendment to permit punitive conditions that are compatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," but that are not "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime." Id. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citations omitted). The Court also held that the eighth amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons. Id. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. Rather, the Court concluded that "restrictive" and even "harsh" conditions are a penalty criminal offenders must pay for their offenses against society. Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399.

In deciding eighth amendment cases, a federal court is not authorized to interfere with the policy choices of state officials concerning the operation of prisons. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the Supreme Court explained its policy of deference:

As we said in Rhodes v. Chapman, "a prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators." In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgement of the prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on "purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior," indeed, the administrators must predict not just one inmate's future actions, as in parole, but those of an entire institution.

Id. at 474, 103 S.Ct. at 872-873 (citations omitted). At the same time, this policy of broad deference does not divest a court of its authority to remedy genuine constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Nevertheless, it does require that, absent a constitutional violation, a court grant wide ranging deference to the expertise of prison officials in deciding how to best administer their prisons. See Whitley, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (1986); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 & n. 29, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461 & n. 29, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). See also Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338, 349 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J., dissenting), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 331, 88 L.Ed.2d 314 (1985).

In discharging its constitutional duty, a court faced with an eighth amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement must consider the challenged conditions "alone or in combination," recognizing that the totality of the conditions "may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Concurring in Rhodes, Justice Brennan wrote that "even if no single condition of confinement would be unconstitutional in itself, `exposure to the cumulative effect of prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment.'" Id. at 363, 101 S.Ct. at 2407 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H.1977)) (Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring).

What emerges from these pronouncements is not a static test; the necessary determinations are imprecise and indefinite. Id. at 346, 361. Rather, the eighth amendment must be interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner. Id. at 345. Also, a court must look to objective factors as much as possible. Id. at 346. Appropriate objective factors include basic human needs such as food, shelter, and medical care, as well as sanitation, safety, the physical plant, educational/rehabilitational programs, the length of confinement, and out-of-cell time. The opinions of experts, while helpful, "simply do not establish the constitutional minima." Id. at 348 n. 13 (citation omitted). In the end, the court must "rely upon its own expertise and on its own knowledge of contemporary standards." Id. at 364 (Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted).

I address each of the myriad aspects of confinement in light of the foregoing principles. Since Rhodes v. Chapman instructs me to consider each aspect alone or in combination, I will address the issues serially to determine whether, taken alone, they establish a constitutional violation. After reviewing each separately, I will determine whether the cumulative impact of the challenged conditions rises to the level of an eighth amendment violation.

III. Pennsylvania's Correctional System

A. Penal Institutions

The Pennsylvania correctional system consists of ten institutions of varying degrees of security. Tr. 7/29/86: 6-7.¹ Additionally, the Commonwealth utilizes fifteen community service centers. Id. The prison population totals approximately 15,000 inmates, and the Commonwealth employs in excess of 4,000 people to operate its correctional facilities. Id. For the fiscal year 1986, the Commonwealth allocated $200 million dollars for prison operations. Id. Since the reinstitution of the death penalty in 1978, three institutions have housed capital inmates: Graterford, Huntingdon, and Pittsburgh. At present, all of Pennsylvania's capital inmates are housed either at Graterford or Huntingdon.

1. State Correctional Institution at Graterford

Graterford is a maximum security institution situated on approximately 1700 acres of land, 65 of which are enclosed by a wall that spans approximately one mile. Tr. 7/28/86: 101. The prison itself consists of five cellblocks, each more than 600 feet long. Id. The RHU at Graterford is a fairly modern building, separate from the main building containing the five primary cellblocks. It is a one-level, U-shaped structure. Tr. 6/16/86: 16-17. One wing of the RHU houses only capital inmates, the middle wing houses both...