Peters v. Clarke
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 7:14CV00598 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | DANIEL PETERS, Plaintiff, v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, ET AL., Defendant(s). |
Daniel Peters, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, et seq. Peters alleges that prison officials substantially burdened his Rastafarian religious exercise in group worship; deprived him without due process of a protected interest in group worship and vocational programs; and treated him differently than general population inmates with regard to these programs. Upon review of the record, I conclude that defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") grooming policy, Operating Procedure ("OP") 864.1 (docket no. 21-1), establishes uniform personal grooming standards for offenders to facilitate the identification of offenders and to promote safety, security, and sanitation. Specifically, OP 864.1 requires male inmates to keep their hair one inch or shorter in thickness or depth. The policy disallows hair styles and beards that "could conceal contraband; promote identification with gangs; create a health, hygiene, or sanitation hazard; or could significantly compromise the ability to identify an offender." OP 864.1(IV)(C)(2). Styles such as braids, plaits, dreadlocks, cornrows, ponytails, buns, mohawks,partially shaved head, designs cut into the hair, or any style that could conceal contraband are not permitted under the provisions of the OP. OP 864.1(IV)(G)(4).
When any inmate in any VDOC prison facility fails to comply with the grooming standards, he receives a disciplinary charge and is housed in segregation until he complies with OP grooming standards. OP 864.1(IV)(H) Offenders do not lose earned good time for noncompliance with OP 864.1 and are not prohibited from earning good conduct time solely for refusing to comply with OP 864.1. A noncompliant inmate who remains charge-free for a required period of time while in segregation and meets certain criteria may be assigned to the 864.1 Violators Housing Unit ("VHU"), which is currently located in the C-5 pod of C Building at Wallens Ridge State Prison. See OP 864.1(IV)(I).
Peters asserts that the VHU is a general population pod, but this self-serving characterization is not consistent with the established VDOC security classification scheme. Under VDOC procedures available online, general population inmates receive security classification designations from 1 to 5, with 1 being minimum security and 5 being maximum security. See OP 830.2(IV)(A)(2).1 This classification policy states its own objectives:
Classification of offenders into appropriate security levels and assignment to facilities equipped to provide appropriate security enhances public, staff, and offender safety by ensuring that each offender receives the appropriate level of control and management while reducing the operating cost of the DOC by ensuring that offenders are assigned to the least restrictive security level necessary and not subjected to excessive control and management.
OP 830.2(IV)(A)(1). Some groups of inmates receive "Specialty Designations," however. For example, inmates in segregation are assigned Security Level S and inmates in protective custody are assigned Security Level P. Id. Inmates who are not compliant with the grooming policy are assigned Security Level H. Id.
A Security Level H inmate who is approved for and transferred to the VHU pod faces conditions and restrictions as set forth in local OP 864A (docket no. 26-12). Some stated objectives in maintaining the VHU pod are to manage safely and "distinctively" inmates who are noncompliant with the grooming standards, and to encourage grooming compliance, while also allowing such inmates participation in groups and privileges not otherwise available to them in segregation so as to improve their quality of life. OP 864A(IV)(A). VHU residents wear different colored jumpsuits to distinguish them from other Wallens Ridge inmates. VHU inmates cannot be housed with or be near non-VHU residents, with the exception of the school tutor. VHU residents have access to various educational programs, such as Anger Management, Thinking for a Change, and the Department of Correctional Education ("DCE") programming. VHU residents may hold jobs, have two-hour non-contact visits each week, and participate in re-entry services if they qualify. They may practice their religious beliefs in their cells or with other offenders in the pod and may meet with the chaplain. Since January 16, 2015, inmates in the VHU pod may also attend a group religious service on Fridays conducted in the DCE area of the prison.
Peters is a Virgin Islands prisoner in the custody of the VDOC under an inter-departmental contract between the VDOC and its counterpart in the Virgin Islands. When Peters first arrived at Wallens Ridge on April 14, 2013, officials placed him in segregation. On April 17, 2013, officials ordered Peters to comply with the grooming policy. Peters refused to comply,because his Rastafarian religious beliefs prohibit him from cutting his hair. Officials charged him with a disciplinary offense (refusal to obey an order to comply with OP 864.1), placed him in pre-hearing detention, conducted a disciplinary hearing, and found him guilty of the charge. As a penalty for the offense, he received a reprimand. Because he was not in compliance with OP 864.1, he remained in segregation for security reasons. On October 1, 2013, officials placed him in the VHU pod.
In July 2014, Peters filed a request to attend existing Rastafarian group religious services,2 as well as educational and vocational programs with general population inmates. Officials denied these requests, based on Peters' VHU status. Officials informed Peters that he was free to worship and practice his religious beliefs inside his cell or to hold a group religious service in the VHU.3 Peters then complained that no such services were being held in the VHU and that he would be fearful that inmates of other beliefs in the VHU might be offended by in-pod services. Officials also advised Peters that he can participate in DCE programming.
Peters filed this § 1983 action in November 2014, against numerous supervisory officials at Wallens Ridge.4 Liberally construed, Peters' complaint alleges the following claims for relief:
Peters seeks compensatory damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief ordering his removal from the VDOC.
Defendants responded to Peters' complaint with a motion for summary judgment, providing additional and undisputed evidence about OP 864.1 and the VHU. Peters has responded to their motion, making the matter ripe for disposition.
A court should grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "As to materiality . . . [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In order to preclude summary judgment, the dispute about a material fact must be "'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In reviewing the evidence, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and maynot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 667 (4th Cir. 2004). Detailed factual allegations in a verified, pro se complaint may be sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits containing a conflicting version of the facts. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) () (citing Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979)).
Section 1983 permits an aggrieved party to file a civil action against a person for actions taken under color of state law that violated his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must establish that he has been deprived of constitutional rights through the actions of a person or persons acting under color of state law. Therefore, he must affirmatively state conduct or omissions by each of the named defendan...
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