Peters v. Com.
| Decision Date | 15 February 1974 |
| Parties | Jesse PETERS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
E. W. Rivers, Melton & Rivers, Paducah, for appellant.
Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Kenneth A. Howe, Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen ., Douglas E. Johnson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee .
Defendant-appellant, Jesse Peters, was indicted for the murder of his mother. His first trial resulted in conviction, and, in accordance with the jury's verdict, he was sentenced to be executed. Upon appeal, this court reversed the conviction and directed a new trial, chiefly because jurors who had expressed conscientious scruples against the death penalty had been excused from the jury panel for cause without compliance with the requirements of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). See Peters v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 154 (1972), for the opinion in the prior appeal of this case.
At the second trial the jury again found Peters guilty, and fixed his punishment at life imprisonment. A single claim of error is advanced for reversal of the second conviction: The trial judge failed to excuse for cause several members of the jury panel. After considering the entire record, we are of the opinion that no reversible error has been demonstrated, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment.
Peters argues that the trial judge erred in not sustaining the defense's motion to excuse for cause some eight jurors who were stricken by exercising peremptory challenges. The defense exhausted the full fifteen peremptory challenges allowed by law. The basis of the rejected challenges for cause is that the prospective jurors had read about the previous trial and that some of them had formed opinions. The trial judge, however, carefully interrogated the individual jurors and in each instance established that the particular juror would remove any thought he had as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, that he would try the case exclusively on the evidence presented and the law given by the court and that there was no reason the juror could not give both the defendant and the prosecution a fair and impartial trial. In other instances, if a prospective juror indicated that the existence of an indictment was an indication of guilt, by interrogation the trial judge effectively removed and such mistaken apprehension.
It is elementary that the determination of whether to excuse a prospective juror rests within the sound discretion of...
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Hunt v. Com.
... ... "RCr 9.36(1) provides that the trial judge shall excuse a juror for cause when there is reasonable ground to believe that the prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict." Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Ky.1987) ( quoting Peters ... 304 SW 3d 43 ... v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ky.1974)) ... We have: ... long recognized that `a determination as to whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an ... ...
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Sanders v. Com.
...that he would have to lean toward what that witness might say. Cf. Marsch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830 (1988); Peters v. Commonwealth, Ky., 505 S.W.2d 764 (1974). We conclude that the lately contested seating of the juror in the present case deprived the defendant neither of trial b......
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Hunt v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000634-MR (Ky. 11/25/2009)
...juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict." Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Ky. 1987) (quoting Peters v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ky. 1974)). We long recognized that `a determination as to whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of ......
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Fugate v. Com.
...is a troubling one. Certainly, the question of the sound discretion of the trial judge must be given great deference. Peters v. Commonwealth. Ky., 505 S.W.2d 764 (1974). The exercise of the sound discretion of the trial judge must be accomplished consistent with the right of the defendant t......