Peters v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission, 2--56489

• Decision Date: 12 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2--56489,2--56489
• Parties: John W. PETERS et al., Appellees, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION et al., Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 306

235 N.W.2d 306

John W. PETERS et al., Appellees, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION et al., Appellants.

No. 2--56489.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 12, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1975.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Haesemeyer, Sol. Gen., for appellants.

Herrick, Langdon, Belin & Harris, Des Moines, for appellees.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, RESS and McCORMICK, JJ.

McCORMICK, Justice.

This appeal involves a declaratory judgment class action by employees of the Iowa Employment Security Commission challenging the right of the executive council and comptroller to exercise control over the position classification and pay plans of the employment security commission. The trial court sustained their challenge. We reverse.

At the root of plaintiffs' argument are two basic contentions. One is that certain provisions of Code chapter 19A establishing the merit system for state employees in Iowa do not apply to them. The other is that certain actions of the executive council and comptroller have violated applicable state and federal law. Resolution of the first contention requires a determination whether chapter 19A does entirely apply to plaintiffs. Resolution of the second contention requires a determination whether the executive council and comptroller have violated applicable law in the respects alleged.

The practical reason for this controversy is that the salaries of plaintiffs are paid with funds granted the State by the federal government. The employment security commission has prepared various pay plans for which federal funding purportedly would be adequate. Certain proposed salaries have been reduced when the plans have reached the executive council. As a result, plaintiffs allege substantial amounts available to pay the higher salaries have reverted to the federal government because not used by the State. Defendants' position is that the executive council has acted within its authority in modifying the pay plans and has reduced proposed salaries when necessary to keep employment security department salaries in line with those in comparable positions in other state agencies in keeping with merit system requirements.

I. The state merit system was created in 1967. Acts 62 G.A. ch. 95. Its purpose was 'to establish for the state of Iowa a system of personnel administration based on the merit principles anc scientific methods governing the appointment, promotion, welfare, transfer, layoff, removal and discipline of its civil employees, and other incidents of state employment.' § 19A.1, The Code. The merit system established in chapter 19A was made applicable to all positions in state government then existing or thereafter established, with certain listed exceptions. § 19A.3, The Code. The exceptions do not include the regular, full-time employees of the employment security commission.

The statute establishes the merit employment department, headed by a merit employment commission. § 19A.4, The Code. The commission is directed to employ a director who acts as executive head of the department. §§ 19A.5, 19A.8, The Code.

The merit employment commission is required by § 19A.9, The Code, to adopt and amend rules for the administration and implementation of the merit system established in chapter 19A.

Under § 19A.9(1), the merit commission is charged with preparing, maintaining and revising a position classification plan 'from a schedule by separate department for each position and type of employment Not otherwise provided by law in state government as approved by the executive council for all positions in the merit system * * *.' (Italics added). The merit department director may not allocate or reallocate a position to a different classification if it might 'result in the expenditure of funds in excess of the total amount budgeted for the department * * * until approval has been obtained from the state comptroller.' The statute also provides, 'Schedules of positions and type of employment Not otherwise provided by law shall be reviewed at least once each year by the governor and submitted to the executive council for continuing approval.' (Italics added).

Under § 19A.9(2), The Code, the merit employment commission is charged with developing a pay plan 'within the purview of an appropriation made by the general assembly And not otherwise provided by law for all employees in the merit system, * * *.' (Italics added). The statute continues, 'Such pay plan shall become effective only after it has been approved by the executive council after submission from the commission.'

In § 19A.22, the statute provides, 'The provisions of this act, including but not limited to its provisions on employees and positions to which the merit system apply, shall prevail over any inconsistent provisions of the Code and all subsequent Acts unless such subsequent Acts provide a specific exception from the merit system.'

Plaintiffs acknowledge they are covered by the merit system created in chapter 19A. However, they contend the executive council and comptroller have no control over their position classification and pay plans because the provisions of § 19A.9(1) and (2) do not apply to them. They argue that their classification and pay plans are 'otherwise provided by law' within the meaning of those provisions.

In so arguing, plaintiffs rely mainly upon § 96.11(4), The Code, which defines the authority of the employment security commission regarding personnel. That provision includes this language:

'Subject to other provisions of this chapter, the commission is authorized to appoint, fix the compensation, and prescribe the duties and powers of such officers, accountants, attorneys, experts, and other persons as may be necessary in the performance of its duties. The commission shall classify its positions and shall establish salary schedules and minimum personnel standards for the positions so classified. All positions shall be filled by persons selected and appointed on the basis of competency and fitness for the position to be filled.' (Italics added).

This authority of the employment security commission to classify its positions and adopt pay plans has been in the Code since 1936. Acts 46 G.A., Ex.Sess., ch. 4, § 11(d). The question here is whether this authority, and like authority in § 97B.5, The Code, has been impliedly repealed by the provisions of chapter 19A.

'Repeals by implication are not favored by the courts and will not be upheld unless the intent to repeal clearly and unmistakably appears from the language used and such a holding is absolutely necessary . . .' Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 243 Iowa 991, 997, 54 N.W.2d 439, 442 (1952); see Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Forst, 205 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Iowa 1973); Llewellyn v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 200 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1972); Radosevich v. City of Ottumwa, 173 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa 1970).

Although an express general repealing clause like § 19A.22 is ineffective as a repealing device, it does constitute an express recognition by the legislature that there are statutory provisions inconsistent with the act in which the clause is included and signifies a legislative intent to repeal such inconsistent provisions. 1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 23.08 at 221 (Fourth Ed. 1972); cf. Kruse v. Gaines, 258 Iowa 983, 986--987, 139 N.W.2d 535, 536--537 (1966). In addition, § 4.8, The Code, provides, 'If statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment by the general assembly prevails.'

Since it is the later enacted statute, chapter 19A must prevail over § 96.11(4) if the provisions are in fact irreconcilable. Plaintiffs maintain they are not, insisting that §§ 19A.9(1) and (2) expressly exclude them from coverage from merit department position classifications and pay plans by exempting employees whose job classification and pay is 'otherwise provided by law.' They assert the legislature intended chapter 19A to apply to them only for record-keepting purposes. We disagree.

In § 19A.3 the legislature listed the state employees exempt from the chapter 19A merit system. Plaintiffs admit they are not on that list.

We are required to construe chapter 19A as a whole, giving effect to every part, in ascertaining the intent of the legislature. We should avoid strained, impractical or absurd results; and should look to the object to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied in reaching a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. Iowa Nat. Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State, Etc., 224 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1974). Examined in light of these principles, it is manifest from the provisions of chapter 19A that the legislature intended to bring all state employees not specifically excepted into a unitary merit system. Inherent in this objective is the precept that all merit system employees should receive equal pay for equal work. The legislature provided for a uniform position classification and pay plan 'so that the same qualifications may reasonably be required for and the same schedule of pay may be equitably applied to all positions in the same class, in the same geographical area.' § 19A.9(1), The Code. This ideal could not be achieved by letting departments or agencies otherwise covered go their own way in classifying positions and developing pay plans. That is one of the evils sought to be remedied by the legislation.

Plaintiffs seem to concede as mucy by expressing a willingness, inconsistent with their interpretation of chapter 19A, to allow the merit commission to pass upon their classification and pay plans. Their goal is to remove the executive council and comptroller from the picture.

We are persuaded the legislature, in requiring the merit commission to prepare a classification and pay plan for all positions in the merit system, did not...