Peters v. Maxwell & Morgan, Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 September 2019
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:18-cv-01399-GMN-EJY
• Parties: GLENKIRK D. PETERS, Plaintiff, v. MAXWELL & MORGAN, CORP., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

GLENKIRK D. PETERS, Plaintiff, v. MAXWELL & MORGAN, CORP., Defendant.

Case No.: 2:18-cv-01399-GMN-EJY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

September 29, 2019

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Maxwell & Morgan, Corp.'s ("Defendant's") Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 20). Plaintiff Glenkirk Peters ("Plaintiff") filed a Response, (ECF No. 21), and Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 26).¹ For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns Defendant's collection of a debt owed by Plaintiff to the homeowner's association governing Plaintiff's home in Arizona. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19). Plaintiff alleges that, when he sold his Arizona home in 2013, he believed the proceeds of the sale "paid off any debts relating to the house, including the homeowners association, Rancho El Dorado HOA (the 'HOA')." (Id. ¶ 19). After that sale, Plaintiff moved to Las Vegas, where he worked for Caesars Entertainment. (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff states that he never worked for Caesars while in Arizona, nor does Caesars have corporate offices in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 22).

In 2016, Defendant sued Plaintiff in Arizona state court alleging that Plaintiff had outstanding financial obligations to the HOA. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24). Defendant then served Plaintiff with this lawsuit through publication in Arizona, though Plaintiff alleges that he did not know about the suit at that time. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). Defendant eventually obtained a judgment against Plaintiff in Arizona state court (the "Arizona Judgment"). (Id. ¶ 28). From that lawsuit and judgment, Defendant sought to garnish Plaintiff's wages to repay the outstanding HOA debt by securing a Writ of Garnishment in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Pinal. (Id. ¶ 32). Defendant did not seek or secure a writ of garnishment in Nevada. (Id. ¶ 34). As of May 2018, Defendant garnished approximately $418.51 per week of Plaintiff's wages earned at Caesars based on the Arizona Judgment. (Id. ¶ 33).

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on July 27, 2018, asserting that Defendant's garnishment of his wages was procedurally incorrect under Nevada law. Defendant moved to dismiss the initial Complaint on September 28, 2018, and also moved for judgment on the pleadings. (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16); (Mot. J. on Pleadings, ECF No. 15). Roughly eleven days later, Plaintiff amended his initial Complaint, (Am. Compl., ECF No. 17), and alleges that Defendant's actions in collecting the HOA debt and garnishing his wages were improper under Nevada laws, thus supporting a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692. (Id. ¶¶ 38-65). Defendant thereafter filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 20).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) mandates that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering whether thecomplaint is sufficient to state a claim, the Court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court, however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a violation is plausible, not just possible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

A court may also dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept., 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff's complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Prolix, confusing complaints" should be dismissed because "they impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges." McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996).

"Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . . However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Similarly, "documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss" without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of "matters of public record." Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Otherwise, if the district court considersmaterials outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss becomes a motion for summary judgment. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should "freely give" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the ground that Defendant never sought to enforce or execute its Arizona Judgment in Nevada; and thus, it did not engage in abusive debt collection practices by violating Nevada law. (Mot. Dismiss ("MTD") 1:20-2:7, ECF No. 20). Defendant claims that it merely served Caesars's registered agent in Arizona with the Arizona Judgment and court-authorized Writ of Garnishment in compliance with Arizona's laws, and Caesars then properly garnished Plaintiff's wages.² (Id. 5:19-6:3). Accordingly, Defendant contends that by not petitioning Plaintiff's employer in Nevada, nor seeking to execute the Arizona Judgment through Nevada courts, it had no obligation to domesticate the Arizona Judgment in Nevada or comply with Nevada's laws on execution of foreign judgments. (Id. 8:5-24).

In response, Plaintiff argues that, because he earned the garnished wages in Nevada, Defendant had to comply with Nevada's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA"), which consists of Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") §§ 17.330 to 17.400, before garnishment could occur. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44); (Resp. 9:4-21, ECF No. 21). By failing to domesticate the Arizona Judgment under Nevada's UEFJA, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' garnishment was illegal and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq. (Id. 10:21-23).

Nevada's UEFJA governs the procedures for an entity or person seeking to execute a foreign judgment³ in Nevada. To invoke the UEFJA's procedures, the entity or person seeking recovery of the foreign judgment may file "an exemplified copy of [the] foreign judgment . . . with the clerk of any district court of this state." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.350. The party seeking recovery of the foreign judgment in Nevada then must comply with the UEFJA's filing and notice requirements, as well as waiting the applicable time-period before executing or enforcing the foreign judgment in Nevada. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.360. In the alternative to filing an exemplified copy of the foreign judgment with a district court clerk under NRS 17.300 to 17.400, "a judgment creditor may elect to bring an action to enforce his or her judgment." See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.390; Transfirst Grp., Inc. v. Magliarditi, No. 2:17-cv-00487-APG-VCF, 2017 WL 2294288, at *3 (D. Nev. May 25, 2017); see also Nev. R. Civ. P. 69 ("A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise.").

Plaintiff cites various cases both within and out of this District to argue that Defendant could not have garnished Plaintiff's wages in Nevada unless Defendant domesticated the Arizona Judgment in Nevada and in compliance with Nevada's UEFJA. (Resp. 10:1-23-12:6-17) (citing, among others, Mem'l Hosp. of Martinsville v. D'Oro, No. 4:10MC00001, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73278 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2011), Kabana, Inc. v. Best Opal, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00806-BES-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10947 (D. Nev. Feb. 8, 2007); Haemerle v. YRC, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1245 JCM (CWH), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14246 (D. Nev. Feb. 5, 2016)). Plaintiff's cited authority does not, however, support his argument in the context of this case. Unlike here, at issue in most cases cited by Plaintiff was the transfer of a judgment from one state to another, and the recipient court's determination about whether that transferred judgment could be executed under the recipient state's laws. See Kabana, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10947, at *9 (concerning the transfer of a New Mexico judgment to a Nevada district court, registration of that judgment in Nevada, and then attempted execution of the judgment through the Nevada court without...