Peters v. McLaren
Decision Date | 10 October 1914 |
Docket Number | 2636. |
Citation | 218 F. 410 |
Parties | PETERS v. McLAREN et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
D. F Pugh and L. R. Pugh, both of Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
J. E Todd and A. T. Seymour, both of Columbus, Ohio, for appellees.
Before WARRINGTON and DENISON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, District judge.
At the suit of Valentine & Co. against the Columbus Buggy Company Daniel McLaren was appointed receiver of the Columbus Buggy Company, and appellant by intervention sought to recover the property in the hands of the receiver, claiming that such property was a trust fund belonging to appellant because of a partnership contract between appellant's testator and one Clinton D. Firestone, and because of the particular manner in which certain of the partnership property passed to the Columbus Buggy Company, a corporation in which Firestone was the controlling stockholder. Two grounds of defense were urged: (1) That the trust claimed by appellant did not exist and (2) that in any event appellant through her own conduct was estopped from making such claim. In the District Court Judge Sater sustained the appellees on both defenses. We approve of those portions of Judge Sater's opinion which are printed below.
The decree is affirmed, with costs.
On June 29, 1882, George M. Peters (hereinafter designated as Peters), Oscar G. Peters, and Clinton D. Firestone (hereinafter called Firestone), entered into articles of copartnership to conduct the business of manufacturing and selling carriages, buggies, and dashes under the name of the Columbus Buggy Company and Peters Dash Company of Columbus, Ohio. * * * On November 9, 1894, Oscar G. Peters died. His interest was withdrawn from the business, and his estate settled but not wholly released from the partnership debts. The articles of copartnership, as originally drawn, remained in force excepting in so far as affected by his death. The extinguishment of his interest left Firestone and Peters as equal partners in and owners of the business. On August 1, 1896, * * * the partnership made an assignment under the (Ohio) state statute in trust for the benefit of its creditors. * * * Its liabilities at that time were about $1,250,000. Prior to the execution and filing of the deed of assignment the partnership * * * gave certain preferences, one of which was, at Peters' instance, in the form of a chattel mortgage for thirty or more thousand dollars, to Mrs. Peters on property in Kansas City, Mo. * * * Peters had an individual estate outside of his partnership belongings. He also had life insurance of some importance, the amount of which was from $60,000 to $75,000. A composition with creditors was suggested, at their first meeting, which was held * * * in October or November, 1896. Peters had become seriously ill, and on his account the meeting had ben deferred. He was, however, present, although a very sick man. A creditors' committee was appointed to work out a composition. A preliminary meeting of the committee was held, at which Peters and all others present were of the opinion that if the partnership estate was converted into money it would yield but a small dividend to the creditors, that some arrangement ought to be made to continue the business, and that Firestone should get his resources together and make some sort of a proposition with that end in view. Peters' health was such that he was at the office and around but a few days only after such meeting. Firestone and the creditors' committee agreed upon a composition proposal, after which he devoted himself almost exclusively to its accomplishment until it was finally wrought out. Both Peters and the creditors looked to Firestone to bring about that result. Peters desired to protect his individual estate, his life insurance, and his wife's preferential mortgage. * * * To effectuate the settlement and accomplish the desire of creditors and of both Peters and Firestone, Peters on December 16, 1896, executed and delivered to Firestone the quitclaim deed whose import is the subject of this controversy. As it embodied agreements as to certain matters to be done by each of the parties, it was executed and acknowledged by both grantor and grantee. The preparation and consideration of the deed extended through some weeks. * * * The deed was executed at the Peters residence, he then being confined to his bed. * * * The deed was fully read to Peters and its purport explained to him, although he had prior knowledge of it and its contents, and on two or three occasions he interrupted the reading to ask an explanation as to the legal effect of certain provisions, his counsel responding to his inquiries. * * *
The following is a copy of the instrument in question omitting the acknowledgment:
the said George M. Peters is ready and willing to relinquish all his right, title, estate, and interest in said partnership property and assets and in the business of said partnership, including the good will thereof and all the estate, right, title, and interest reserved to him in said deed of assignment:
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Davidson v. Vaughn.
...or operative portion, when this is clear and definite, or create a doubt which does not otherwise exist. Peters v. McLaren, 6 Cir., 218 F. 410, 416, 134 C.C.A. 198; Wilson v. Towers, 4 Cir., 55 F.2d 199, 200; Augusta Land Co. v. Augusta Ry., etc., Co., 140 Ga. 519, 523, 79 S.E. 138; Ontelau......
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Davidson v. Vaughn
... ... dispositive or operative portion when this is clear and ... definite, or create a doubt which does not otherwise exist ... Peters v. McLaren, 218 F. 410, 416, 134 ... C.C.A. 198; Wilson v. Towers, 55 F.2d 199, ... 200; Augusta Land Co. v. Augusta Ry. etc ... Co.140 Ga. 519, ... ...
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...and as the body of the article is somewhat ambiguous, resort may be had to the caption to show the parties' intent. Peters v. McLaren, 218 F. 410, 416, 134 C.C.A. 198; Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380, L.Ed. 47. In giving construction to the article, therefore, the rule applicab......
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