Peters v. Meeks, 32788

• Decision Date: 24 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 32788,32788
• Parties: Frederick C. PETERS, Berenice Todd Peters, Frederick Todd Peters, Lewis W. Peters, Ferguson E. Peters, Plantation Development Company, a Florida corporation, and Old Plantation Corporation, a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. W. Herman MEEKS, Jr., as Tax Collector of Broward County, Florida, and Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 753

163 So.2d 753

Frederick C. PETERS, Berenice Todd Peters, Frederick Todd Peters, Lewis W. Peters, Ferguson E. Peters, Plantation Development Company, a Florida corporation, and Old Plantation Corporation, a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. W. Herman MEEKS, Jr., as Tax Collector of Broward County, Florida, and Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellees.

No. 32788.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 24, 1964.

Rehearing Denied May 26, 1964.

Carl A. Hiaasen of McCune, Hiaasen, Crum & Ferris, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Chancey & Chancey and Ross, Norman & Cory, Fort Lauderdale, for W. Herman Meeks, Jr., as Tax Collector of Broward County; John U. Lloyd, Fort Lauderdale, for Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, appellees.

THOMAS, Justice.

In determining this dispute, appropriately described by the appellees as a 'massive' attack on the 1961 tax roll of Broward County, we go first to the decree of the chancellor to ascertain what was decreed that vested jurisdiction in this court to review the case. We approve the description 'massive' because of the prodigious amount of work reflected by the complaint and the original and reply briefs of the appellants totaling 108 pages in which appear 106 citations of decisions, 25 references to the State and Federal Constitutions, 40 references to Laws of Florida from 1927 on, 21 references to rules of procedure in Florida and 5 to Federal Rules, 11 references to texts and encyclopedias, and 2 quotations from Fortune Magazine, not to mention the complaint itself which with its exhibits numbered 91 pages. Although 28 Assignments of Error were filed in the Chancery Court, there was an effort at simplification here when the presentation was confined to but seven topics.

In the decree the chancellor held point-blank that Chapters 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 137, 153, and Secs. 193.111, 193.25, 193,27, 193.28, 193.29, 193.30, 193.31, 193.32, 193.67, and 193.671, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., were constitutional thereby rejecting the appellants' contention that they were invalid because of the deletion at an election in 1944 of the clause in Sec. 5, Art. VIII, of the Constitution, F.S.A. before then existing: 'The powers, duties and compensation of such county commissioners shall be prescribed by law.'

The appellants represent that all questions presented in this case are ones of law and that 'the suit was predicated almost exclusively on constitutional grounds.' Following this it is stated in the brief that 'the underlying basic constitutional premise stems from the fact that at the General Election in 1944' there was omitted from the Constitution the clause we have already quoted.

As we understand, then, the prime problem is whether county commissioners were stripped of any power that was vested in them by the sections of the statute we have listed, or to put it in the language of the appellants as it appears in their first 'topic' by the deletion of the quoted clause there was withdrawn from the legislature the authority to enact any laws investing the county commissions, all of them, of course, with power. Therefore, reason the appellants, all the acts subsequent to the effective date of the constitutional amendment undertaking to clothe them with power are of no effect and, to draw upon our recollection of the oral argument, such commissions could do little more than meet for a sort of social occasion, without compensation, no doubt.

The magnitude of the attack is further emphasized by the number of sections of the statutes involved, 222, dealing with a variety of subjects, from the eradication of cattle ticks and rattlesnakes to the equalization of taxes and the financing of county governments.

Considerable space in appellants' brief is devoted to the construction of constitutional language, giving due credit for the principles the framers had in mind, indulging their knowledge of the English language in expressing those principles, the considering in pari materia of all parts bearing upon a particular subject, attributing to every sentence some effect, affording to plain language the meaning expressed, and other rules oft-repeated and not now disavowed. With the hope we will not be charged with facetiousness, we observe that we cannot undertake to construe language that is not there.

But it is difficult for us to see how an excursion in such field, made familiar by the passage of time and repeated appearances in litigation here would aid in the resolution of the problem we are facing. It does not involve an interpretation of phraseology used. On the contrary, it concerns rather obliquely an intention to be gleaned from language left out or, perhaps more accurately, from the act of leaving it out. In other words, could it be logically said that when the clause was eliminated on readoption of the article, the people meant that county commissions were not thereafter to have power, perform duties, or receive compensation or, to put it otherwise, that the legislature could not afterward invest them with authority, impose upon them duties or pay them for services. They would then become a kind of vegetable official--nominated, elected and impotent.

We heartily reiterate the view that sovereignty resides in the people and that they may modify and change the constitution as they wish so long as they do not run afoul of the Federal Constitution.

We cannot ignore the effect from a practical standpoint of a ruling in favor of appellants. Aside from the chaos that would result from a decision in their favor causing the collapse of the government of every county in the State we are sure there is sound reason in law not to embrace the view.

We think the appellees have a ready reply to the challenge when they remind us that the State, as distinguished from the Federal, Constitution is a limitation of the power inherent in the people, or as it was specified in Sun Insurance Office, Limited, v. Clay, Fla., 133 So.2d 735, '[S]tate constitutions * * * are limitations upon the power of the state legislature.' A further pronouncement in that case sheds light on our problem, 'It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that each department of government * * * has, without any express grant, the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that department * * *.' Pertinent to these comments we refer to Sec. 5, Art. IX of the Constitution expressly providing for authority on the part of the legislature to empower the counties to assess and impose taxes for county purposes and enjoining them to do so on the principles governing State taxation.

The whole method of securing tax money to finance operation of the counties from the time the amount needed is fixed until the equalization and settlement of challenges of individual owners is vicariously or directly under supervision and control of the county commissioners. And afterward the expenditure of the money gathered for myriads of county purposes is directed by the Boards of County Commissioners. It would, in our view, be unrealistic and illogical to hold that the county commissioners were but holders of a naked title to office simply because of the omission of the quoted portion of the original Sec. 2, Art. VIII. And we believe we can adopt that attitude without any violence to the remainder of the Constitution or any of the rules by which it is to be construed.

In their second 'topic' the appellants complain strenuously about a violation of the rights secured to them under the due process and equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions by reason of the manner in which the board of county commissioners conducted its business when sitting as a board of equalization...