Peters v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., Docket Nos. 71928
| Decision Date | 22 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | 71931,Docket Nos. 71928 |
| Citation | 377 N.W.2d 774,423 Mich. 594 |
| Parties | Patricia PETERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. Margaret E. MORRISH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET FLINT ENGINE PLANT, Defendant-Appellant. 423 Mich. 594, 377 N.W.2d 774 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman P.C. by Granner S. Ries, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Lacey & Jones by Stephen Jay Schwartz, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Conklin, Benham, McLeod, Ducey & Ottaway, P.C. by Martin L. Critchell, Detroit, for amicus curiae Mich. Self-Insurers' Ass'n.
Robert M. Crites, Flint, for plaintiff-appellee.
Munroe and Nobach, P.C., Cameron C. McComb, East Lansing, for defendant-appellant.
Conklin, Benham, McLeod, Ducey & Ottaway, P.C. by Martin L. Critchell, Office of the General Counsel of General Motors Corp. by John G. Rahie, Detroit, for defendant-appellant General Motors Corp.
The Court granted leave in these two cases in order to consider the legal standard to be applied in workers' compensation cases involving psychiatric disabilities related to employment. The Legislature has amended the relevant statute effective January 1, 1982. Because this Court today in Hurd v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Mich. 531, 377 N.W.2d 300 (1985), has construed this statute as applicable to "personal injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982," we decline to reexamine our interpretation of the earlier statute in Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc. (After Remand), 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978).
The plaintiff worked as a telephone operator for the defendant from November, 1967, until September, 1977. In September 1978, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging a nervous and emotional disorder, aggravation of hypertension, and an aggravation of an injury to the heart, circulatory system, and central nervous system.
Plaintiff was awarded benefits by the hearing referee in 1980, and, on October 29, 1982, the WCAB, citing Deziel, affirmed the award with a minor modification. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant's application for leave to appeal from the decision of the board. In an order dated September 19, 1984, this Court granted leave to appeal.
Plaintiff Morrish worked for General Motors from February, 1969, until January, 1978. Subsequently, Morrish filed a workers' compensation claim, alleging a psychiatric disability caused by incidents at work. The hearing referee, on February 4, 1980, determined that there was no causal nexus between plaintiff's disability and her employment. On November 19, 1982, the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision of the hearing referee and awarded benefits. The Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for leave to appeal on May 25, 1983. In an order dated September 19, 1984, this Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.
In Deziel, this Court considered the compensability of mental disorders under the existing statute, M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(1). In interpreting the statutory requirement that compensable injuries must arise "out of and in the course of" employment, we developed a
three-step analysis. This analysis required findings that
1) the claimant was disabled;
2) an injury in the form of a precipitating work-related event had occurred;
3) using a subjective causal nexus standard, the employment had combined with some internal weakness or disease to produce the disability.
The relevant statute was subsequently changed by the Legislature, 1980 P.A. 357; M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(2); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(2), effective January 1, 1982. 1
In light of the legislative action, we decline to reexamine our interpretation in Deziel as we are persuaded that it would be unwise to create potentially a third standard for the determination of the complex question of liability for alleged work-related mental disability. These cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
These two cases were consolidated to enable this Court to decide the appropriate legal standard to apply in workers' compensation cases involving claims of psychiatric disabilities arising "out of and in the course of" one's employment. This my colleagues have not done. Rather, the majority has stated that because the Legislature has amended the relevant statute effective January 1, 1982, they need not reexamine this Court's interpretation of the earlier statute in Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc. (After Remand), 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978).
This rationale completely disregards the fact that the rules set forth in Deziel (After Remand), will be applied to all mental disability cases with a "personal injury" date prior to January 1, 1982. This would include cases yet to be filed (providing compliance with the notice and claim provision set forth at 1969 P.A. 317; M.C.L. Sec. 418.381(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237 ), to cases filed but yet to be heard by the hearing referee, and, also, to those cases now pending wherein the issue was preserved for appeal. The majority, in its cursory opinion, has articulated no reasons why an amendment should preclude consideration of cases unaffected by that legislation. Additionally, and most importantly, by adhering to Deziel (After Remand), the majority ignores standards previously set forth by this Court regarding interpretation or application of workers' disability compensation statutes. 1 Thus, I respectfully dissent and write separately in an effort to interpret the Workers' Disability Compensation Act in a manner consistent with the intent of the legislation.
The plaintiff, born in 1941, began working for the defendant as a telephone operator in November, 1967, and continued as a telephone operator the entire ten years of her employment. Plaintiff last worked for the defendant on September 2, 1977, when she left her job complaining of dizziness and impaired vision. Following a respite of some three months, plaintiff attempted to return to work on December 3, 1977, but defendant terminated her employment at that time for excessive absences due, in part, to her high blood pressure condition.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a workers' compensation petition on September 26, 1978, alleging a work-related disability in the form of a nervous-emotional disorder, aggravation of hypertension, and aggravation of an injury to the heart and circulatory and central nervous systems.
At an administrative hearing, the plaintiff testified regarding various aspects of her job that she alleged contributed to her disability. Plaintiff testified about the numerous telephone calls she was required to handle and indicated that many of these phone calls were abusive. She also testified that her supervisors were very rigid regarding attendance, tardiness and the frequency of trips to the restroom. Plaintiff stated that it was necessary for her to leave her work station more often than her co-workers because of medical treatment she was undergoing for hypertension. She testified that it was necessary to request permission to go to the restroom and that records were kept of these visits.
Testimony was also heard from three medical experts, Dr. Bruce L. Danto (plaintiff's psychiatrist), Dr. Gordon R. Forrer (defendant's psychiatrist), and Dr. S.L. Schuchter (defendant's internist). At the conclusion of the proofs, the hearing referee entered an open award, finding that the plaintiff had suffered a compensable injury described as a "moderately severe anxiety reaction caused by work stress." The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the open award of benefits granted by the hearing referee, with the sole modification that interest on accrued compensation be paid at the rate of twelve percent per year, rather than the five percent rate ordered by the hearing referee. Defendant's subsequent application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Defendant thereafter filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court which was granted September 19, 1984.
The plaintiff, born in 1949, began working for the defendant in February of 1969. For the first few years she worked a teletype on the motor line, sorting pistons. In 1976, she fell down a stairway at work and was incapacitated for a few months with an alleged back injury. Following her return to work without restrictions in October of 1976, she performed various jobs.
Shortly after returning to work, the plaintiff was given a job in the sanitation The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for workers' disability compensation benefits alleging a psychiatric disability. The hearing referee, following lay and expert testimony, determined that the plaintiff's nervousness or mental disability was not caused by, aggravated by, or contributed to by her employment and that there was no causal nexus between her illness and her employment. The referee concluded that plaintiff's testimony on this issue was not credible.
department. Apparently, in this particular job, the plaintiff initially had problems with the foreman. In response to alleged threats and harassment by the foreman, the plaintiff became depressed and angry, drank considerably, and considered shooting herself or the foreman because of the alleged threats and [423 MICH 604] harassments. Her last day of work with General Motors was January 16, 1978.
In an order entered November 19, 1982, the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision of the hearing...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gardner v. Van Buren Public Schools, s. 95531
... ... Nos. 95531, 95532 and 95536 ... Calendar Nos ... Term, 1993 ... Supreme Court of Michigan ... Argued Nov. 3, 1993 ... Decided April ... Epps explained her telephone policy, that plaintiff had seemed to enjoy ... opened the classroom door before the bell rang. When plaintiff told him to close it, the ... due to mistreatment he received from students, co"-workers, and administrators ... \xC2" ... 531, 377 N.W.2d 300 (1985), and Peters v. Michigan Bell, 423 Mich. 594, 377 N.W.2d 774 ... ...
-
Corbett v. Plymouth Tp., Docket Nos. 97085
...the current test as understood by this Court with the rejected Deziel test (as digested by this Court in Peters v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 423 Mich. 594, 599, 377 N.W.2d 774 (1985) ). The employee must establish the (1) the claimant was disabled; (2) an injury in the form of a precipit......
-
Hurd v. Ford Motor Co.
...of this issue, and inasmuch as the merits of the instant case are not before this Court, we do not, as in Peters v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 423 Mich. 594, 377 N.W.2d 774 (1985), consolidated with Morrish v. General Motors Corp (released simultaneously with this opinion) remand to the W......
-
Iloyan v. General Motors Corp., Docket No. 118438
...in a significant manner. M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(2); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(2). And see Peters v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 423 Mich. 594, 623-624, 377 N.W.2d 774 (1985) (Riley, J., dissenting). The issue whether a plaintiff is disabled is a question of fact. Nezdropa v. Wayne Co., 152 Mich.......