Peters v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.
Decision Date | 05 March 1935 |
Citation | 259 N.W. 724,217 Wis. 481 |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Parties | PETERS v. MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC RY. & LIGHT CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; Daniel W. Sullivan, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Action brought by John Peters to recover damages from the Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Company for personal injuries sustained by him as the result of a collision with a street car, which he alleged was being negligently operated by the defendant. Upon a trial the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and entered judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.
Shaw, Muskat & Paulsen, of Milwaukee, for respondent.
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant in this action to recover damages for personal injury sustained by plaintiff on March 9, 1931, upon being struck by one of defendant's electric street cars, while he was walking across defendant's tracks at a street intersection. Viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, the evidence admitted finding the following facts. Plaintiff was struck by a south-bound car while he was walking westward on the north crosswalk. When he was about to step on to that crosswalk, at the east curb of the street, he had observed that the car was about a block to the north, and he planned to board the car at the northwest corner of the intersection. Upon walking a few steps from the east curb, he waited for several north-bound automobiles to pass and then continued westward. When he was in the center of the north-bound car track, about 7 3/4 feet east of the nearest rail of the south-bound car track, he again looked northward and saw that the approaching south-bound car was 50 feet away. He held up his hand as a signal to the motorman, and claims that the latter responded by nodding, which plaintiff interpreted as an affirmative answer. The motorman admitted seeing plaintiff's raised hand, but denies that he nodded in response. Plaintiff then, without looking again toward the approaching car, walked at a more rapid rate--but without running--the remaining distance of 7 3/4 feet to the east rail of the south-bound car track and some 4 or 5 feet beyond, when he was struck by the car. He testified that, on making his last observation as to the car, he did not make any estimate as to its speed, but that “it started to slow down and then started ahead real fast again, as though he was going to stop and did not.” On the other hand, other witnesses testified that the car approached at the rate of 12 to 15 miles per hour; that it was about 6 feet from the plaintiff the instant he stepped from safety to danger; that as soon as the motorman saw that plaintiff had started to walk faster, he had applied the emergency brakes when 10 to 15 feet from plaintiff, and did everything that he could do to stop the car; and that he brought it to a stop in 35 feet, at a point which was 20 feet beyond the place of collision.
[1] In answer to plaintiff's contention that the court erred in directing a verdict for defendant, the latter contends that, as it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to make an observation for the car at the last moment of opportunity before entering the zone of danger, there was no issue for the jury as to that fact, and that his failure in that respect constituted contributory negligence, as a matter of law, which defeated his right to recover. It is well established that Goldmann v. M. E. R. & L. Co., 123 Wis. 168, 170, 101 N. W. 384, 385;Meissner v. Southern Wis. R. Co., 160 Wis. 507, 509, 152 N. W. 291.
Although the collision involved in Goldmann v. M. E. R. & L. Co., supra, was betweena horse and a street car, the court then said, in relation to the duty of a foot traveler, that “the single step onto the track is negligence unless, before taking it, he assures himself, by observation, of its safety, if the view is unobstructed.” That is in accord with the established rule, which, in White v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 489, 493, 78 N. W. 585, 587, was stated as follows: See, also, Schliesleder v. M. E. R. & L. Co., 147 Wis. 668, 134 N. W. 144;Lotharius v. M. E. R. & L. Co., 157 Wis. 184, 188, 146 N. W. 1122;Schmidt v. M. E. R. & L. Co., 158 Wis. 505, 508, 149 N. W. 221.
[2] In the case at bar it is undisputed that, after last observing the car, when he was 7 3/4 feet from the nearest rail on which it was approaching, plaintiff walked that distance and entered the pathway of that car, which constituted a zone of danger, without again looking toward it to ascertain whether he could cross in safety ahead of it; that, at the moment he finally entered that zone of danger, he could readily have observed, by looking to the north, that the car was continuing to approach in such a manner as rendered it impossible to walk across its pathway in safety; and that, if he had so observed, he could readily have halted instantly, at every step which he was taking, instead of continuing to walk into that zone of danger. Traveling as he was on foot--and not running--with his movements under easy and immediate control, he had no such momentum to overcome, and no such time taking operation to perform, as make it impossible for a traveler by motor or horse drawn vehicle to stop instantly. The substantial differences in those respects between a traveler on foot and a traveler by vehicle materially affect the proposition as to what constitutes the last moment of opportunity before entering the zone of danger. Although two seconds before entering the zone of danger may be the last moment of opportunity for an automobile driver to take the required last observation, under such circumstances as existed in Dahinden v. M. E. R. & L. Co., 169 Wis. 1, 171 N. W. 669, it is obvious that no such length of time between the taking of that last observation and the entering of the zone of danger should be permitted to elapse in the case of a pedestrian required to exercise due care for his safety.
Consequently, in that respect, the decisions in such cases as Dahinden v. M. E. R. & L. Co., supra, and Grimm v. M. E. R. & L. Co., 138 Wis. 44, 119 N. W. 833, are inapplicable. On the other hand, squarely in point in respect to the conduct and resulting contributory negligence of the plaintiff in this case is the following statement in Lotharius v. M. E. R. & L. Co., supra, page 188 of 157 Wis., 146 N. W. 1122, 1124:
[3][4] Even if, as plaintiff claims, he interpreted an alleged nod by the motorman as an affirmative response to his raised hand signal of his desire to become a passenger, that did not prevent or excuse him from performing his absolute duty of looking just before stepping into the zone of danger toward the approaching car, and thus discovering its imminent approach and avoiding entering upon its pathway, as he could readily have done by exercising ordinary care. His own negligence in those respects is not excused because of any negligence on the part of the motorman. The latter's alleged nod did not entitle plaintiff to assume that the motorman was yielding the right of way to him, when upon a mere glance toward the car...
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