Peters v. Peters

• Decision Date: 20 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 21896,21896
• Citation: 443 S.E.2d 213,191 W. Va. 56
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Patricia L. PETERS, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Nanette PETERS, Executrix of the Estate of John Lewis Peters, deceased, as such Executrix, and Nanette Peters, in her individual right, Don Randall Peters, John Michael Peters, and the Whitesville State Bank, a corporation, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 213

443 S.E.2d 213

191 W.Va. 56

Patricia L. PETERS, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v.Nanette PETERS, Executrix of the Estate of John Lewis Peters, deceased, as suchExecutrix, and Nanette Peters, in her individual right, Don Randall Peters, John Michael Peters, and the Whitesville State Bank, a corporationDefendants-Respondents.

No. 21896.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1994.

Decided March 24, 1994.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Miller April 20, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1." 'A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770(1963).'Syl. pt. 1, Massey v. Jim Crockett Promotions, Inc., 184 W.Va. 441, 400 S.E.2d 876(1990).Syl. pt. 3, Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 W.Va. 407, 396 S.E.2d 174(1990)."Syl. pt. 1, Stemple v. Dobson, 184 W.Va. 317, 400 S.E.2d 561(1990).

2.Passbook presentation clauses are for the purpose of preventing payment to one who is not a depositor and may be waived by the bank.The clauses are not meant to protect a depositor against withdrawals by a co-depositor.To hold otherwise would place a heavy burden on a bank to mediate between co-depositors, one of the burdens that the legislature obviously sought to remove by enacting W.Va.Code 31A-4-33[1993].

3.Although the imposition of a duty that an affidavit be taken from all owners concerning any actions taken in regard to an account or certificate by another joint owner arguably might provide depositors with more security, there exists no West Virginia law requiring a bank to inquire of or inform one joint depositor about the action of another joint depositor.The purpose of W.Va.Code 31A-4-33[1993], which allows any joint depositor to withdraw funds from any joint account, is to relieve a financial institution from just such meddling.

4.The rules of a bank voluntarily adopted by it become a valid agreement or contract between the bank and its depositors when an account is opened and the passbook is issued or a certificate of deposit purchased pursuant to the printed rules set forth in the passbook or the certificates.However, mere boilerplate recitals of the obligation to present passbooks or surrender endorsed certificates at the time of withdrawal constitute nothing more than general statements of bank policy and as such create no substantive rights in depositors.Thus, when the terms relating to the requirement of presentation of a passbook or certificate are positioned or articulated in such a way as to make it evident that a Bank does not intend the terms to be binding, no contract exists as to those terms.

Peter A. Hendricks, Madison, for plaintiff-petitioner.

Francis M. Curnutte III, Smith, Curnutte & Hostler, Charleston, for defendants-respondents.

NEELY, Justice:

This appeal resulted from a suit brought by Patricia L. Peters("Patricia") who alleged that the Whitesville State Bank("the Bank") improperly paid out to the decedent John Lewis Peters("John"), Patricia's late husband, the proceeds of certain bank accounts held jointly by Patricia and John.On cross motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court of Boone County, relying on W.Va.Code 31A-4-33[1993], awarded judgment to the Bank, holding that the Bank was not liable to Patricia as a matter of law under the facts and circumstances presented.Patricia's appeal followed.

The undisputed facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: Patricia and John were married on 2 April 1973.They lived together in Boone County until 7 March 1989 when John died testate.Patricia and John had no children; John was survived by Nanette Peters, Don Randall Peters and John Michael Peters, his children from a previous marriage, and his widow Patricia.

On 17 April 1978, Patricia and John established joint checking and passbook savings accounts at the Bank.Each of these accounts was in the form of a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship.In connection with the establishment of the joint savings account, the Bank issued John and Patricia a passbook in the names of John L. or Patricia Peters to be used in making withdrawals from their account.Printed in the passbook were the rules and regulations governing the relation between the depositors and the Bank.At the beginning of the regulations appears the following:

"NO PAYMENTS WILL BE MADE EXCEPT UPON PRESENTATION OF THIS BOOK."

Rules Number 5 and 7, also printed in the passbook, are pertinent for our purposes:

5.Deposits and the interest thereon may be withdrawn by the depositor in person or by written order; but in either case, the passbook must be presented, so that such payments may be entered therein.

7.In all cases, a payment upon presentation of the deposit shall be a discharge to the bank for the amount so paid.

Both John and Patricia contributed funds in unknown proportions to the accounts, and both from time to time withdrew funds from the accounts.

During the course of their marriage, the parties purchased from the Bank two certificates of deposit ("CDs"), each in the initial principal face amount of $10,000 and each of which was held in the form of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.The CDs were made payable to John L. Peters or Patricia Peters; each certificate was negotiable; each matured certificate was payable at a determined future time; and each certificate provided that it was "payable on its return properly endorsed."Each of the certificates bears on its face the following:

This bank is prohibited by Federal Law from paying this deposit in whole or in part before maturity and from paying interest after maturity.

As the CDs matured, they were renewed as provided for in the certificates.At no time did the Bank act as a trustee for either Patricia or John or undertake to manage the affairs or act in a fiduciary capacity for either or both of the parties.

In June 1984, John, claiming that he had lost his passbook and certificates, withdrew funds in the checking account and the savings account; he also redeemed the two CDs then current, one of which had not yet matured and was thus subject to an early withdrawal penalty, to wit, a forfeiture of three months' interest in the amount of $456.30.Notwithstanding the aforementioned rules printed in the passbook and on the certificates, the Bank allowed John to withdraw the funds on deposit in both accounts without presentation of either the passbook or the certificates.

In September 1984, Patricia presented the CDs then current to the Bank and asked that the CDs be renewed.The Bank refused to do so, apprising her of her husband's withdrawal of the funds on deposit represented by the CDs.At no time before the presentation of the CDs by Patricia had the Bank alerted her to her husband's withdrawal of the funds.

On 3 April 1989, Patricia filed suit against Nanette Peters, Don Randall Peters, John Michael Peters¹ and the Bank on the grounds that John's actions were unlawful and that the Bank had acted unlawfully in permitting the withdrawal of funds and the cashing of the CDs.In her complaint, Patricia requested that the court require the Bank to reimburse her in the amount of $20,000 plus interest from the date it permitted John to liquidate the two certificates in question.In its answer, the Bank asserted that Patricia's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the Bank had acted lawfully and properly within the confines of its contractual relationship with John and Patricia.

On 3 May 1992, the court granted the Bank summary judgment, ruling that W.Va.Code 31A-4-33[1993] relieved the Bank of liability to Patricia because the Bank had paid the funds to Patricia's co-depositor.We think the court was correct in so holding.

I.

In Syllabus Point 3 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770(1963), we established the standard to be employed in determining whether summary judgment is proper:

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.

See alsoMassey v. Jim Crockett Promotions, Inc., 184 W.Va. 441, 400 S.E.2d 876(1990);Stemple v. Dobson, 184 W.Va. 317, 400 S.E.2d 561(1990);Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 W.Va. 407, 396 S.E.2d 174(1990).Summary judgment is not proper "unless the facts established show a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances."Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. at 171, 133 S.E.2d at 777.(Citations omitted).With this standard in mind, we turn to the errors assigned by Patricia on appeal.

II.

Patricia argues that the lower court erred as a matter of law or otherwise abused its discretion in granting the Bank summary judgment by disposing all issues in reliance upon W.Va.Code 31A-4-33[1993].W.Va.Code 31A-4-33[1993], otherwise known as the West Virginia Banking Statute, provides in pertinent part:

(b) When a deposit is made by any person in the name of such depositor and another or others and in form to be paid to any one of such depositors, or the survivor or survivors of them, such deposit, and any additions thereto, made by any of such person, upon the making thereof, shall become the property of such persons as joint tenants.All such deposits, together with all interest thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of the persons so named, and may be paid to any one of them during the lifetime of them, or to the survivor or survivors after the death of any of them.

(c) Payment to any joint...