Peters v. Ramsay, 40

• Decision Date: 07 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 40,40
• Citation: 327 A.2d 472,273 Md. 21
• Parties: Bonnie Lee PETERS v. Albert Alexander RAMSAY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 21

273 Md. 21

327 A.2d 472

Bonnie Lee PETERS v. Albert Alexander RAMSAY.

No. 40.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 7, 1974.

Henry L. Conway, Jr., Glen Burnie, for appellant.

C. MacNair Speed, Baltimore (Lord, Whip, Coughlan & Green, P.A., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

LEVINE, Judge.

This is a personal injury case arising out of a collision on May 12, 1971, between two automobiles being operated by the parties at the intersection of Ritchie Highway and Hahn Drive in Anne Arundel County. As a result of injuries suffered by appellant, she brought suit against appellee in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. There, the case was tried before a jury which, having found upon special issues that appellee was guilty of negligence proximately causing the collision, and that appellant was free of contributory negligence, rendered a verdict in favor of the latter in the sum of $7,000. ¹ Subsequently, the trial judge (Beardmore, J.) denied a motion for judgment n. o. v. and a new trial. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the judgment in favor of appellant was reversed upon the ground that she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, Ramsay v. Peters, 20 Md.App. 61, 314 A.2d 722 (1974). In light of the unusual physical circumstances which prevailed, novel questions arise under the motor vehicle code; hence, we granted certiorari.

The collision occurred while appellant was proceeding in a northerly direction on Ritchie Highway. Appellee, who had been southbound, was making a left turn to proceed easterly on Hahn Drive which intersects Ritchie Highway at a right angle on the east side only. The cars collided at a point established by a state trooper, who investigated the accident, as being in what we shall identify for convenience as the right of three northbound lanes in Ritchie Highway, approximately midway between an imaginary extension of the north and south sides of Hahn Drive.

Ritchie Highway is a divided highway with a grass median strip separating the northbound and southbound lanes. The center and left northbound lanes are separated from each other by an interrupted white line. There are also left turn lanes at the Hahn Drive intersection for both northbound and southbound traffic on Ritchie Highway. Between intersections, the right lane is separated from the center lane by a solid white line. At the time of this accident, the right lane on Ritchie Highway began at the entrance to a medical center located in the southeast quadrant of the Hahn Drive intersection and extended northward to the intersection at State Route 648, an overall distance of some 800 feet. All three northbound lanes were similar to each other in width, composition and appearance. Apparently, Ritchie Highway initially had been constructed as a predominantly four-lane divided highway, and remained that way for much of its length, although not in this vicinity, on the day of the accident. Except to the extent that the solid white line separating the right lane from the center lane can be so regarded, there were no signs or devices restricting the use of the right lane. There were curbs in some parts of the east side of Ritchie Highway, just above and below Hahn Drive.

As appellant was proceeding in a notherly direction on Ritchie Highway, she reached the entrance to the medical center, the point at which the northbound segment of Ritchie Highway widened from two to three lanes. There, she observed that traffic in both the left lane and what had become the center lane was backed up to that point from Route 648. Since the righthand lane was virtually unoccupied, she moved into it prior to reaching Hahn Drive, not for the purpose of turning right at that intersection, but with the intention of entering a service station approximately 230 feet north of Hahn Drive.

According to appellant, the right lane, whih abutted an assortment of commercial establishments in that area, was ordinarily used by traffic to make a right turn. The trooper confirmed that it was 'used by the public in general for right turns.' Appellant explained that, based on her prior experience in that vicinity, it was necessary to enter the right lane in advance if one was preparing to make a righthand turn, because to do so directly from the center lane would subject that person to the danger of being struck by other vehicles which might already have occupied the right lane.

As appellee reached the intersection, proceeding in a southerly direction, he stopped to make his left turn. At that point, the northbound traffic, which was backed up, had allowed sufficient room for vehicles wishing to turn easterly into Hahn Drive. The lead driver in the center or left northbound lane motioned to appellee as if to wave him on. Upon entering the right lane, he struck appellant's car on its left side, while, as we have indicated, it was approximately midway through the intersection.

In essence, the primary contention of appellee at every stage of these proceedings has been that appellant is barred from recovery as a matter of law because her automobile was positioned at a point where it should not have been under the circumstances which then obtained. Indeed, even here he clings to the notion, which he advanced at the prior levels, that appellant was actually on an 'improved' berm or shoulder. Appellant, of course, has consistently maintained that she was properly in the right lane, and that the failure of appellee to yield the right of way was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The focal point for these conflicting claims-as submitted to the jury and at both appellate levels-has been the following provisions of the motor vehicle laws, Md. Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66 1/2:

§ 1-132:

'Highway means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way or thoroughfare of any kind used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel, whether actually dedicated to the public and accepted by the proper authorities or otherwise.'

§ 1-177:

'Roadway means that portion of a highway improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder. If a highway includes two or more separate roadways the term 'roadway' as used herein refers to any such roadway separately but not to all such roadways collectively.' (emphasis added).

§ 11-304:

'(a) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only under the following conditions, and in all cases subject to the requirements of subsection (b):

'(b) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon the right only under conditions permitting this movement in safety. In no event shall this movement be made by driving off the pavement or main traveled portion of the roadway.' (emphasis added).

§ 11-402:

'(a) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.'

The ultimate question upon which this case turns, as the Court of Special Appeals recognized, is whether appellant, at the point of impact, was on the 'main traveled portion of the roadway' within the meaning of § 11-304(b). In effect, judging by the tenor of its jury instructions and its decision in denying appellee a new trial and judgment n. o. v., the trial court concluded that this was a question for the jury. The Court of Special Appeals held, correctly, of course, that this called for an interpretation of a statute, which is a function of the court, not the jury. Falcone v. Palmer Ford, 242 Md. 487, 493-494, 219 A.2d 808 (1966); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Vogelsang v. Sehlhorst,194 Md. 413, 419, 71 A.2d 295 (1950); see Hunt v....