Peters v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 21 December 1993
• Citation: 636 A.2d 926
• Parties: Albert F. PETERS, Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. Thomas P. ROBINSON, Thomas P. Robinson, Jr., and Robert H. Robinson, Respondents Below, Appellees. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 926

636 A.2d 926

Albert F. PETERS, Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. Thomas P. ROBINSON, Thomas P. Robinson, Jr., and Robert H Robinson, Respondents Below, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Dec. 21, 1993.

Decided: Jan. 27, 1994.

Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery. AFFIRMED.

Stephen P. Ellis (argued), and Lynn O'Donnell of Sergovic & Ellis, P.A., Georgetown, for appellant.

Eric C. Howard of Wilson, Halbrook & Bayard, Georgetown, for appellees.

Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, and HOLLAND, JJ.

HOLLAND, Justice:

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the Court of Chancery which partitioned certain real property in kind. The petitioner-appellant, Albert F. Peters ("Peters"), was devised a life estate in an undivided one-third interest in the real property, as a tenant in common with the respondent-appellee, Thomas P. Robinson, Sr. ("Thomas, Sr."), and Robert H. Robinson ("Robert"), who is not a party in this appeal. The respondent-appellee, Thomas P. Robinson, Jr. ("Thomas, Jr."), was devised a fee simple vested remainder interest in an undivided one-third share upon Peters' death. ¹

In this appeal, Peters acknowledges that the Court of Chancery properly partitioned the property in kind into three parts. Peters contends, however, that the Court of Chancery erred by not ordering the one-third share of the real property to which his life estate attached to be either sold or partitioned further. The Court of Chancery held that the owner of a life estate may not compel a partition sale against the holder of a remainder interest. We have concluded that the judgment of the Court of Chancery should be affirmed.

Facts

In 1958, Margaret Robinson Peters ("Margaret") and her two brothers, Thomas, Sr. and Robert, inherited certain real property from their uncle, John Houston. That property was an approximately 410 acre farm north of Lewes, in Sussex County, Delaware (the "Houston Farm"). The three siblings owned the Houston Farm as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-third interest in fee simple.

In 1978, Margaret married Peters. Margaret died in 1986. She specifically devised her interest in the Houston Farm as follows:

Should I predecease my husband, I bequeath to him a life estate in all of my right, title and interest in the property known as the "John Houston Farm" on the east side of Delaware Route 1, north of Lewes, Delaware. It is my intention by this life estate that he have the full usage of my share of this property and/or the rents or profits accruing therefrom. At the death of my husband, or should my husband predecease me, I leave this property absolutely and in fee to Thomas Peter Robinson, Jr., my nephew.

Thus, following Margaret's death, the ownership of the Houston Farm was as follows: Robert, an undivided one-third tenancy in common fee simple interest; Thomas, Sr., an undivided one-third tenancy in common fee simple interest; and an undivided one-third tenancy in common interest in which Peters owned a life estate and Thomas, Jr. owned a vested remainder in fee simple.

Peters filed a Petition for Partition of the Houston Farm. He was apparently dissatisfied with the income he was receiving from the farm. Peters' petition alleged that the parties were unable to agree upon a division of the property. The petition requested the Court of Chancery to order a sale of the Houston Farm and to apportion the proceeds between Peters, Thomas, Sr., Thomas, Jr., and Robert.

The Court of Chancery held a hearing on June 23, 1992. The uncontroverted testimony in the record reflects that by the time of the hearing the parties had agreed that the Houston Farm could be physically divided into three parts of equal value. Peters' trial attorney made the following remarks in his opening statement:

The property which the Court is considering in this case is a 409 acre farm.... [T]he scales certainly tip in favor of an allocation in kind of a 1/3 portion to the respondent Robert Robinson and the respondent Thomas P. Robinson [Sr.]. In fact, the parties have already agreed to allocate a 1/3 portion to Robert Robinson. And Thomas Robinson [Sr.] has also requested a 1/3 portion to be allocated to him, which is acceptable to the petitioner.

According to Peters' trial attorney, the purpose of the Chancery hearing was limited:

The real issue for the Court to determine in this case is what happens to the 1/3 allocated to the petitioner, Albert Peters and Thomas Robinson, Jr., who is--who holds the remainder interest after Albert Peters.

. . . . .

The respondents insist that the allocation to Albert Peters require him to accept a life interest in that 1/3 portion on the front left, with the remainder interest to Thomas, Jr.

The record reflects that Thomas, Sr. and Thomas, Jr. argued to the Court of Chancery that after the Houston Farm was divided into three parts pursuant to the parties' agreement, Peters' life interest and Thomas, Jr.'s remainder interest should simply attach to that portion of the property assigned to them. Peters opposed that in kind allocation. Instead, Peters' attorney stated that, following the hearing, he wanted the Court of Chancery to partition the Houston Farm in the following manner:

[W]e will request that the Court in fact divide in kind a 1/3 portion requested by Robert, the 1/3 portion requested by Thomas Robinson, Sr., and sell the 1/3 portion allocated to the petitioner and Thomas Robinson, Jr.

At the hearing, Peters' testimony confirmed the representations of his attorney. Peters testified that the parties had agreed upon a physical division of the Houston Farm to eliminate the co-tenancy, whereby Robert would receive one-third in fee and Thomas, Sr. would receive one-third in fee. However, Peters testified that with respect to the disposition of the remaining one-third, the parties disagreed. He wanted that parcel to be sold and the proceeds divided between himself and Thomas, Jr. Alternatively, Peters requested that the remaining one-third share of the Houston Farm be physically divided so that a portion of that share was conveyed to him in fee and a portion was conveyed to Thomas, Jr. in fee.

The Court of Chancery concluded that the Houston Farm should be partitioned in kind pursuant to the parties' agreement. However, the Court of Chancery held that Peters was not entitled to compel the elimination of Thomas, Jr.'s remainder interest by a partition proceeding. Accordingly, the final partition decree divided the Houston Farm into three parts, but did not eliminate the successive ownership interest of Thomas, Jr. by either ordering a sale or a further partition in kind.

Partition Proceedings

Origin and Purpose

Partition was an equitable remedy under English law and retains that character under Delaware law. 25 Del.C. § 751. Partition developed originally under the English common law as a remedy to co-parceners. See generally 4A Powell, The Law of Real Property p 607 (Rohan, ed. 1993). The purpose of partition was to permit co-tenants to sever concurrent undivided interests in the same real property. Id. As the common law evolved, the equitable remedy of partition was extended to joint tenants and tenants in common. Id.

Delaware, like most states, has enacted a partition statute. 25 Del.C. § 701 et seq. See 4 Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 1822, at 277 (1979). The Delaware partition statute is substantially a codification of the common law:

[T]he ancient jurisdiction of the court of chancery to order partition between tenants in common is not affected by the statute law of the state, where, in adjudicating between parties holding joint interests in law, it will promote the several interests of the litigants that partition should be made.

Bradford v. Robinson, Del.Err. & App., 30 A. 670, 672 (1884) (emphasis added).

Partition Proceedings

Concurrent Interests Severed

Partition means a severance of interests which are concurrent. 1 American Law of Property § 4.96 (1952). Such types of contemporaneous co-ownerships are usually either joint tenancies or tenancies in common. Id. The purpose of a partition proceeding is to eliminate a present concurrent interest in the same property so that each owner may enjoy and possess his or her interest in severalty. Dixon v. Dixon, 189 Neb. 212, 202 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1972). See Pleasanton v. Bell, Del.Supr., 1 Del.Cas. 511 (1814).

The Delaware partition statute recognizes the common law equitable right to sever concurrent ownership interests in the same real property. 25 Del.C. § 721(a). See Knight v. Knight, Del.Ch., 89 A. 595 (1914). The Delaware statute also recognizes that partition may be had notwithstanding the fact that the concurrent ownership interest held "by any parcener, joint tenant or tenant in common may be for less estate than a fee." 25 Del.C. § 721(c). Accordingly, Peters had standing to petition for partition of the Houston Farm in order to sever the concurrent ownership of his life interest from the fee simple interests owned by Robert and Thomas, Sr.

The Delaware partition statute recognizes the unique nature of real property. Consequently, the Delaware statute continues the common law preference for a physical, in kind, division of the real property that makes "a just and fair partition thereof amongst the parties." Id. § 724. The Delaware statutory scheme expressly provides that an order to sell the real property becomes appropriate only after the Court of Chancery determines that "a partition of the premises would be detrimental to the interests of the parties entitled." Id.

In this case, the parties waived the appointment of commissioners and agreed that the Houston Farm could be equitably divided in kind into three parts of equal value. See id. The Court of Chancery properly granted Peters' petition for partition by ordering the Houston Farm to be divided in kind. Id. § 721. Concurrent ownership of the Houston Farm was eliminated: Peters...