Peters v. Woodbury Cnty.
Decision Date | 25 October 2013 |
Docket Number | No. C 12–4070–MWB.,C 12–4070–MWB. |
Citation | 979 F.Supp.2d 901 |
Parties | Shannon M. PETERS, Plaintiff, v. WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA; Glenn J. Parrett, Individually and as Sheriff of Woodbury County, Iowa; and Michelle Risdal, Lee Blanchard, Jonathan Hatfield, and Carlos Lucero, Individually and as Deputy Sheriffs/Jailers of Woodbury County, Iowa, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
979 F.Supp.2d 901
Shannon M. PETERS, Plaintiff,
v.
WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA; Glenn J. Parrett, Individually and as Sheriff of Woodbury County, Iowa; and Michelle Risdal, Lee Blanchard, Jonathan Hatfield, and Carlos Lucero, Individually and as Deputy Sheriffs/Jailers of Woodbury County, Iowa, Defendants.
No. C 12–4070–MWB.
United States District Court,
N.D. Iowa,
Western Division.
Oct. 25, 2013.
[979 F.Supp.2d 908]
David A. O'Brien, Willey, O'Brien, LC, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.
Timothy C. Boller, Thomas C. Verhulst, Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher, PC, Waterloo, IA, John C. Gray, Heidman Law Firm, LLP, Sioux City, IA, for Defendants.
MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS |
I. |
INTRODUCTION |
910 |
A. |
Factual Background For Summary Judgment |
910 |
1. |
Peters's arrest and booking |
911 |
2. |
Events upon arrival at the holding cell |
912 |
3. |
Escalation of the incident in the holding cell |
912 |
4. |
Subsequent events |
913 |
B. |
Factual Background For The Motion To Exclude Expert Evidence |
914 |
C. |
Procedural Background |
916 |
1. |
Peters's claims |
916 |
2. |
The pending motions |
917 |
|
||
II. |
PETERS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORT |
917 |
A. |
Arguments Of The Parties |
918 |
B. |
Analysis |
918 |
1. |
Applicable standards |
918 |
2. |
Application of the standards |
920 |
a. |
Peters's “reliability” challenge |
920 |
b. |
Peters's “relevancy” challenge |
921 |
C. |
Summary |
925 |
|
||
III. |
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT |
925 |
A. |
Summary Judgment Standards |
926 |
B. |
Challenges Based On Qualified Immunity |
926 |
1. |
Standards for qualified immunity |
926 |
2. |
The “violation of privacy rights” claim |
929 |
a. |
Source of the right |
930 |
i. |
Arguments of the parties |
930 |
ii. |
Analysis |
930 |
b. |
Nature of the conduct |
931 |
i. |
Arguments of the parties |
931 |
ii. |
Analysis |
932 |
iii. |
Summary |
940 |
c. |
Violation of the right |
940 |
i. |
Arguments of the parties |
940 |
ii. |
Analysis |
941 |
iii. |
Summary |
945 |
d. |
“Clearly established” right |
945 |
i. |
Arguments of the parties |
945 |
ii. |
Analysis |
946 |
e. |
Summary |
948 |
3. |
The “excessive force” claim |
948 |
a. |
Source of the right |
948 |
b. |
Violation of the right |
949 |
i. |
Arguments of the parties |
949 |
ii. |
Analysis |
950 |
iii. |
Summary |
962 |
c. |
“Clearly established” right |
963 |
i. |
Arguments of the parties |
963 |
ii. |
Analysis |
963 |
d. |
Summary |
964 |
4. |
The “First Amendment retaliation” claim |
964 |
a. |
Arguments of the parties |
965 |
b. |
Analysis |
966 |
c. |
Summary |
970 |
C. |
Challenges To Claims Based On The Iowa Constitution |
971 |
1. |
Arguments of the parties |
971 |
2. |
Analysis |
971 |
D. |
Challenges To “Monell Liability” |
971 |
1. |
Arguments of the parties |
972 |
2. |
Analysis |
972 |
|
||
IV. |
CONCLUSION |
973 |
[979 F.Supp.2d 909]
Did male and female county jail officers cross a constitutional line when they forcibly removed clothing from a female arrested for a misdemeanor offense who refused to answer “suicide” questions during booking and refused to change into a jail uniform in front of a female officer? In this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the female arrestee asserts that the defendant jail officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in an unconstitutional
[979 F.Supp.2d 910]
manner, used “excessive force” in doing so, and did so in retaliation for her vociferous complaints about the order to strip in front of a female officer, all in violation of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. She also contends that the defendant county and the defendant former county sheriff are subject to “Monell liability” for the jail officers' constitutional torts. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims, primarily on the ground that the defendant jail officers are entitled to qualified immunity, but also on the ground that there is no cause of action for a violation of rights under the Iowa Constitution and that there is no basis for “Monell liability” of the county and the former county sheriff. As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff seeks to exclude the testimony and report of the defendants' expert, because she argues that the expert has applied the wrong legal standard to her “excessive force” claim and has opined on legal conclusions that are within the province of the court. Although I find that the pending motions present some knotty issues, I conclude that the appropriate disposition of these motions is clear.
My determination of what facts are actually disputed in this case—and then whether those disputes are genuine—has been complicated by the parties' submissions and, sometimes, by the lack thereof. In the first instance, the factual background stated here is drawn primarily from the defendants' Joint Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Their Motions For Summary Judgment (docket no. 42–1) and the plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Joint Statement Of Undisputed Facts In Support Of Their Motions For Summary Judgment (docket no. 53–3). The plaintiff did not submit a statement of additional material facts that she contends preclude summary judgment, however, as required by N.D. IA. L.R. 56(b)(3). Even so, the parties apparently agree that the defendants' Joint Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts and the plaintiff's Response are not exhaustive of factual issues material to the defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment, because both the defendants and the plaintiff repeatedly recite and rely on additional facts in their briefs, both with and without adequate citations to the parties' appendices or other portions of the record. A further problem here is that the plaintiff has failed to respond to several of the defendants' individual statements of material facts by expressly admitting or denying them, and she has sometimes made what appear to be denials without any references or only imprecise references to parts of the record supporting her refusal to admit the stated facts, contrary to the requirements of N.D. IA. L.R. 56(b). Thus, some of the facts are deemed undisputed because of the plaintiff's failure to respond appropriately to the defendants' pertinent statements of undisputed facts. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 56(b). 1
[979 F.Supp.2d 911]
Thus, unless otherwise indicated, the facts stated below are from the defendants' Joint Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts, and the plaintiff has expressly admitted them.
1. Peters's arrest and bookingSioux City police officers arrested plaintiff Shannon Peters on May 27, 2012, for violation of a no contact order. The defendants elsewhere assert, and Peters does not dispute, that she was arrested after police stopped a speeding car, in which Peters's boyfriend, against whom she had obtained a no contact order, was the driver and Peters was a passenger. Peters elsewhere asserts, and told the Defendant Officers at the time of her booking, that she believed that the no contact order had been dropped, but she now admits that she was mistaken. Peters was taken to the Woodbury County Jail, and, upon arrival there, she was taken to the booking counter, where defendant Officer Michelle Risdal and defendant Officer Jon Hatfield were already present. Peters was crying while she was at the counter.2 At the time that she arrived at the jail, Peters was wearing a swimsuit under her shirt and sweat pants.
Citing a video of Peters's booking, the defendants contend that, while at the booking counter, after several minutes of sobbing, Peters suddenly became agitated and upset and repeatedly shouted, “This is bullshit” at the officers, then refused to answer all of the booking questions, including the medical and “suicide” questions. Peters denies these allegations, citing the same video. Sergeant Lee Blanchard came into the booking area and directed the officers to terminate the booking process prior to completion.3 Officer Risdal, the only female officer present, escorted Peters to a holding cell, and two male officers, Officer Hatfield and Sergeant Blanchard, followed.
[979 F.Supp.2d 912]
2. Events upon arrival at the holding cell
Officer Risdal and Peters entered a holding cell, but Officer Hatfield remained outside in the hallway. The parties agree that Sergeant Blanchard was also in the hallway, but dispute whether he could see into the holding cell and whether or not there was “screaming” at that point. The defendants assert that Sergeant Blanchard went to the doorway of the cell and asked Officer Risdal if Peters had answered the “suicide” questions, and Officer Risdal then repeated three “suicide” questions. The defendants assert that Peters refused to answer and, instead, turned to Officer Risdal and yelled, “Why the fuck would I wanna hurt myself!” Peters admits only that she responded, “Why the fuck would I want to hurt myself,” but denies the rest of these facts, apparently including the defendants' allegation of the question that prompted this response. Unfortunately, the video of the hallway to the holding cells, on which both parties in part rely, does not show the inside of the holding cell in which Peters was placed, so that it does not allow me to determine beyond dispute precisely what happened, and the audio on the recording does not allow me to determine beyond dispute precisely what was said during this exchange.
In the holding cell, Officer Risdal explained to Peters that Peters would have to take off her swimsuit. In her deposition, Officer Risdal explained that she directed Peters to do so, because the swimsuit had strings on it that Peters could use to harm herself. At this point, Sergeant Blanchard left the cell and joined Officer Hatfield in the hallway, so that the only officer in the cell with Peters was a female officer, Officer Risdal. Peters refused to remove her clothing.4
3. Escalation of the incident in the holding cellPeters continued to scream at Officer Risdal and to refuse to remove her clothing, and when Sergeant Blanchard looked back into the cell, he saw Peters standing facing Officer Risdal in what he considered an aggressive manner. 5 Sergeant Blanchard and Officer Hatfield then reentered the cell,...
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