Peterson, In re

• Decision Date: 01 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-5118,89-5118
• Citation: 897 F.2d 935
• Parties: , 22 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1147, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,253 In re Melvin E. PETERSON, Debtor. Phillip D. ARMSTRONG, Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of Melvin E. Peterson, Appellant, v. Melvin E. PETERSON, Debtor and his Personal Representative Bruce Peterson and Marshall Peterson, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 935

897 F.2d 935

58 USLW 2559, 22 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1147,

Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,253

In re Melvin E. PETERSON, Debtor Phillip D. ARMSTRONG, Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of Melvin E. Peterson, Appellant, v. Melvin E. PETERSON, Debtor and his Personal Representative Bruce Peterson and Marshall Peterson, Appellees.

No. 89-5118.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 11, 1989.

Decided March 1, 1990.

Phillip D. Armstrong, Minot, N.D., for appellant.

Michael Ward, Minot, N.D., for appellees.

Before McMILLIAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and SNEED, Senior Circuit Judge. ^*

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Phillip Armstrong (trustee) appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court ¹ for the District of North Dakota finding that the bankruptcy homestead exemption of debtor Melvin Peterson survived his death and could be distributed to his heirs. We affirm.

I.

Peterson filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) on December 9, 1985. Peterson claimed a homestead exemption when he filed the petition. The trustee concedes that at the time of filing, Peterson was entitled to and properly claimed a homestead exemption. At the time he filed his petition, Peterson had five children, one of whom was a dependent. ² Peterson died on August 20, 1986, while his case was still pending.

In April 1988, the trustee moved for a declaratory judgment that the homestead exemption lapsed when Peterson died before his bankruptcy case closed without leaving a surviving spouse or a dependent child. On October 24, 1988, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of trustee, holding that under North Dakota law the homestead exemption continues after the claimant dies only if there is a surviving spouse or a dependent child. The court ruled that Peterson's homestead exemption was relinquished when he died during the pendency of his bankruptcy without leaving a spouse or a dependent child, and the property reverted to the bankruptcy estate.

Peterson's estate appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the district court. On January 17, 1989, the district court reversed the bankruptcy judge, ruling that Bankruptcy Rule 1016, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its legislative history established that the exemptions of a debtor are preserved even if the debtor dies prior to the closing of the case. See In re Peterson, No. A4-88-272, slip op. at 4 (D.N.D. January 17, 1989). Trustee's motion for reconsideration was denied. This appeal followed.

II.

A brief review of how the homestead exemption fits into the overall bankruptcy scheme, as well as the interplay between federal and state law, will enable this court to more effectively address the issue raised by the trustee. At the time the debtor files a Chapter 7 petition, a bankruptcy estate is created which is comprised of all of the debtor's legal and equitable interests in property, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541(a)(1) (1988). See In re Fandrich, 63 B.R. 250, 251 (Bankr.D.N.D.1986) (Fandrich ); In re Sivley, 14 B.R. 905, 909-910, 5 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d (MB) 565, 572 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1981). Section 541(a)(1) is a broad provision which encompasses all apparent interests of the debtor. In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1270-71 (8th Cir.1984). Code section 522(b)(2)(A) permits debtors to exempt from the bankruptcy estate any property that is exempt under federal, state, or local law applicable on the date of filing the petition. ³ 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). Debtors may claim exemptions by filing a list of exempt property at the time the petition is filed. Unless the trustee or any creditor objects within a specified time period, the property claimed is exempt. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(l ) (1988). ⁴

A homestead exemption is one of the exemptions available under North Dakota law. The North Dakota Constitution mandates that laws be established which exempt a homestead from forced sale. N.D.Const. art. XI, Sec. 22 (1981). N.D.Cent.Code Sec. 28-22-02 accords the head of family certain absolute exemptions from attachment, levy and sale, among them being "the homestead as created, defined, and limited by law." N.D.Cent.Code Sec. 28-22-02(7) (Supp.1989). The amount of real property which may be taken as a homestead exemption is set forth at N.D.Cent.Code Sec. 47-18-01 (Supp.1989), which defines the homestead as consisting "of the land upon which the claimant resides, and the dwelling house on that land in which the homestead claimant resides, with all its appurtenances, and all other improvements on the land, the total not to exceed eighty thousand dollars in value, over and above liens or encumbrances or both." ⁵ See generally Fandrich, 63 B.R. at 252.

III.

With this overview in mind, we turn to the issue raised by trustee. For reversal, trustee argues that the homestead exemption lapsed and reverted to the bankruptcy estate when Peterson died without leaving a spouse or dependent children while his bankruptcy case was still open. Because entitlement to a bankruptcy exemption is a question of law, we review the judgment of the district court de novo. In re Hutton, 893 F.2d 1010, 1011-1012 (8th Cir.1990); Stevens v. Pike County Bank, 829 F.2d 693, 695 (8th Cir.1987).

We do not agree with Trustee's contention that Peterson's death cause his exemption to lapse. "It is hornbook bankruptcy law that a debtor's exemptions are determined as of the time of the filing of his petition." In re Friedman, 38 B.R. 275, 276 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984) (Friedman ). We join these courts finding that bankruptcy exemptions are fixed on the date of filing. See White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 313, 45 S.Ct. 103, 104, 69 L.Ed. 301 (1924); Mansell v. Carroll, 379 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir.1967).

By holding that exemptions are fixed on the date of filing, we focus only on the law and facts as they exist on the date of filing the petition. There is no doubt that the law as it exists on the date of filing determines a debtor's claimed exemption. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(A), which allows a debtor to claim state-created exemptions, explicitly provides that the state law applicable on the date the petition is filed governs the exemptions which may be taken. The propriety of limiting our factual investigation to those facts existing on the date of filing is less self-evident. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, we hold today that only the facts existing on the date of filing are relevant to determining whether a debtor qualifies for a claimed exemption.

Our decision to consider only the facts and circumstances as they exist on the date of filing is supported by precedent, Bankruptcy Rule 1016, logic, and policy considerations. Although no court in this circuit has addressed the issue of which facts should be examined to determine whether a debtor qualifies for a claimed exemption, several other courts have reached the same conclusion we reach today. In Friedman, 38 B.R. at 276-77, the bankruptcy court rejected an argument similar to the one made by the trustee in this case. The court held that the $7500 federal homestead exemption claimed by the husband on the date of filing survived his death and could be claimed by his wife in addition to her own homestead exemption. The court reasoned that the husband's entitlement to the homestead exemption vested at the time the petition was filed and his subsequent death did not destroy the claimed exemption. Id. at 276.

Similarly, in In re Rivera, 5 B.R. 313, 315-16 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1980), the bankruptcy court denied the debtor a homestead exemption because he was unmarried ⁶ and did not qualify for head of family status under Florida law at the time he filed his petition, even though his child was born three days after the bankruptcy petition was filed. The court held that "the right to claim exemptions by a Debtor is governed by the facts and governing circumstances which existed on the date the petition was filed and not by any changes which may have occurred thereafter." Id. at 315 (emphasis added). Because the debtor was unmarried and childless at the time of filing, the court determined that the debtor was not entitled to a homestead exemption.

Several courts have extended the Rivera rule to hold that trustees or creditors were not entitled to the proceeds of exempt property which the debtor sold after filing, so long as the debtor was entitled to the exemption on the date of filing. See, e.g., In re Patterson, 64 B.R. 120, 123 (W.D.Wis.1986) ("[o]nce a debtor's available exemptions are determined, a debtor generally will not lose the available exemptions because of the subsequent sale of the exempt assets"); In re Werner, 79 B.R. 819, 820 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1986) (sale of exempt farm property two days after filing of petition does not alter exempt status because "debtors are entitled to the exemptions they had available on the date of filing their bankruptcy petition"); In re Brzezinski, 65 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1985) (sale of exempt farm property at auction 17 days after filing does not destroy exemption because "[e]xemption rights are determined based on the circumstances present at the time of filing ... [c]hanges occurring after filing are not relevant").

Secondly, Bankruptcy Rule 1016 (1988) provides in relevant part that "[d]eath or insanity of the debtor shall not abate a liquidation case under Chapter 7 of the Code. In such event, the estate shall be administered and the case concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though the death or insanity had not occurred." Chief Judge Conmy noted that this rule does not address the specific issue raised in this case, but found the rule helpful. See In re Peterson, No. A4-88-272, slip op. at 2. We agree. Rule 1016 states that where possible, death of the debtor should not influence the administration or resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding. By determining exemptions based on the facts as they exist on the date of filing, Rule 1016's dictate that a...