Peterson v. Buxton
| Decision Date | 29 March 1967 |
| Citation | 108 N.H. 77,227 A.2d 779 |
| Parties | Philip E. PETERSON v. Sandra Peterson BUXTON. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gerald F. Giles, Portsmouth, for plaintiff.
Shaw & Eldredge, Carleton Eldredge, Exeter, for defendant.
The defendant contends that there were no such changes in circumstances between the original decree and the order of modification as to justify a reduction in the order for payments into the savings account and that the Trial Court abused his discretion.
As the court said in Guggenheimer v. Guggenheimer, 99 N.H. 399, 403, 112 A.2d 61, 64: 'The Court has wide discretion in determining the amount that a father shall be required to contribute for the support of his family'. This rule applies to modifications as well as to the original award. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 90 N.H. 117, 119, 106 A.2d 187.
A modification will be set aside only if it clearly appears that there was an abuse of judicial discretion. Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 548, 176 A.2d 708.
Defendant relies heavily on those parts of the decision in Fortuna which relate to the need for a substantial change in circumstances in the financial condition or needs of the parties to justify a modification and which state that the support of another woman to whom the former husband was not married, together with her child and their illegitimate child, did not in that case constitute such a change in circumstances as would itself warrant a modification.
In this case, both parties have remarried and the plaintiff is now supporting a wife and child of that marriage. While the remarriage of either or both parties does not as a matter of law require a modification of a decree for the support of children (Payette v. Payette, 85 N.H. 297, 298, 157 A. 531; Eaton v. Eaton, 90 N.H. 4, 3 A.2d 832), these facts, together with the duty of the plaintiff to support the legitimate child of his second marriage, are circumstances which may be considered by the Trial Justice. This is a different Situation than existed in Fortuna, and while the plaintiff's second wife can be said to have entered into the marriage at her own risk, the innocent child of that marriage is not in such a position.
There was evidence that plaintiff and his second family live with his mother on a dairy farm which came down from his grandfather. He works on the farm, receives no wages, as such, from the gross income, which is handled by his mother, but he and his family receive their living from the farm. The situation was the same when defendant was living with him. Plaintiff's mother has made all support payments beginning with the temporary order and including the deposits in the davings account.
According to plaintiff's testimony, the farm income in 1960 was $1,097.26; in 1961, $1,830.11; in 196...
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Archibald v. Whaland
...see Morphy v. Morphy, 114 N.H. 86, 315 A.2d 631 (1974), while legitimate offspring from a new marriage are considered. Peterson v. Buxton, 108 N.H. 77, 227 A.2d 779 (1967). Cf. Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 176 A.2d 708 (1961). I conclude, therefore, that stepchildren have no enforceabl......
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Logan v. Logan, 80-034
...remarriage and the consequential duty to support stepchildren are factors for the trial court to consider. See Peterson v. Buxton, 108 N.H. 77, 78, 227 A.2d 779, 780-81 (1967). The trial court has wide discretion in determining matters of child support, Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. ---, 421 A.2......