Peterson v. City Com'n, City of Jacksonville
| Decision Date | 07 February 1950 |
| Citation | 44 So.2d 423 |
| Parties | PETERSON v. CITY COMMISSION, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
L. Page Haddock, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Marks, Gray, Yates & Conroy, Jacksonville, for appellees.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed on authority of City of Tallahassee v. Roberts, 155 Fla. 815, 21 So.2d 712, and similar cases.
This is a workmen's compensation case. It was submitted to the Florida Industrial Commission and to the Court below upon stipulation of counsel and pertinent protions thereof are viz.:
'1. That Employee was injured on or about February 4, 1948, while acting within the scope of his employment with Employer; that as a direct result of said injury Employee was required to have an operation performed on his left knee; that Employee's medical history reveals no injury to said knee prior to February 4, 1948; that as a further result of said injury Employee was caused to lose considerable time from his employment with Employer and he became obligated to pay, or have someone on his behalf, pay divers sums of money for hospital, medical, and doctors' bills, as shown by bill of particulars attached hereto and made a part hereof.
'2. That at the time Employee received the injury as aforesaid his salary from Employer was $212.16 per month.
'3. That at the time Employee received said injury he was starting to clean or change a burner on a boiler belonging to Employer and located in Employer's main plant; that said burner is approximately 10 inches above the floor level and in order to clean or change same, it is necessary to squat down to a deep-knee bend position; that at said time and place Employee squatted to a deep-knee bend position to clean or change the burner and when he did his left knee snapped; that there was no noticeable pain at that time but it was necessary for Employee to resume a standing position immediately and when he did so his left knee snapped again accompanied by pain in his knee; that the incident was called to the attention of the Chief Engineer of Employer but Employee continued to work since it did not seem to be a serious injury at the time and it was not necessary for Employee to clean or change the burner again for several days; that Employee was compelled to favor his knee thereafter and when it was necessary to change the burner on the third day after the injury he attempted to squat down for that purpose and his left knee again snapped and on this occasion his knee showed signs of being swollen; Employee was thereupon sent by Employer to Dr. John H. Mitchell, who treated him on several occasions and permitted him to perform light duties with instructions not to climb around boilers or to squat down; Employee continued to have trouble with his knee and he asked that he be sent to another doctor and he was thereupon sent by Employer to Dr. John F. Lovejoy, who later performed an operation on Employee's knee; that the nature of the operation was excision of the medial meniscus of the left knee or removal of internal cartilage of the left knee joint; that this type of injury is usually caused from some sudden stress thrown upon the joint of the knee, or by a sudden twist of the knee or leg while the knee is bent; that the knee is usually in a bent position when the injury occurs and an attempt to straighten the leg after the injury causes severe pain; that Employee had cleaned said burner on numerous occasions prior to the date of his aforesaid injury and on those occasions Employee performed his duty similar to the manner he was attempting on the date of his injury except that on those occasions he received no injury.
Our adjudications and statutes must be considered and applied to the facts set out in the above stipulation of counsel of record. These provisions are viz.: Subsections (6), (18) and (19) of Section 440.02, F.S.A.:
'(6) The term 'injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury.
'(18) The term 'time of injury' means the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury.
We have for decision here the question of whether or not the claimant's injury occurred in the course of his employment; If so, was the alleged injury an accident within the meaning of Florida's Workmen's Compensation Law? The stipulation admits that the claimant was injured on February 4, 1948, 'while acting within the scope of his employment with Employer'. It further recites that the claimant was injured...
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Zundell v. Dade County School Bd.
...Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. v. Lee, 44 So.2d 650 (Fla.1950) (cerebral hemorrhage while claimant lifted boards at a sawmill); Peterson v. City Comm'n, 44 So.2d 423 (Fla.1950) (claimant's left knee snapped when he squatted to a deep-knee This progression was, however, temporarily halted in 1953, whe......
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Gray v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co.
...that appellant was not injured 'by accident.' The cases of McNeill v. Thompson, Fla., 53 So.2d 868, and Peterson v. City Commission, City of Jacksonville, Fla., 44 So.2d 423, are much closer cases than those heretofore discussed, but could have been decided on the same We wish to make clear......
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Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines
...of the Workmen's Compensation Law; and insofar as the McNeill [McNeill v. Thompson, Fla., 53 So.2d 868] and Peterson [Peterson v. City Comm., Fla., 44 So.2d 423] cases, supra, hold that an injury is not compensable if it happens while the claimant is performing his ordinary work in the usua......
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Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 30872
...accident.' See Brooks-Scanlon v. Lee, Fla.1950, 44 So.2d 650 (cerebral hemorrhage while lifting boards at a sawmill); Peterson v. City Commission, Fla.1950, 44 So.2d 423 (left knee 'snapped' when employee squatted to a deep-knee position); LeViness v. Mauer, Fla.1951, 53 So.2d 113 (chest pa......