Peterson v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
| Decision Date | 03 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3418,96-3418 |
| Citation | 212 Wis.2d 642,570 N.W.2d 63 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. Ray A. PETERSON, d/b/a Master Builders, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, LABOR & HUMAN RELATIONS, Respondent-Respondent, Bruce Boulden, Complainant-Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: DANIEL R. MOESER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before VERGERONT, ROGGENSACK and DEININGER, JJ.
Ray A. Peterson appeals an order of the circuit court under § 227.57, STATS., affirming a decision of the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 1 (DILHR) which held that Peterson willfully refused to rent housing to a black family on the basis of race, in violation of the Wisconsin Open Housing Act (WOHA), § 101.22, STATS. 2 Peterson assigns several evidentiary errors to the administrative proceedings and contends that the record fails to support DILHR's decision. However, we conclude that the evidentiary decisions were proper and the decision on the merits of the discrimination complaint was supported by substantial and credible evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
Bruce Boulden filed a complaint with the Equal Rights Division of DILHR on December 23, 1993, alleging that Ray A. Peterson refused to rent housing to him because of his race. The Equal Rights Division investigated the complaint and on November 1, 1994, it issued a Charge and Initial Determination finding probable cause to believe that Peterson had violated WOHA by refusing to rent to Boulden and/or imposing different terms or rental conditions due to race. Administrative Law Judge, John L. Brown (the ALJ), heard the matter on January 13, 1995.
It was undisputed at the hearing that Peterson operated a rental business in the Madison area under the name of Master Builders, and that in the fall of 1993, Peterson offered a newly constructed seven bedroom house for rent. At that time, he was renting approximately twelve of his sixty housing units to African-Americans.
Boulden testified that on or about November 11, 1993, he saw a classified advertisement for the seven bedroom house, and called Peterson's number to get more information. Peterson advised Boulden to drive by the house and call him back if he wanted to set up an appointment. Boulden did so the same day, and arranged to have Peterson show him the house the following day.
Peterson showed the house to Boulden and his adult step-daughter, Regina Mitchell. Boulden said that he told Peterson during the tour that his household would consist of three adults (Regina, his wife, and himself) and four children (the Bouldens' daughter, his wife's nephew, and two of Regina's six children). Peterson didn't give Boulden a formal application, but asked him to submit a written statement listing who would be living in the house, where the tenants had lived in the previous twelve months, and the amount and sources of household income.
The following week, Boulden wrote Peterson a letter in which he listed the family's sources of income and gave him the name and address of the family's current landlord, stating that it was the only place they had lived since coming to Madison. Boulden attached copies of his wife's and his sister's 3 SSI checks and Regina's AFDC grant. Boulden's letter did not state who would be living in the house.
After waiting a few days for a response, Boulden contacted Peterson to inquire about his application. Peterson said he did not receive copies of the SSI checks and AFDC grant, so Boulden and his wife brought second copies of the documents to Peterson. Boulden testified that he also gave the names and ages of the four children who would occupy the household to Peterson at that time. Peterson said he would review the information and get back to Boulden.
Boulden called Peterson for another status check on November 22, 1993. He testified that Peterson told him he had verified the family's income and current tenancy and would get back to him. When Boulden again contacted Peterson on November 23, 1993, Peterson informed him that he would need to conduct a personal inspection of the Bouldens' apartment before approving their tenancy. They scheduled an appointment for the following day, which was the Wednesday before Thanksgiving.
During the inspection, Peterson asked Boulden about the number of children present in the apartment. Boulden explained that four of the children belonged to a friend who was visiting for the Thanksgiving holiday. In addition, there were four of Regina's children present, two of whom did not ordinarily reside with her. There was nothing in the inspection which suggested that the friend or four children were permanent residents. Peterson left without telling the Bouldens whether they had been approved.
Boulden called Peterson again on November 26, 1993. According to Boulden, Peterson told him that his application was being rejected for misrepresentation, because Peterson had counted more than four children when he inspected the family's current residence. Peterson testified that he could not recall having met Boulden or rejecting his application, but maintained that he would not have rented to Boulden based on his application letter.
On February 10, 1995, before the ALJ had issued a decision, Peterson filed a motion for a new hearing to present additional rebuttal evidence. The ALJ denied the motion on February 15, 1995. The next day, Peterson filed a motion to admit Respondent's Exhibit 18A, which detailed certain misrepresentations about the Bouldens' income which Peterson had discovered. The parties briefed the issue, and Peterson requested that the ALJ disqualify himself. The ALJ denied both motions.
On August 25, 1995, the ALJ found that Peterson's only expressed reason for rejecting the application was the alleged misrepresentation of the number of household members, and that the expressed reason was a pretext. He reasoned that because Peterson never initiated any contact with Boulden, required a special home inspection, and expressed an unsubstantiated reason for rejecting Boulden's application, Peterson was unwilling to rent to Boulden due to racial discrimination. The ALJ found Peterson's discrimination was willful and that it caused the Bouldens embarrassment and humiliation. He ordered Peterson to cease discriminating on racial grounds; he awarded Boulden $7,200.00 in non-economic damages, $29.74 in economic loss, $100.00 forfeiture, and $13,305.83 in attorney fees.
Peterson sought review in the Dane County Circuit Court, where DILHR's decision was affirmed. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review.
We review the decision of the administrative agency, rather than that of the circuit court. 4 Stafford Trucking, Inc. v. DILHR, 102 Wis.2d 256, 260, 306 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Ct.App.1981). The precise standard of review varies depending on whether the issue is factual or legal in nature. See § 227.57(3), STATS.
The agency's factual findings must be upheld on review if there is any credible and substantial evidence in the record upon which reasonable persons could rely to make the same findings. See Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis.2d 46, 54-55, 330 N.W.2d 169, 173-74 (1983); § 227.57(6), STATS. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any finding of fact. See Advance Die Casting Co. v. LIRC, 154 Wis.2d 239, 249, 453 N.W.2d 487, 491 (1989); § 227.57(6). Rather, it must examine the record for credible and substantial evidence which supports the agency's determination.
Discriminatory motivation is a factual determination. St. Joseph's Hospital v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 264 Wis. 396, 401, 59 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1953). However, evidentiary rulings require the application of legal standards to a particular set of facts. See State v. Gil, 208 Wis.2d 531, 538, 561 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Ct.App.1997). A court is not bound by an agency's conclusions of law in the same manner as by its factual determinations. West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis.2d 1, 11, 357 N.W.2d 534, 539 (1984). However, some deference may nonetheless be appropriate. 5 This is also true in the case of evidentiary decisions which occur during the course of a contested case hearing because they depend greatly upon the weight and credibility of testimony and the foundational basis for admission, which the fact-finder is in the best position to assess. See Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis.2d 365, 388-89, 541 N.W.2d 753, 761 (1995). Decisions about which evidence is admissible are discretionary in nature, and we will not disturb them so long as the ALJ examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and used a rational process to reach a conclusion which a reasonable ALJ could make. See Ritt v. Dental Care Associates, S.C., 199 Wis.2d 48, 72, 543 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Ct.App.1995).
Racial Discrimination.
It is unlawful for a landlord to discriminate by refusing to rent housing to any person on the basis of race or color. Section 101.22(1)(h) and (2)(a), STATS., 1993-94. However, a landlord does have the right to request information about the family and financial status of prospective tenants under § 101.22...
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