Peterson v. Glory House of Sioux Falls, 16395

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Citation: 112 Lab.Cas.P 56,443 N.W.2d 653
• Docket Number: No. 16395,16395
• Parties: 112 Lab.Cas. P 56,078, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 912 Stanley PETERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The GLORY HOUSE OF SIOUX FALLS, a Non-Profit Corporation, Defendant and Appellee. . Considered on Briefs
• Decision Date: 26 April 1989

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443 N.W.2d 653 112 Lab.Cas. P 56,078, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas.
912 Stanley PETERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
The GLORY HOUSE OF SIOUX FALLS, a Non-Profit Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee. No. 16395. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs April 26, 1989.
Decided July 5, 1989.

Richard L. Johnson, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Stuart L. Tiede of Woods, Fuller, Schultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

MORGAN, Justice.

Stanley Peterson (Peterson) appeals from a summary judgment entered against him in his wrongful discharge action against The Glory House of Sioux Falls (Glory House), a nonprofit corporation. We affirm.

Peterson was employed by Glory House from November 1982 through August 30,

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1985. The mission of Glory House is the aiding and assisting of men in rehabilitating their lives after undergoing an alcohol rehabilitation program or after incarceration in prison. It operates two half-way houses in Sioux Falls, "Glory House" and "Glory House Too." Peterson was employed as Director of Glory House Too. He had no employment contract and was given no assurances of employment for any specific term. Peterson's employment was terminated on August 30, 1985.

Peterson brought a wrongful discharge action against Glory House, alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for warning a resident of Glory House Too about the improper sexual conduct of a fellow employee. For purposes of reviewing a summary judgment, we have to assume that to be the reason. Peterson's complaint set out two causes of action: (1) for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) for tortious discharge contrary to public policy. Glory House moved for judgment on the pleadings. Treating it as a motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing Peterson's complaint with prejudice. Peterson appeals.

On appeal, although recognizing that South Dakota is an employment-at-will state (SDCL 60-4-4), Peterson raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because under the facts of this case, South Dakota law should recognize: (1) a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, which creates a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge; and (2) an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between employer and employee, which creates a cause of action for breach of said covenant.

We first define our scope of review from an order granting summary judgment. In Nizielski v. Tvinnereim, 429 N.W.2d 483, 485 (S.D.1988) (quoting Time Out, Inc. v. Karras, 392 N.W.2d 434, 436-37 (S.D.1986)) we stated:

Our scope of review on appeal is not under the 'clearly erroneous' doctrine, but rather under the strict standards attendant upon entry of summary judgment as delineated in [Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968),]:

(1) Evidence must be viewed most favorable to the nonmoving party;

(2) The burden of proof is on the movant to show clearly that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;

(3) Summary judgment is not a substitute for a court trial or for trial by jury where any genuine issue of material facts exists;

(4) Surmise that a party will not prevail upon trial is not sufficient basis to grant summary judgment on issues which are not shown to be sham, frivolous or so unsubstantial that it is obvious that it would be futile to try them;

(5) Summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should be awarded only when the truth is clear and reasonable doubts touching the existence of a genuine issue as to material fact should be resolved against the movant;

(6) When no genuine issue of...