Peterson v. Gunderson
| Decision Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 48781 |
| Parties | ROBERT ERVIN PETERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DARRELL MICHAEL GUNDERSON, in his official capacity as the Shoshone County Sheriff, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Shoshone County. Hon. Scott Wayman, District Judge.
Order s denying and granting summary judgment, affirmed.
Robert Ervin Peterson, Smelterville, pro se appellant.
Hon Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Robert Ervin Peterson appeals from the district court's orders denying his motion for summary judgment and granting the Shoshone County Sheriff's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
At issue is whether the Sheriff was required to issue Peterson a concealed weapons license despite Peterson's prior felony conviction. The record in this case indicates that in the underlying criminal case, Peterson pled guilty in October 2006 to four felony counts of possessing material that sexually exploited children, Idaho Code § 18-1507A(2) (2006). Then, in May 2008, the district court heard Peterson's motions to reconsider and to withdraw his guilty plea. Following that hearing, the court entered an order imposing a unified sentence of five years with two years determinate on each of the four counts to run consecutively for a total of twenty years with eight years determinate.[1]
In May 2020, Peterson filed an application with the Sheriff under I.C. § 18-3302(7) for a license to carry concealed weapons. Initially, the Sheriff denied Peterson's application, citing to a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922. After several communications between Peterson and the Sheriff in which Peterson disputed the Sheriff's denial, Peterson received a copy of an August 2020 letter from the Shoshone County Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney providing a legal opinion to the Sheriff regarding "firearm possession by individuals convicted under I.C. § 18-1507A."
The letter noted that the legislature had repealed I.C. § 18-1507A in 2012 and that the current version of I.C. § 18-1507 prohibited the conduct previously prohibited under the repealed I.C. § 18-1507A. The letter opined the current version of I.C. § 18-1507 controlled Peterson's application for a concealed weapons license, concluding that "individuals seeking authorization to possess firearms who have been convicted for an offense under I.C. [§] 18-1507A prior to its repeal in 2012 should be treated as if the offense were a conviction under I.C. [§] 18-1507." The implication from this letter and its legal analysis was that the Sheriff declined to issue Peterson a concealed weapons license because Peterson's right to possess a firearm remained suspended under I.C. § 18-310(2). See I.C. § 18-310(2)(o) (providing convicted felon's right to possess firearm not restored upon final discharge if convicted under I.C. § 18-1507).[2]
In November 2020, Peterson filed a pro se action in the district court entitled "Petition to Enjoin Wrongful Denial of Concealed Carry License" and requested that the court order the Sheriff to issue Peterson a concealed weapons license. In his petition, Peterson disputed the Sheriff's legal analysis. Further, Peterson alleged that he had been convicted of violating I.C. § 18-1507A in 2006; he had "successfully and satisfactorily completed the prescribed term of imprisonment in February 2016"; and upon this "final discharge" from his sentence, I.C. § 18-310(2) restored all his civil rights, including his right to possess a firearm, "as a function of law."
Peterson mailed a copy of his petition and summons to the Sheriff rather than serving process on the Sheriff. See I.R.C.P. 4(d)(1) (). As a result, the Sheriff did not answer the petition but rather only entered a "special notice of appearance." Thereafter, the parties filed several anomalous filings that did not comport with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peterson moved for "summary judgment" because the Sheriff had failed to answer the petition. The district court denied that motion. Despite this denial, the Sheriff filed an "objection" to Peterson's "summary judgment" motion, asserting Peterson had failed to serve his petition properly. Peterson then responded to this "objection," and the court again denied Peterson's requested relief.
Despite these denials and the absence of another summary judgment motion from Peterson, the Sheriff filed a "Response to Motion for Summary Judgment" and a supporting declaration. In this response, the Sheriff asserted, among other things, that Peterson was disqualified from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Peterson had failed to present evidence that he had satisfactorily completed his sentence as necessary to restore his full rights of citizenship under I.C. § 18-310(2); regardless, the 2012 amendment of I.C. § 18-1507 incorporated the crime of which Peterson had previously been convicted under I.C. § 18-1507A (2006), thereby preventing the automatic restoration of his civil rights under I.C. § 18-310(2)(o); and the law prohibiting Peterson's right to possess a firearm did not violate the ex post facto doctrine. Peterson then filed a "response" to the Sheriff's response.
In February 2021, the district court held a hearing during which it stated the hearing's purpose was to address Peterson's motion for summary judgment. Following the parties' arguments, the court orally ruled. The court stated it was applying the summary judgment standards under Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It denied Peterson's request to strike the Sheriff's filings as untimely, concluding the timing of the filings did not prejudice Peterson.[3] Then, the court considered whether Peterson's petition was "a request to have a writ of mandate" or, alternatively, a petition for "judicial review." Ultimately, the court noted "some procedural problems" with the case, appeared to conclude a writ of mandate was an inappropriate procedure, but did not reach a conclusion on the nature of the action.
Addressing the merits of Peterson's petition, the district court concluded it was undisputed that Peterson had been convicted of "multiple felony offenses" that were "all punishable by terms exceeding one year" and that he had "served his sentence and done his time and taken care of all that." The court then concluded that Peterson was disqualified from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and that, as a result, he was disqualified under Idaho law from possessing a firearm:
[T]he basic fact still remains that because the offenses were punishable by more than one year, and were disqualifying under federal law, and if disqualified under federal law, it's a disqualification under State law. And that is the situation [Peterson] has found himself in.
Further, the court rejected Peterson's ex post facto argument, concluding that "the right to possess a firearm is not an absolute right"; "a restriction on a person's right to have a firearm license" is not punitive; and the "issuance of a license" is "a civil proceeding," not "a criminal proceeding." Thereafter, the court entered an order denying summary judgment for Peterson, a separate order granting summary judgment for the Sheriff, and a judgment on both orders.
Peterson, proceeding pro se, timely appeals.
As an initial matter, we address the nature of Peterson's petition, which dictates this Court's standard of review. Although the district court noted "procedural problems" with the parties' filings and considered the nature of Peterson's petition, it did not reach a specific conclusion on the issue. For example, the court considered whether Peterson's petition was a request for a "writ of mandate." It appeared to reject this notion, however. The court also considered whether Peterson's petition was a petition for "judicial review," stating that an "Idaho administrative procedures appeals action, also commonly referred to as judicial review" is "another available remedy." Ultimately, however, the court addressed the merits by construing the parties' filings as cross-motions for summary judgment, as evidenced by its order construing the Sheriff's "objection and written response" as a summary judgment motion and granting that motion.
Peterson does not directly address the Court's standard of review. Although his opening brief has numerous sections entitled "standard of review," he misconstrues the meaning of that phrase. He does assert, however, that this appeal addresses the denial of a summary judgment motion governed by I.R.C.P. 56; the district court "erred in ruling [his petition] was actually a request for a Writ of Mandamus";[4] and his petition was "authorized and described by I.C. § 18-3302(18)." In support, Peterson quotes I.C. § 18-3302(18), which provides that "a civil action may be brought to enjoin a wrongful refusal to issue a license . . . ." Meanwhile, the Sheriff assumes without analysis that this Court is addressing a decision denying a writ of mandate and asserts the Court's review is limited to determining whether Peterson had a clear legal right to the relief sought.
Because Peterson's petition cites I.C. § 18-3302(18) and because that provision specifically allows an applicant to bring a civil action to enjoin a wrongful refusal to issue a concealed weapons license, we construe Peterson's petition as a complaint asserting a private right of action and seeking injunctive relief. See Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 176, 923 P.2d 416, 421 (1996) (...
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