Peterson v. Heymes

• Decision Date: 29 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 1:15-cv-969,1:15-cv-969
• Citation: 277 F.Supp.3d 913
• Parties: Jamie Lee PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. David HEYMES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

277 F.Supp.3d 913

Jamie Lee PETERSON, Plaintiff,

v.David HEYMES, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-969

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed September 29, 2017

Gretchen Elizabeth Helfrich, Roshna Bala Keen, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Christopher James Raiti, G. Gus Morris, Troy, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge

This is a wrongful conviction civil lawsuit. Before the Court are three motions to dismiss, which have been converted to motions for summary judgment.¹ Defendants assert, among other things, that collateral estoppel bars the claims in this lawsuit arising from Peterson’s interrogations and confession. Defendants argue that Peterson had a fair opportunity to litigate the voluntariness of his confession in a Walker hearing, and the matter was resolved against him during the criminal proceedings.² This Court held oral argument on Defendants’ motions, and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file supplemental briefs. Because Peterson’s conviction has been vacated, the underlying criminal proceedings have no preclusive effect and Defendants’ motions are denied.

I.

The parties all filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).³ For Rule 12(b)(6) motions, when a document is attached to, referred to, or is otherwise integral to the complaint, the document may be considered by the court without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond , 641 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 2011) ; Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co. , 508 F.3d 327, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2007). However, for motions under both 12(b)(6) and 12(c), when the parties present matters outside the pleadings, the court must convert the motion to one for summary judgment if those matters are not excluded from consideration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a court converts the motion to one under Rule 56, the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion. Id.

Peterson’s amended complaint (ECF No. 3) acknowledges the criminal action but does not allege or otherwise discuss the issues raised in the Walker hearing. For their collateral estoppel issue, Defendants rely on the motion and brief filed by Peterson in the underlying criminal proceedings, as well as the transcript from the Walker hearing. None of those documents are referred to in the complaint, nor are those documents integral to Peterson’s claims; the documents are integral to the preclusion issue raised by Defendants. Those documents do not refute or contradict any factual allegation in the complaint. Taking judicial notice of those documents, the proceedings of another court, does not resolve the matter. The majority of circuit courts have sanctioned taking judicial notice of public records for the fact of their existence, and not for the truth of the matters contained within those documents. Passa v. City of Columbus , 123 Fed.Appx. 694, 697 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases). "Further, in general a court may only take judicial notice of a public record whose existence or contents prove facts whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Id. (citation omitted). To the extent Peterson and Defendants disagree about the facts the documents purport to establish, Defendants cannot rely on those documents for the purpose of a Rule 12 motion.

Accordingly, at the close of the hearing on Defendants’ motions, the Court provided the parties notice that the motions would be converted to motions for summary judgment. (ECF No. 68 Minutes PageID.1062.) Peterson and Defendants filed supplemental briefs.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions, together with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and (c) ; Payne v. Novartis Pharms. Corp. , 767 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2014). The burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, but that burden may be discharged by pointing out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass’n , 760 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2014). The facts, and the inferences drawn from them, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). Once the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts in the record showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc. , 627 F.3d 195, 200 (6th Cir. 2010) ("After the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must present some ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ") (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court does not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter; the court determines only if there exists a genuine issue for trial. Tolan v. Cotton , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). The question is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

II.

The following facts are not in dispute and provide the context necessary to understand the preclusion issue raised by Defendants. In 1996, an elderly woman was sexually assaulted and then killed in her home in Kalkaska County. Eventually, Peterson became a suspect. Peterson was interrogated several times by Defendants Somers and Heymes, and he eventually confessed. He later challenged the voluntariness of his confession and filed a motion to suppress. The state court held a Walker hearing and found that Peterson’s confession was voluntary and admissible.

Investigators secured two DNA samples from the victim. Semen samples collected from the victim’s vagina were tested against Peterson’s DNA, but no match was found. A second sample was collected from the victim’s shirt. At trial, an expert witness testified that she was unable to develop a DNA profile from the shirt sample and, therefore, could not exclude Peterson as the source.

In December 1998, Peterson was convicted by a jury. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Peterson’s application for leave to appeal. While Peterson’s appeals were pending, he filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing under Michigan Compiled Laws § 770.16. Peterson requested the stain on the victim’s shirt be tested for DNA. The trial court denied the motion. Peterson’s attempt to secure habeas relief in federal court was denied in 2009.

What happened next was summarized by Judge Janet Allen of the 46th Circuit Court for the County of Kalkaska in her opinion and order granting Peterson’s motion for relief from judgment. (ECF No. 35—8.) Attorneys from the Innocence Project at the University of Michigan Law School and attorneys from the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law took notice of Peterson’s case. In 2013, Peterson, the County Prosecutor, and the Michigan State Police agreed to additional DNA tests using advanced techniques that were not available at the time of Peterson’s trial. The new tests again excluded Peterson as a possible source of the DNA captured by the vaginal swab. The new tests also excluded Peterson as a possible source of the DNA from the stain on the victim’s shirt.

The results of the new tests were submitted to the Combined Police DNA Index System (CODIS). The DNA from the vaginal swab matched that of Jason Anthony Ryan. The DNA tests from the victim’s shirt could not exclude Ryan as a possible source. Ryan was arrested in late 2013. He had been interviewed in July 1997 as part of the original investigation and had told police that he had been in the area of Kalkaska in October 1996, when the homicide occurred.

With the results of the new DNA tests, Peterson filed a motion for relief from judgment under Michigan Court Rule 6.500, et seq. The Kalkaska County Prosecutor opposed the motion and also argued that a new trial was not warranted by § 770.16.

In a lengthy opinion, Judge Allen granted Peterson’s motion. In the conclusion of the opinion, Judge Allen order that the "judgment of conviction in this case is VACATED [.]" (PageID.509.) Judge Allen also found that § 770.16 applied to Peterson’s case and ordered a new trial. (Id. ) Rather than retrying the case, the Kalkaska County Prosecutor opted to dismiss the charges.

III.

With this background information, the Court turns to Peterson’s complaint and Defendants’ motions.⁴ As explained above, all Defendants have raised collateral estoppel as a defense, and the Court notified the parties that the matter would be resolved on summary judgment grounds.

Peterson’s first count alleges that all Defendants violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conducting a coercive interrogation, individually, jointly, in conspiracy with one another, and consistent with the practices and policies of the Village and County.

Defendants all move to dismiss Count 1, arguing that the claim is precluded by collateral estoppel.

"It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d...