Peterson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 811

• Decision Date: 09 April 1998
• Docket Number: Civil No. 97-19 (DSD/JMM).
• Citation: 999 F.Supp. 665
• Parties: Uriah PETERSON, By and Through Joel PETERSON and Gayle Peterson, his parents and natural guardians, Plaintiffs, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 811, a municipal corporation, and John Mattison, Superintendent of Independent School District No. 811, in both his individual and representative capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

999 F.Supp. 665

Uriah PETERSON, By and Through Joel PETERSON and Gayle Peterson, his parents and natural guardians, Plaintiffs, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 811, a municipal corporation, and John Mattison, Superintendent of Independent School District No. 811, in both his individual and representative capacity, Defendants.

Civil No. 97-19 (DSD/JMM).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

April 9, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

George Floyd Restovich, Restovich Law Office, Rochester, MN, for Uriah Peterson, by and through, Joel Peterson and Gayle Peterson, his parents and natural guardians, plaintiff.

Daniel Q. Poretti, Timothy James Pawlenty, Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, MN, for Independent School District No. 811, John Mattison.

ORDER

DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the cross-motions for summary judgment of plaintiff Uriah Peterson and defendants Independent School District No. 811 and John Mattison. Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, the court grants defendants' motion and denies plaintiff's motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Uriah Peterson, at all relevant times, was a resident of Wabasha County Minnesota and a student enrolled at Wabasha-Kellogg High School within defendant Independent School District No. 811. Plaintiffs Joe and Gayle Peterson are Uriah Peterson's parents.¹ Defendant John Mattison, at all relevant times, was the Superintendent of Schools for Independent School District No. 811.²

On October 8, 1994, Uriah Peterson, after playing football with a group of boys behind Wabasha-Kellogg High School, climbed into the bed of a pick-up truck with several other boys. Peterson noticed a BB gun lying in the bed of the pick-up truck. The pickup truck proceeded to the front of the school where it stopped, one of the boys in the back exited the vehicle, and the remaining passengers started speaking with others in the parking lot. Richard Hartshorn, the Principal of the elementary school in Independent School District No. 811, was also in the parking lot, and noticed one of the truck's occupants holding the BB gun. After the truck and its occupants briefly exited and re-entering the school parking lot, Hartshorn allegedly watched one of the boys in the truck raise the gun and position it on his shoulder in a shooting position. Hartshorn then left the parking lot and sought the assistance of a police officer.

Hartshorn located Wabasha City Police Officer Todd Baab and the two returned to the school parking lot. The truck was no longer at the scene, but Officer Baab approached a group of boys loitering in the parking lot and inquired about the incident. The truck then reappeared, still loaded with several occupants. Officer Baab stopped the vehicle and questioned the occupants, who admitted having a gun on school property, but told Officer Baab that the gun had been dropped off at the home of one of the truck's occupants. Officer Baab proceeded to the home of the student who owned the gun and determined that the rifle was a BB gun.

Hartshorn, defendant Mattison, Officer Baab, and Wabasha City Police Chief David Krueger met on October 10, 1994, to discuss the gun incident. Because possession of a weapon on school property is a felony offense,³ a police investigation ensued. County Attorney James Nordstrom, however, later determined that insufficient evidence existed to support a violation of criminal law.

On November 22, 1994, the school board of Independent School District No. 811 met in a closed session to discuss the gun incident. There is some dispute as to whether the board decided to suspend Uriah Peterson at that time.⁴ The next day, November 23, 1994, Mattison and his secretary, Connie LaRocque, interviewed all five students involved, including Uriah Peterson. At his interview, Uriah Peterson admitted being in the back of the pick-up truck during the October 8, 1994 incident and admitted being aware that the gun was in the back of the truck with him and the other boys. Mattison, after affording Uriah Peterson the opportunity to explain his side of the incident, suspended him pending an expulsion hearing before the school board.

On November 28, 1994, the Petersons were sent a "Notice of Intended Action and Hearing," informing them of an expulsion hearing set for December 6, 1994, and containing a statement of facts, a list of witnesses, and a description of the anticipated testimony. Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of David D. Kuhl (Docket No. 35). The expulsion hearing took place on December 6, 1994, before the Wabasha-Kellogg school board. Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by his father, Joel Peterson. The testimony established that, while plaintiff did not bring the 33 gun onto school property, did not know of the gun's presence until after he had gotten into the truck, and did not handle the gun, plaintiff was in the truck, was aware of the gun's presence, and did not exit the vehicle even though he was aware that it was against the rules to have a gun on school property.

The Wabasha-Kellogg school board on December 7, 1994, voted to expel Uriah Peterson and the other four students involved in the gun incident until December 12, 1994, for violating the school Dangerous Weapons Policy. Peterson was also prohibited from participating in extra-curricular activities through January 2, 1995. On December 9, 1994, the Petersons filed a notice of appeal with the Minnesota Department of Education.⁵ The Petersons challenged the school board's action on both procedural and substantive due process grounds. On January 13, 1995, the Department reversed the school board's expulsion and ordered that all records regarding the incident be expunged from Peterson's file on the basis that "substantial evidence on the record does not support a conclusion that student's conduct violated reasonable school board regulations which were sufficiently clear and definite as to provide notice to the student that he must conform his conduct to its requirements." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Discussion, and Decision and Order of Commissioner of Education, Exhibit L to Affidavit of Bruce Piotrowski (Docket No. 26) (hereafter "Findings and Conclusions") at 8. The Department also held, however, that all pre-hearing procedural requirements were met and the hearing before the school board met the procedural requirements of the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act, Minn.Stat. § 127.26 et seq.

Rather than appeal the Department's final decision through the state courts pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 127.33, plaintiff chose to file this federal action on January 3, 1997, nearly two years after the Department reversed the expulsion decision of the Wabasha-Kellogg School Board. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his procedural and substantive due process rights by suspending and subsequently expelling him without a fair hearing and without substantial evidence to support the conclusion that he had violated a school policy. Plaintiff also alleges, based on the same facts, that defendants failed to follow the procedures set out in the Minnesota Pupil Fair Dismissal Act. Plaintiffs seek monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which are now properly before the court for decision.

DISCUSSION

The court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This standard mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which requires the trial court to enter judgment as a matter of law if there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and gives that party the benefit of all justifiable inferences that can be drawn in its favor. Id. at 250. The nonmoving party, however, cannot rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings. Nor may the nonmoving party simply argue that facts supporting its claim will be developed later or at trial. Rather the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or otherwise, sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, judgment as a matter of law should not be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. If a plaintiff fails to support an essential element of a claim, however, summary judgment must issue because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges three causes of action. Counts One and Two are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

A school district is considered a "person" for purposes of § 1983 li...