Peterson v. Jasmanka

Decision Date21 February 2014
Docket NumberNo. 20130162.,20130162.
Citation2014 ND 40,842 N.W.2d 920
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
PartiesJack M. PETERSON, Lilly Peterson, Lacey Mineral and Royalty General Partnership, John R. Lacey, Ramona Lacey, Michael Lacey, Cheryl Lacey, and John Satermo a/k/a Lee John Satermo, Eugene H. Peterson, Plaintiffs and Appellees v. Lester JASMANKA, deceased, through Personal Representative Monica CLARK, Chief Financial Officer for Hanna Boys Center, f/k/a Archbishop Hanna Center for Boys, Sonoma, California, and all other persons unknown claiming any estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance upon, the property described in the Complaint, Defendants Lester Jasmanka, deceased, through Personal Representative Monica Clark, Chief Financial Officer for Hanna Boys Center, f/k/a Archbishop Hanna Center for Boys, Sonoma, California, Appellant Hal Nestaval, Darlene Nestaval, Jerry Nestaval, Sara Nestaval and Kirk Nestaval, Sylvia M. Holst, Veneda and Gary Yeager, Michelle and Daniel Riddle, and Jon and Karen Holst, Appellees.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Andrew T. Forward (argued) and Richard P. Olson (on brief), Minot, N.D., for plaintiffs and appellees Jack M. Peterson, Lilly Peterson, Lacey Mineral and Royalty General Partnership, John R. Lacey, Ramona Lacey, Michael Lacey, Cheryl Lacey, and John Satermo, a/k/a Lee John Satermo, and Eugene H. Peterson.

Joshua A. Swanson (argued) and H. Patrick Weir, Jr. (appeared), Fargo, N.D., for appellant Lester Jasmanka, deceased, through Personal Representative Monica Clark, Chief Financial Officer for Hanna Boys Center, f/k/a Archbishop Hanna Center for Boys, Sonoma, California.

Sandra B. Dittus and Sara R. Behrens, Grand Forks, N.D., for appellees Hal Nestaval, Darlene Nestaval, Jerry Nestaval, Sara Nestaval, and Kirk Nestaval; submitted on brief.

Zachary E. Pelham (argued), Bismarck, N.D., for appellees Sylvia M. Holst, Veneda and Gary Yeager, Michelle and Daniel Riddle, and Jon and Karen Holst.

John W. Morrison, Jr., and Paul J. Forster, Bismarck, N.D., for amicus curiae Whiting Oil and Gas Corporation.

SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] Monica Clark, as the personal representative of the estate of Lester Jasmanka, appeals from a district court order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in Jack and Eugene Peterson. We affirm, concluding (1) the 1990 judgment was not void and therefore could not be vacated under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), and (2) the motion to vacate the judgment for fraud and misrepresentation under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) was untimely.

I

[¶ 2] Lester Jasmanka owned land in Mountrail County. In 1952, Jasmanka executed a warranty deed transferring the property but reserving 50 percent of the minerals beneath the land. The 1952 deed listed Jasmanka's address as 5506 Modoc Avenue in Richmond, California. In 1959, Jasmanka executed two oil and gas leases on the property. The 1959 leases listed Jasmanka's address as 5505 Modoc Avenue. The 1952 deed and 1959 leases were recorded.

[¶ 3] In 1990, when there had been no use of the minerals in more than thirty years, Jack and Eugene Peterson, who owned the surface estate in the land, published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the official county newspaper. The Petersons also mailed a notice of lapse of mineral interest to Jasmanka at 5505 Modoc Avenue. The Petersons subsequently began a quiet title action, serving Jasmanka by publication and by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the 5505 Modoc Avenue address. In affidavits, the Petersons' attorney advised the court that the 5505 Modoc Avenue address was the only known address for Jasmanka. When no response to the summons and complaint was received, the district court entered a default judgment quieting title in the mineral interest in the Petersons.

[¶ 4] Jasmanka had died in California in 1963, and his will was originally probated there. Under the residuary clause and a codicil to his will, the Mountrail County mineral interest would have passed to Hanna Boys Center (HBC). In 2011, Clark, the chief financial officer of HBC, applied for informal probate of Jasmanka's will in Mountrail County. Clark was appointed as personal representative of Jasmanka's estate.

[¶ 5] In 2012, 49 years after Jasmanka's death and 22 years after entry of the default judgment quieting title to the minerals in the Petersons, Clark moved to vacate the 1990 quiet title judgment. Clark contended the Petersons had mailed the notice of lapse of mineral interest to the wrong address and therefore had not strictly complied with the notice requirements in the abandoned minerals statute, N.D.C.C. ch. 38–18.1. Clark argued the district court therefore had lacked personal jurisdiction and the 1990 judgment was void, and the judgment should be vacated under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). Clark also argued the Petersons had fraudulently misrepresented to the court that the 5505 Modoc Avenue address was the only address of record for Jasmanka and the 1990 judgment should therefore be vacated under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3). The district court concluded the Petersons had properly served the notice of lapse of mineral interest upon Jasmanka at his last address shown of record in 1990 and denied Clark's motion to vacate the default judgment.

II

[¶ 6] Clark argues the district court erred in concluding the Petersons had complied with the notice requirement in N.D.C.C. § 38–18.1–06(2) when they mailed the notice of lapse of mineral interest to the 5505 Modoc Avenue address in 1990. We first address the appellees' contention that the issue was never properly before the district court because relief from the judgment was not available under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).

[¶ 7] On the basis of alleged improper service of notice of lapse of mineral interest to a record owner who had died 27 years before the notice was mailed, Clark's 2012 motion sought to vacate a default judgment entered 22 years earlier. Recognizing our holdings in prior cases, Clark concedes that Rule 60(b) is the exclusive means for reopening a default judgment. See Burgard v. Burgard, 2013 ND 27, ¶ 7, 827 N.W.2d 1;Flemming v. Flemming, 2010 ND 212, ¶ 3, 790 N.W.2d 762;Shull v. Walcker, 2009 ND 142, ¶ 12, 770 N.W.2d 274.

[¶ 8] Clark contends the 1990 default judgment can be vacated under Rule 60(b)(3) and (4), which provides:

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment or Order. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

....

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;....Clark contends the judgment may be vacated under Rule 60(b)(4) because the district court lacked personal jurisdiction and the judgment was therefore void, or, alternatively, the judgment may be vacated under Rule 60(b)(3) because the judgment was based upon the Petersons' fraudulent misrepresentation that the 5505 Modoc Avenue address was the only address of record for Jasmanka.

A

[¶ 9] Clark contends the 1990 judgment is void and should be vacated under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4).

[¶ 10] Although the decision to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily left to the discretion of the district court, the court has no discretion under Rule 60(b)(4) if the judgment is void. State ex rel. Schlect v. Wolff, 2011 ND 164, ¶ 24, 801 N.W.2d 694;Valley Honey Co., LLC v. Graves, 2003 ND 125, ¶ 24, 666 N.W.2d 453;Eggl v. Fleetguard, Inc., 1998 ND 166, ¶ 4, 583 N.W.2d 812. As this Court explained in Eggl, at ¶ 4 (citations omitted):

If the judgment is valid, the motion to vacate must be denied; if the judgment is void, the court has no discretion to protect it and it must be vacated. The question to be resolved is whether the judgment is void as a matter of law, and our review of the trial court's decision is plenary.

Furthermore, although a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) must generally be made within a “reasonable” time, this Court has clarified that [a]nytime is a ‘reasonable’ time to set aside a void judgment,” and accordingly there is no time limit for attacking a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Eggl, at ¶ 5 (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.65[1], at 60–197 (1998)).

[¶ 11] Clark's primary contention on appeal is that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the 1990 quiet title judgment because the Petersons failed to properly serve the notice of lapse of mineral interest upon Jasmanka, the record owner of the mineral interest. Clark in effect contends strict compliance with the notice requirements of the statutory abandoned minerals procedure under N.D.C.C. § 38–18.1–06(2) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a subsequent quiet title action in district court regarding the disputed minerals. Clark's argument is premised upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the abandoned minerals procedure under N.D.C.C. ch. 38–18.1.

[¶ 12] A mineral interest is deemed to be abandoned if it is unused for 20 years, and N.D.C.C. ch. 38–18.1 provides the procedure for a surface owner to succeed to the ownership of an abandoned mineral interest under the land. Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 2013 ND 50, ¶ 8, 829 N.W.2d 453;Halvorson v. Starr, 2010 ND 133, ¶ 5, 785 N.W.2d 248;N.D.C.C. § 38–18.1–02. The prescribed procedure to acquire the abandoned mineral interest is delineated in N.D.C.C. § 38–18.1–06, which at the relevant time in 1990 provided in part:

1. Any person intending to succeed to the ownership of a mineral interest upon its lapse, shall give notice of the lapse of the mineral interest by publication.

2. The publication provided for in subsection 1 must be made once each week for three weeks in the official county newspaper of the county in which the mineral interest is located; however, if the address of the mineral interest owner is shown of record or can be determined upon reasonable...

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3 cases
  • Capps v. Weflen
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 31 October 2014
    ...provides the procedure for a surface owner to succeed to the ownership of an abandoned mineral interest under the land. Peterson v. Jasmanka ex rel. Clark, 2014 ND 40, ¶ 12, 842 N.W.2d 920. There is no dispute that the subject mineral interests were unused for more than 20 years within the ......
  • Nelson v. McAlester Fuel Co., 20160007
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 7 March 2017
    ...interest vests in the surface owner as of the date of abandonment, without the necessity of a subsequent quiet title action." Peterson v. Jasmanka , 2014 ND 40, ¶ 12, 842 N.W.2d 920 (citing N.D.C.C. § 38–18.1–02 ; Johnson v. Taliaferro , 2011 ND 34, ¶¶ 15–17, 793 N.W.2d 804 ). Thus, if the ......
  • Hall v. Hall
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 21 October 2020
    ...§ 38-18.1-02 ] and a subsequent quiet title action, and [has] emphasized they are entirely separate, distinct procedures." Peterson v. Jasmanka , 2014 ND 40, ¶¶ 12-13, 842 N.W.2d 920. Under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06.1(1), providing the process for perfecting title in a surface owner, surface ow......

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