Peterson v. Klee, Case No. 2:12-cv-11109
| Decision Date | 15 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-11109 |
| Parties | DENARD PETERSON, Petitioner, v. PAUL KLEE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan
Petitioner Denard Peterson ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, Petitioner challenges his 2001 plea-based conviction of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree on the following grounds: (1) his trial counsel forced him to accept the terms of the plea agreement and the terms of that agreement were breached; (2) he was erroneously denied relief during state post-conviction review; (3) he was denied his right to appellate review; and (4) his sentence exceeded the state sentencing guidelines without a jury verdict. Having thoroughly reviewed the claims asserted in the habeas application, the accompanying briefs, and the Rule 5materials,1 the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ for two independent reasons. First, Petitioner's claims are barred by the doctrine of procedural default, as Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause to excuse the default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to review his claims. Second, and in the alternative, the Court concludes that the state court adjudication of the merits of Petitioner's claims did not violate clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, the Court will deny the petition.2 The Court will, however, grant Petitioner a certificate of appealability and permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Petitioner's plea-based conviction arose from the October 2000 rape of a seventy-three-year-old woman in her house. Although Petitioner was not immediately arrested in connection with the crime, he eventually turned himself in, after which the victim, Mary Jane Hock, identified Petitioner in a live line-up. InJanuary of 2001, after having been advised of his Miranda rights, Petitioner gave a full confession.
Petitioner's preliminary examination took place on January 23, 2001. Hock testified at this hearing, describing the events of October 16, 2000. Hock testified that as she was entering her house, Petitioner approached her from behind, physically assaulted her, forced her inside, and stated, "I'm going to rape you, I'm going to kill you, I'm going to make love to you." Petitioner then dragged Hock into her bedroom and forcibly raped her. Afterwards, Petitioner rifled through Hock's belongings, taking personal property, including her wallet, before departing. At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the state court bound Petitioner over for trial on charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and first-degree home invasion. Having been previously convicted of a crime, Petitioner faced a sentencing enhancement as a second-time habitual offender.
On February 9, 2001, after defense counsel filed a notice that Petitioner would be raising an insanity defense, Petitioner underwent a court-ordered competency evaluation. The forensic examiner opined that, despite evidence of mental illness, Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (ECF No. 36.) A competency hearing was held on March 16, 2001, at which Petitioner was found competent to stand trial.
On May 16, 2001, Petitioner pleaded no contest to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520(B)(1)(c), in exchange for dismissal of the home invasion charge and the prosecution's agreement not to proceed with the habitual offender sentencing enhancement. At the plea hearing, counsel stated the reason for the no contest plea was because of potential civil liability and because Petitioner could not recall the details of the incident. (Plea Hrg. Tr., ECF No. 11-3.) Although Petitioner stated at the plea hearing that his attorney told him he would seek placement for Petitioner at a facility where he could receive medication, all of Petitioner's responses during the plea colloquy were appropriate and responsive and did not give rise to concerns regarding his competency at the time of the plea. When asked whether he understood the proceeding and whether he wished to enter the plea, Petitioner repeatedly stated under oath that he understood and that he was guilty.
Two weeks later, on May 31, 2001, the court sentenced Petitioner to a term of twenty-three years and nine months to forty years of imprisonment. Portions of the sentencing transcript raise questions about Petitioner's competency at sentencing. Petitioner's allocution amounted to a series of rambling non sequiturs unrelated to the proceedings. (Sent'g Tr. 8-12, ECF No. 11-4.)
In August 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of application for leave to appealand a request for the appointment of appellate counsel. (ECF No. 11-9, Pg ID 381.) The court granted the request and appointed attorney Joseph Evanski to represent Petitioner on appeal. James Hall, then an associate of Evanski, met with Petitioner at the Riverside Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan to discuss his options on appeal, as well as the costs and benefits associated with those options. After this meeting, Evanski filed a motion to have Petitioner's competency evaluated for purposes of determining whether Petitioner was competent to assist counsel on appeal. (ECF No. 11-9, Pg ID 240-47.) Evanski's motion indicated that during the meeting with Hall, Petitioner appeared incompetent to either understand the ramifications of seeking to withdraw his guilty plea or to assist appellate counsel in pursuing the appeal. Of particular concern was Hall's belief that Petitioner was not capable of understanding that he risked consecutive sentences if convicted of both the criminal sexual conduct and home invasion charges. The trial court granted appellate counsel's motion on November 10, 2002, and ordered that Petitioner be evaluated. (ECF No. 11-9, Pg ID 345.)
Dr. Jennifer Balay evaluated Petitioner and issued a report dated January 28, 2003. (ECF No. 11-9, Pg ID 354-57.) Dr. Balay's report noted that Petitioner was a chronically mentally ill man who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and opined that Petitioner was currently psychotic. Dr. Balay's report indicated that itwould be difficult for Petitioner at that time to "carry out any kind of coherent and rational conversation with his attorney as he considers his various legal options."
Equipped with Dr. Balay's findings, Evanski filed a motion in February 2003 to have Petitioner committed for psychiatric treatment. In that motion, Evanski asked the court to order that Petitioner be committed for treatment to render him competent to proceed in the appeal or, in the alternative, to provide counsel with guidance on how to proceed.
On April 1, 2003, the trial court issued an order dismissing Petitioner's appeal. The order reads as follows:
(ECF No. 11-5, Pg ID 132.)
Over two years later, on November 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for relief from judgment. In this motion, Petitioner raised what essentially formed the four issues raised in the current habeas petition, seeking to invalidate his no contest plea and sentence. The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment in an opinion and order dated December 20, 2005. The court determinedthat Petitioner's appellate attorney acted appropriately when he asked the court for guidance regarding Petitioner's ability to communicate and grasp the legal issues surrounding his appeal. The court indicated that a criminal defendant is allowed to seek post-conviction review once he regains competency. Then, seemingly operating under the assumption that the filing of the motion indicated a restoration of Petitioner's competence, the court, using the lens of de novo review, addressed and rejected the merits of Petitioner's substantive claims.3 (ECF No. 11-6.)
Petitioner then attempted to file a pro se application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, but the application was dismissed without prejudice on September 15, 2006 for failure to pursue the case in conformity with the Michigan Court Rules. The order of dismissal cited non-compliance with Michigan Court Rules 7.201(B)(3) and 7.216(A)(10), which relate to the documents and fee required to initiate the appeal. Petitioner did not seek to correct his deficient filing with the Michigan Court of Appeals, nor did he seek leave to appeal the dismissal in the Michigan Supreme Court.
On February 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion seeking discovery of DNA evidence and an order for DNA testing in the state court. This motion was deniedby the trial court on February 19, 2010 because Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements for seeking DNA testing under Michigan law. (ECF No. 11-9, Pg ID 221 (discussing Michigan Compiled Laws § 770.16).)
In July of 2011, Petitioner filed another motion seeking discovery, which was predictably denied by the trial court. In denying this motion, the court explained that Petitioner had exhausted his appellate rights and therefore had no right to receive further discovery or documents for purposes of appeal. (ECF No....
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