Peterson v. Lindstrand

• Docket Number: 9:19-CV-569 (GTS/DJS)
• Decision Date: 15 February 2022
• Parties: DAVID PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. J. LINDSTRAND, Deputy Superintendent for Administration, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

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DAVID PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. J. LINDSTRAND, Deputy Superintendent for Administration, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.

No. 9:19-CV-569 (GTS/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

February 15, 2022

DAVID PETERSON Plaintiff, Pro Se

HON LETITIA JAMES Attorney General for the State of New York Attorney for Defendants

DAVID C. WHITE, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER^[1]

DANIEL J. STEWART UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff David Peterson (“Plaintiff) brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Defendants violated his constitutional right to due process with respect to an inmate disciplinary hearing held in 2014 while Plaintiff was an inmate at Great Meadow Correctional Facility. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 56. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Dkt. No. 66 (“Pl.'s Opp.”).^[2] For the following reasons, this Court recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2014, Plaintiff was Chairman of the Inmate Liaison Committee (“ILC”) at Great Meadow. Compl. at ¶ 12. He served on that committee with another inmate named Frank Povoski. Id. at ¶ 13. On August 14, 2014 while these inmates were meeting to discuss ILC business an altercation broke out. As a result of that altercation, Plaintiff was issued a misbehavior report which charged him with assaulting inmate Povoski, possession of a weapon, and fighting. Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl., Ex. A; Dkt. No. 56-1, White Decl., Ex. B. Plaintiff denied the allegations in the misbehavior report.

After being issued the misbehavior report Plaintiff was moved to the Special Housing Unit at Great Meadow. White Decl., Ex. A (“Pl.'s Dep.”), p. 34. Pursuant to the relevant rules for the conduct of a disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to select an assistant to help him prior to the hearing and he selected Defendant Corlew. Id. at pp. 36-37; Dkt. No. 56-4, Corlew Decl. Corlew met with Plaintiff twice and admittedly provided him with some documents. Pl.'s Dep. at p. 37; Corlew Decl. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing began on August 20, 2014 and was completed September 3, 2014 with Defendant Lindstrand presiding. Dkt. No. 56-5, Lindstrand Decl. at ¶ 7. At the hearing Plaintiff and five other individuals testified. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to, inter alia, 365 days in SHU. Id. at Ex. C. Plaintiff administratively appealed to the Superintendent, Defendant Miller, who affirmed the determination. Dkt. No. 56-6, Miller Decl., Ex. A. A subsequent appeal to Defendant Venettozzi also resulted in an affirmance. Dkt. No. 56-7, Venettozzi Decl., Ex. A.

Plaintiff ultimately secured a reversal of the disciplinary determination in state court. Pl.'s Dep. at pp. 56-57. Upon a rehearing, he was found not guilty of the charges. Id. at pp. 74-75.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [] affidavits, if any, ” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994). To that end, sworn statements are “more than mere conclusory allegations subject to disregard ... they are specific and detailed allegations of fact, made under penalty of perjury, and should be treated as evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion” and the credibility of such statements is better left to a trier of fact. Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289 (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) and Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995)).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court's role “is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, where a party is proceeding pro se, the court must “read [his or her] supporting papers liberally, and ... interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims in their entirety on several grounds. First, they seek summary judgment on the ground that no protected liberty interest was implicated in this case. Dkt. No. 56-3, Defs.' Mem. of Law at p. 5. Next, they seek summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff received all the process due to him under the circumstances. Id. at pp. 6-12. Third, they seek summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at pp. 12-13. Fourth, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claim is untimely. Id. at pp. 13-14. Finally, they contend that Plaintiff is not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks. Id. at pp. 14-15.

A. Due Process

To successfully state a claim under Section 1983 for denial of due process arising out of a disciplinary hearing, a plaintiff must show that he both (1) possessed an actual liberty interest, and (2) was deprived of that interest without being afforded sufficient process. Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 654 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2000).

1. Liberty Interest

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme Court determined that to establish a liberty interest, a plaintiff must sufficiently demonstrate that (1) the State actually created a protected liberty interest in being free from segregation; and that (2) the segregation imposed an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. at 483-84. To determine whether an inmate has suffered an “atypical and significant hardship, ” the conditions imposed upon the inmate must be compared with those imposed upon the rest of the general population of the facility as well as those in administrative and protective confinement. See Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004). When assessing the severity of the hardship imposed, a court should take into account both the duration and the conditions of the confinement, where appropriate. Id. While not the only factor to be considered, the duration of a disciplinary confinement remains significant under Sandin. Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff testified, and nothing in the record refutes, that he was held in SHU for 365 days as the result of the determination at issue. Pl.'s Dep. at p. 56. He alleges that he was denied recreation and showers, among other things. Compl. at ¶¶ 83 & 85. Defendants have offered no evidence to challenge these assertions and so the Court concludes that Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to at least survive summary judgment on the question of whether a protected liberty interest was implicated on these facts. See, e.g., Greenburger v. Roundtree, 2020 WL 6561598, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4746460 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2020) (holding that the length of confinement combined with the particular facts of the confinement present unique factual questions that may not be resolved on summary judgment).

2. The Process Due

In the context of an inmate disciplinary proceeding, due process requires that the inmate be: (1) afforded advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) provided a written statement supporting the disposition and reasons for the disciplinary action taken; (3) permitted to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; (4) entitled to a fair and impartial hearing officer; and (5) found guilty only if the disposition is supported by at least “some evidence.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1974); Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing cases). Additionally because Plaintiff was confined to a special housing unit prior to his disciplinary hearing he was also entitled to an employee assistant. Clark v. Gardner, 256 F.Supp.3d 154, 170 (N.D.N.Y. 2017).

“To establish a procedural due process claim in connection with a prison disciplinary hearing, an inmate must show that he was prejudiced by the alleged procedural errors, in the sense that the errors affected the outcome of the hearing.” Clark v. Dannheim, 590 F.Supp.2d 426, 429 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). This is so because, as the Second Circuit has noted “it is entirely inappropriate to overturn the outcome of...