Peterson v. Oceana Circuit Judge

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FEAD
• Citation: Peterson v. Oceana Circuit Judge, 243 Mich. 215, 219 N.W. 934 (Mich. 1928)
• Decision Date: 22 June 1928
• Docket Number: Motion No. 88.
• Parties: PETERSON v. OCEANA CIRCUIT JUDGE.

243 Mich. 215

219 N.W. 934

PETERSON

v.OCEANA CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Motion No. 88.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 22, 1928.

Petition for mandamus by Angus Peterson against Joseph Barton, Oceana Circuit Judge. Writ denied.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except POTTER, J.Wm. J. Branstrom, of Fremont, and Earl C. Pugsley, of Hart, for petitioner.

William W. Potter, Atty. Gen., Henry J. Horrigan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Frank Bagley, Pros. Atty., and F. E. Wetmore, both of Hart, for respondent.

FEAD, C. J.

On September 7, 1927, the plaintiff was bound over for trial in the circuit court for Oceana county upon a charge that, on March 22, 1927, he had set fire to and burned a house belonging to himself, with intent to injure an insurance company which had a fire policy then in force upon the building. At the examination before the magistrate, over objections by his counsel, evidence of both verbal and written confessions of plaintiff that he had set the fire was introduced. Plaintiff made a motion to the circuit court of Oceana county to dismiss the complaint, warrant, and all proceedings had in the cause, and to discharge the plaintiff on the ground that the corpus delicti had not been established at the examination by proper evidence. The motion having been denied, a writ of mandamus is here sought to require the circuit judge to grant the motion to discharge the plaintiff.

The question is whether there was sufficient evidence before the magistrate to establish the corpus delicti, aliunds the confessions of plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiff cite as controlling People v. Kirby, 223 Mich. 440, 194 N. W. 142, and People v. Lee, 231 Mich. 607, 204 N. W. 742.

In cases of arson, proof of the corpus delicti requires the showing, not only that the building was burned, but that the fire was intentionally or willfully set. This proof may be made by circumstantial evidence, and the cited authorities forbid neither the drawing of reasonable inferences nor the weighing of probabilities.

Excluding the confessions of plaintiff, the evidence taken on the examination was brief. The building burned was a farm house. The policy of fire insurance, covering the house, furniture, implements, and a barn, was written in September, 1925. The barn burned in December, 1925, and, on the same day, plaintiff moved to another farm in the neighborhood. A tenant occupied the house until December, 1926. The building was vacant thereafter, but some of plaintiff's furniture remained in the house. On March 22, 1927, about 8:30 p. m., plaintiff appeared at Mears, after the store had closed, aroused the storekeeper, and purchased a gallon of gasoline. From Mears, two roads led toward plaintiff's home, which was north and west of Mears. The west road was much the better way to travel. On the...