Peterson v. Reeves

• Citation: 727 S.E.2d 171,315 Ga.App. 370,12 FCDR 1390
• Decision Date: 30 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. A11A1870.,A11A1870.
• Parties: PETERSON v. REEVES et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

315 Ga.App. 370

727 S.E.2d 171

12 FCDR 1390

PETERSON

v.REEVES et al.

No. A11A1870.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 30, 2012.

Lawrence Alan Stagg, Ringgold, for appellant.

Regland & Jones, Evan Wier Jones, Atlanta, Andrew D. Lewi, F. Laurens Brock, for appellee.

McFADDEN, Judge.

Monisa Reeves and the conservator of her estate sued psychiatrist Mark Peterson for injuries she sustained when she attempted suicide. Peterson moved for summary judgment, arguing that he had no duty to involuntarily commit Reeves, who was participating in voluntary, outpatient mental health care. Because we find that whether Peterson breached duties arising from the psychiatrist-patient relationship is an issue of fact, we affirm the denial of Peterson's motion for summary judgment.

We decline Peterson's invitation to establish a rule that, as a matter of law, a psychiatrist's statutory duty to “bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of care and skill,” OCGA § 51–1–27, can never be violated by failure to involuntarily commit a patient. Such innovations are the province of the General Assembly.

We likewise decline Peterson's invitation to add “control” of the patient to the essential elements of medical malpractice in cases of suicide. Again such innovations are for the General Assembly. And the evidence at bar, construed as Reeves, the nonmovant on summary judgment is entitled to have it construed, shows why judicial creation of such a rule would be improper. The evidence would authorize a jury to find that Peterson shares in the responsibility for a negligent failure to subject Reeves to a suicide or self-injury risk assessment, an adequate psychiatric evaluation, and consideration for hospitalization; that he shares in the responsibility for the failure to stabilize Reeves in a proper medication regimen; and that he was negligent in failing to be available for consultation, or to have another psychiatrist available, when she was discharged. And the evidence would authorize a jury to find that those negligent omissions were a proximate cause of the defendant's lack of control over Reeves at the time of her attempted suicide as well as of the attempted suicide itself.

1. On appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga.App. 459(1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (1997).

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment under OCGA § 9–11–56, the moving party must show that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demand judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, on appeal from the denial or grant of summary judgment the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

(Citations omitted.) Benton v. Benton, 280 Ga. 468, 470, 629 S.E.2d 204 (2006).

Viewed in a light most favorable to Reeves as the nonmovant, the facts show that Reeves has a history of mental illness dating back to December 2001, and she began seeing Peterson at that time. She continued her treatment with Peterson, as well as other mental healthcare providers, until the incident at issue. She has been diagnosed with a schizo-affective disorder, a recurrent major depressive disorder, a bipolar disorder and psychotic disorders related to her other mental illnesses.

On August 5 or 6, 2005, Reeves's brother took her to the Parkridge Valley Hospital emergency room because she exhibited psychotic symptoms and behavior. She was not hospitalized. The next day, she attempted to jump from a balcony into an empty swimming pool. Reeves's friend called 911, and the police took her to the Hutcheson Medical Center emergency room. Reeves was found to be at high risk of committing suicide and was involuntarily committed to Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital.

Three days later, Reeves's status was changed from involuntary to voluntary, and on August 15, 2005, she was discharged to Horizons Crisis Group Home, a voluntary treatment facility. On August 17, 2005, Horizons discharged Reeves at her request.

On August 23, 2005, Reeves's brother and sister-in-law again brought her to the Hutcheson Medical Center emergency room. Later that evening, she was admitted to Horizons Crisis Group Home. Peterson saw Reeves on August 26, 2005, diagnosed her with severe major depressive disorder with psychosis and bipolar disorder with psychosis, and prescribed medication.

On August 29, 2005, Reeves was discharged from Horizons either at her request or perhaps for unspecified “administrative reasons.” According to the expert affidavit Reeves submitted with her complaint, there was no indication that Reeves was subjected to a suicide or self-injury risk assessment, an adequate psychiatric evaluation, or considered for hospitalization, even though she had been admitted to Horizons because of clinical instability and danger of suicide.

On the evening of August 31, 2005, Reeves poured gasoline over herself and set herself on fire.

Reeves and her conservator filed this action against multiple defendants, seeking damages for Reeves's pain and suffering, medical expenses, personal injuries and economic losses. Peterson moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. Peterson moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied that motion as well. After we granted his application for interlocutory appeal, Peterson filed this appeal.

2. Peterson argues that Georgia law requires a psychiatrist to have control over a patient before he can be held liable for “any resulting harm” and that because he lacked control over Reeves, he had no affirmative duty to prevent her suicide attempt. His authority for that argument is the plurality opinion in Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982).

Bradley Center is not on point. In that case, our Supreme Court, “granted certiorari to consider whether an individual other than the patient can recover for the alleged malpractice of the physician where that person is injured by the criminal conduct of the patient and there is no privity between the injured party and the physician.” 250 Ga. at 200, 296 S.E.2d 693. The court's “concern ... [was] with the first element [of the cause of action for negligence]—specifically, whether a physician can owe a legal duty of care to an injured party who was not his patient.” Id. The court was at pains to make clear that Bradley Center was “not a malpractice case; it [was] an ordinary negligence case in which privity has never been an essential element.” Id. at 203, 299 S.E.2d 188. The Supreme Court explained that in

cases [ ] called ‘classic medical malpractice actions' by the Court of Appeals, doctor-patient privity is essential because it is this ‘relation which exists between physician and patient which is a result of a consensual transaction’ that establishes the legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga.App. 727, 731 [ , 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955)].

Id. at 201, 296 S.E.2d 693.

Rather the duty at issue in Bradley Center “ar[ose] out of the general duty one owes to all the world not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Id. at 201, 296 S.E.2d 693. Consequently the court found it necessary to address the “general rule [that] there is no duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing physical harm to others.” Id. (citing Shockley v. Zayre &c., Inc., 118 Ga.App. 672, 165 S.E.2d 179 (1968); Restatement of Torts 2d, § 315). The court found applicable one of the exceptions to that rule: “One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 201–202, 296 S.E.2d 693 (citing Restatement of Torts 2d, § 319; Prosser, Torts, § 56, p. 349). Reeves was Peterson's patient. So they were in privity. It follows that Bradley Center has no application here.

This court has twice declined to extend Bradley Center to medical malpractice cases—most recently over a dissent joined by Judge Andrews. Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga.App. 472, 476(3), 552 S.E.2d 865 (2001); Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. O'Neal, 198 Ga.App. 770, 773–774(3), 403 S.E.2d 235 (1991). We now decline that invitation for the third time—and with it we decline the invitation in Judge Andrews's dissent here to disregard the rationale of Bradley Center and distinguish Purcell on its facts.

3. Peterson next argues that no duty should be placed on a psychiatrist in a voluntary, outpatient facility to involuntarily commit any patient. But the General Assembly has imposed on every physician the duty to “bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of care and skill.” OCGA § 51–1–27. If the decision whether to involuntarily commit a patient in such circumstances is to be excepted from that statutory duty, it is for the General Assembly to create the exception.

But the General Assembly has taken the opposite course—notwithstanding that it has established a public policy favoring treatment of psychiatric patients in the least restrictive appropriate care setting. The chapter setting out that policy contains an immunity provision. Until last year, it read:

Any ... physician ... who acts in good faith in compliance with the admission and discharge provisions of this chapter shall be immune from civil or criminal liability for his or her actions in connection with the admission of a patient to a facility or the discharge of a patient from a facility.

OCGA § 37–3–4. Effective July 1, 2011, the General Assembly amended that provision, adding language that reaffirms the...