Peterson v. State
| Decision Date | 14 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 382S105,382S105 |
| Citation | 453 N.E.2d 196 |
| Parties | Allenn Glenn PETERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Peter L. Benjamin, Merrillville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-appellant Allenn Glenn Peterson was convicted of Murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1 (Burns Repl.1979), Rape (class A felony), Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1 (Burns Repl.1979), and Robbery (class B felony), Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns Repl.1979), at the conclusion of a jury trial in Lake Superior Court on October 22, 1981. The defendant was sentenced to a term of forty-five (45) years for the murder, thirty-five (35) years for the rape, and thirty (30) years for the robbery. Sentences for the murder and rape were ordered to be served consecutively; the sentence for the robbery was ordered to be served concurrent with the sentence imposed for the rape. Peterson now appeals.
Peterson raises three errors on appeal, concerning: 1) whether the trial court erred in admitting color photographs of the victim after the cause of death was established; 2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the defendant's statement given to the police; and, 3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motions for mistrial.
On March 11, 1981, the defendant spent the day with Robert Watkins. They were at the home of Kevin Lee Thomas from about 11:30 a.m. until 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., and spent most of that time drinking beer. Thomas stated that though he knew Watkins and Peterson used drugs, none were consumed at his house on that day. Both Watkins and Peterson were known to study and practice karate. After leaving Thomas's home, they went to the home of Watkins and there the defendant killed Watkins by stabbing him several times and beating him. When Watkins' mother, Bessie White, arrived at home at approximately 9:30 p.m. on that day, she was met at the door by Peterson. Peterson then raped her and left her tied and gagged. The house was in total disarray and Watkins' body was found under a mattress. There was shaving cream on Watkins' face, covering one eye, and there were some lewd messages written in shaving cream on various places throughout the house. Peterson gave a statement to the police in which he said he and Watkins were practicing karate and he accidentally injured Watkins during the encounter. An autopsy revealed the cause of death was multiple stab wounds to the chest and abdomen, lacerating the heart and lungs.
There were four color photographs admitted into evidence showing the victim's body taken from different angles, depicting not only the body's position but also the general disarray of the room. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these color photographs since the cause of death had already been established by the coroner's report and they did nothing more than inflame the jury since their prejudicial character outweighed their probative value. These photographs, however, showed the body as it was discovered by the police and demonstrated its position in relation to the entire scene of the crime. The fact that a photograph is gruesome and might arouse the jury is not sufficient ground in itself to justify its exclusion from the evidence if it is material and relevant. A test to be applied when photographs are admitted into evidence is whether a witness would be permitted to describe verbally the subject of the photographs. Rowan v. State, (1982) Ind., 431 N.E.2d 805, 816-17; Jackson v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 685, 687. These photographs could reasonably be determined to be helpful to the jury in identifying the crime scene and the position of the body and its condition. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting them into evidence.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements, alleging that the statements were made under a promise of reward and were not freely and voluntarily given. This motion was denied by the trial court.
Police Officer Gerald Rodda stated that the defendant was read his constitutional rights, was asked if he understood them, and was given a form, setting out his rights, to read, all before the defendant gave a statement. He signed a waiver and indicated that he understood his rights. A statement was then taken from him. Prior to this, all of the defendant's clothes, except his underclothes, had been taken from him when he was brought into the jail in the early morning hours so they could be examined. This took place in March and it was chilly in the cell. Defendant was cold and shivering when he was brought from his cell and the police found clothing for him and gave him coffee to drink. Rodda did not remember exactly when this was done, perhaps a couple of hours before the statement was taken. Later, a second and shorter statement was taken from the defendant for the purpose of straightening out a few facts. The same procedure was followed in the taking of this statement as was taken with the first one. The only claim of any promise made to the defendant to induce him to give a statement was the allegation that Rodda told him that if he told the truth, the judge would be lenient with him. Rodda and other police officers present denied that, stating that no promise was ever made to the defendant. They said there was no discussion about what the judge would do but they asked the defendant if he wished to give a statement and he agreed to do so.
The only other claim the defendant makes about the involuntariness of his statements was that he had been drinking beer and smoking pot to a great extent during the previous day. He argues he was still under the influence of the beer and pot to the extent that he could not freely and voluntarily waive his rights and give a confession. The police testified that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of liquor or narcotics, or drugs of any kind, that he seemed coherent, and that he was able to freely and openly discuss the incidents with them. They gave him coffee and cigarettes and took several breaks during the three hour period of the first statement. The second statement took about twenty minutes.
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the voluntariness of a statement or waiver, we do not weigh the evidence but determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding. In determining whether a statement was voluntarily given or whether a waiver of the Miranda rights has occurred, we look to all the circumstances surrounding its giving to determine whether it was induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influence. Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 553, 356 N.E.2d 1188, 1191; Montes v. State, (1975) ...
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