Peterson v. State

Decision Date31 March 2020
Docket NumberNo. 14, Sept. Term, 2019,14, Sept. Term, 2019
Citation467 Md. 713,226 A.3d 246
Parties Elijah PETERSON v. STATE of Maryland
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by Kiran Iyer, Assistant Public Defender (Claire Caplan, Assistant Public Defender and Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD) on brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Carrie J. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD) on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Hotten, J. Section 3-110 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("Crim. Proc.") provides defendants the opportunity to plead "not criminally responsible" to a criminal charge. The General Assembly enacted §§ 3-101–123 to outline the process for such a plea. When a defendant is found guilty but "not criminally responsible" ("NCR"), the defendant is committed to the Maryland Department of Health ("the Department") for inpatient care or treatment.1 A court may thereafter authorize "conditional release" for a defendant with specified conditions recommended by the Department, and if the defendant violates those conditions, the defendant may be re-confined to an appropriate facility chosen by the Department. The instant case addresses whether defendants found guilty, but not criminally responsible, may seek post-conviction relief through the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a writ of error coram nobis , or a writ of habeas corpus .

Petitioner, Elijah Peterson ("Mr. Peterson"), seeks review of a ruling by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County that denied both Mr. Peterson’s request for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPPA") and his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis . The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to answer the following three questions:

1. Is post[-]conviction relief available to a person who has been convicted of a crime, found not to be criminally responsible, and is either committed to a psychiatric hospital or on conditional release?
2. Is coram nobis relief available to a person who has been convicted of a crime, found to be not criminally responsible, and is either committed to a psychiatric hospital or on conditional release?
3. Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in holding that [Mr. Peterson], who was convicted of a crime and found not to be criminally responsible and was on conditional release, was not eligible to collaterally challenge his convictions by either a post[-]conviction petition or a petition for writ of coram nobis ?

For reasons discussed below, we affirm the well-reasoned analysis of the Court of Special Appeals on the questions presented. However, given the Court’s recent decision in Sabisch v. Moyer , a circuit court, upon receipt of an appropriate filing, could render a determination regarding whether Maryland’s habeas corpus statute is implicated with respect to Mr. Peterson.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Factual Background

In March 2007, Mr. Peterson, while walking down the middle of the road on Marlboro Pike in Prince George’s County, pointed what appeared to be, a rifle at a police vehicle as it passed. He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of auto theft, one count of attempted theft over $500, one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, one count of attempted armed carjacking, two counts of first-degree assault, and two counts of second-degree assault. Mr. Peterson entered a plea of not guilty, but through counsel, proceeded to a bench trial on an agreed statement of facts. The bench trial consisted of the following colloquy:

[THE STATE]: Your Honor, had this matter gone to trial, the State would have put on evidence that on March 6, 2007, members of the Washington Area Vehicle Enforcement Team were working in the area of Marlboro Pike and Brooks Drive. Corporal Stakes and Corporal Aponte of the Prince George’s County Police Department were driving west on Marlboro Pike when they observed the Defendant, Mr. [ ] Peterson, ... entering the roadway with what they believed to be a silver rifle, held with both hands, raised at shoulder level with his head tucked downward, pointing the perceived weapon at an oncoming vehicle. The county cruiser was in the slow lane and the first vehicle was in the fast lane. The driver of the first vehicle slammed on its brakes and swerved in front of their vehicle to avoid [Mr. Peterson], who appeared to be pointing a silver rifle at that particular car.
Mr. Peterson was still in the roadway, still advancing forward, pointing the apparent rifle at Corporal Aponte, who was driving a 1987 brown Chevrolet truck. Corpora[l] Aponte recognized the silver weapon and ... [he] stopped his vehicle because he believed that [Mr. Peterson] was attempting to carjack both the Corporal and the other motorist. At that time Corporal Aponte got out of his vehicle and confronted [Mr. Peterson]. He gave Mr. Peterson verbal commands to drop the weapon and get on the ground and placed him under arrest without incident.
Further investigation revealed that what they believed to be a silver rifle[ ] was, in fact, a silver caulk gun[ ] and all events occurred in Prince George’s County, Maryland.
THE COURT: Was the caulk gun loaded?
[MR. PETERSON]: No.
THE COURT: It wasn’t loaded. Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, those are the allegations. We believe it’s a true statement of facts as to what occurred on that particular date.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that being the case, the Court finds him guilty of the offenses.
* * *
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What is supported [by the facts] would be second degree assault of both police officers.
THE COURT: I find him guilty of that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But the other charges, the auto theft, there was no auto theft.
THE COURT: How about – okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. They stopped.
THE COURT: All right. I find him not guilty of the other counts, then. And I also find him not criminally responsible based upon the report from Springfield.

Overall, the circuit court found Mr. Peterson guilty of two counts of second-degree assault, and determined that he was NCR because he lacked substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See Crim. Proc. § 3-109(a).2 Thereafter, the circuit court ordered Mr. Peterson to be civilly committed to the Department for inpatient treatment. The court never asked Mr. Peterson whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty. The court never advised Mr. Peterson that he had a right to a jury trial or asked whether he was waiving that right.

On December 5, 2007, the circuit court ordered Mr. Peterson to be conditionally released from the Department for a period of five years, subject to conditions that included mandatory mental health and substance abuse treatment. Mr. Peterson was also required to comply with recommendations from his mental health treatment provider and either reside on hospital grounds or in other housing approved by the Department.3 He was required to voluntarily admit himself to a psychiatric facility as requested by his mental health provider. Mr. Peterson could not own, possess, or use a firearm of any kind or take illicit drugs, use alcohol, or abuse prescription drugs. Between 2008 and 2013, the circuit court issued Mr. Peterson multiple orders for conditional release, in which the circuit court placed similar conditions on Mr. Peterson as the original order in December 2007. In March 2013, the circuit court maintained the previously imposed conditions, but also required Mr. Peterson to refrain from initiating contact with the victim of his crime. Procedural Background

1. Circuit Court Proceedings

On July 24, 2012, during conditional release, Mr. Peterson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPPA").4 After securing counsel, Mr. Peterson filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which asserted (1) Mr. Peterson’s NCR plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and was invalid because the record failed to demonstrate that he understood the nature of the charges and (2) Mr. Peterson’s original counsel was ineffective because he did not inform Mr. Peterson of the consequences of pleading NCR.

On June 11, 2013, the circuit court conducted a hearing regarding Mr. Peterson’s post-conviction request. On November 15, 2013, the court denied Mr. Peterson’s request for post-conviction relief and held that Mr. Peterson was neither "confined" nor on "probation or parole," for purposes of the UPPA.

On January 10, 2014, while committed, Mr. Peterson filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and requested a hearing to vacate the 2007 NCR judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court found that Mr. Peterson’s commitment to the Department was a direct consequence of his NCR plea, and, therefore, not a collateral consequence. The court denied Mr. Peterson’s request for coram nobis relief. Mr. Peterson’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied because the court determined that Mr. Peterson was never "convicted" and that he failed to demonstrate significant collateral consequences.

Mr. Peterson timely appealed both the denial of his respective petitions for post-conviction claim and his coram nobis relief to the Court of Special Appeals.

2. The Court of Special Appeals Proceedings

The Court of Special Appeals initially reviewed the history of the NCR plea to ascertain whether a defendant who enters such a plea, is eligible for post-conviction or coram nobis relief. Peterson v. State , 2019 WL 328416 at *3-5 (2019). The Court of Special Appeals held that the

NCR statutory scheme recognizes that ‘no valid purpose would be furthered by holding the [NCR defendant] accountable for his acts. [NCR] is a recognition that none of the theories which underlie our criminal law—prevention,
...

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