Peterson v. United States, Case No. 3:19-cv-00463
| Decision Date | 12 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-00463,Criminal Case No. 3:18-cr-00070-02 |
| Parties | MANGET PETERSON, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the Court is Movant's pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 671).1 The United States has filed a Response, asking the Court to deny the Motion. (ECF No. 684). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by Standing Order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having determined that Movant clearly is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the undersigned FINDS no basis for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the presiding District Judge DENY Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; DISMISS this civil action, with prejudice; and REMOVE this matter from the docket of the Court.
On April 3, 2018, Movant Manget Peterson ("Peterson") was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia (the "Sentencing Court") on one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl. (ECF No. 1). On August 7, 2018, Peterson signed a plea agreement with the United States in which he agreed to plead guilty to the Indictment in exchange for the United States' promise not to file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. (ECF No. 409). Peterson and the United States stipulated to certain facts and agreed that, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG"), Peterson's adjusted offense level would be 32. (Id. at 6). The parties reserved their rights to argue for and against a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) and acknowledged their understanding that neither the Probation Office, nor the Sentencing Court, was bound by the parties' calculation of the USSG offense level. (Id.). Peterson agreed to waive his right to seek appellate review of his conviction and sentence, unless the sentence exceeded the maximum penalty allowed by law. (Id. at 6-7). He likewise waived his right to collaterally attack his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence on any ground, except on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 7).
On August 21, 2018, the Sentencing Court accepted Peterson's plea of guilty to the charge set forth in the Indictment, found him guilty of the charge, and scheduled a sentencing hearing on December 3, 2018. (ECF No. 410). Senior United States Probation Officer, Beth Srednicki, prepared a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") at the Sentencing Court's request. (ECF No. 584). In the PSR, Officer Srednicki calculated Peterson's adjusted offense level to be 34. (Id. at 24-25). She found that Peterson's base offense level was 30, and she increased the base offense level by two levels to account forPeterson's role as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the drug trafficking organization in which he was involved. (ECF No. 584 at 24-25). Another two-level increase was added for Peterson's possession of a firearm. (Id. at 24). With a three-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility, Peterson's total offense level was 31. (Id. at 25). Based on his total offense level and Criminal History Category of I, Officer Srednicki calculated Peterson's USSG sentence range to be 108 to 135 months of imprisonment. (Id. at 31). His statutory minimum sentence was five years in prison, with a statutory maximum of no more than 40-years' imprisonment. (Id.). Peterson's lawyer, Glen Conway ("Conway"), objected to the portion of the PSR that added two levels to the offense level based upon Peterson's possession of a firearm, but no objection was lodged as to the two-level enhancement for Peterson's role in the conspiracy. (Id. at 35).
On January 22, 2019, the Sentencing Court adopted the PSR and entered judgment against Peterson, imposing a sentence of 108 months of incarceration, followed by four years of supervised release. (ECF No. 581). Peterson did not appeal his sentence, but filed the instant motion under § 2255. (ECF No. 671). In the petition, Peterson raises three grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he claims that Conway misled him into signing the plea agreement by telling him that if he failed to plead guilty, he would be designated as a career criminal. (ECF No. 671 at 4). Peterson contends that this advice was faulty. Second, Peterson asserts that Conway should have challenged the leadership enhancement to the sentence. According to Peterson, Conway refused to object to the sentence enhancement even though Peterson asked him to do so, and even in the face of questioning by the Sentencing Court as to why no objection was made. (Id.) Finally, Peterson argues that Conway should have challenged "the relevant conduct of Mr. David Miller." (Id. at 7). Peterson indicates that certain communications between his co-defendants, Mr. Miller and Willie Peterson, were attributed to Peterson although he did not participate in the communications. (Id.). Peterson does not explicitly state the relief he seeks, but given the nature of the motion, he presumably wants his conviction and sentence vacated, set aside, or corrected.
On June 20, 2019, the undersigned ordered Conway to file an affidavit responding to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 674). In addition, the United States was ordered to file a response to the Motion to Vacate within forty-five days after receipt of Conway's affidavit. (Id.). Conway's affidavit was filed on July 23, 2019, (ECF No. 681), and the United States submitted its response on August 27, 2019. Peterson was given thirty days to file a reply. (ECF No. 685). More than thirty days have passed, and Peterson has not replied. The Court recently requested that the United States supply transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings, and those transcripts were made part of the record on June 9, 2020. (ECF Nos. 715, 717). Therefore, this matter is fully briefed and ready for resolution.
A motion made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence that was entered in a separate proceeding. To succeed on such a motion, the movant must prove that the conviction or sentence was imposed in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States; or the court imposing the sentence lacked jurisdiction; or the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or the sentence was otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. "A motion collaterally attacking a prisoner's sentence brought pursuant to § 2255 requires the petitioner to establish his grounds by a preponderance of the evidence." Sutton v. United States of America, No. CRIM.A. 2:02CR65, Civ.A. 2:05CV91, 2006 WL 36859, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan.4, 2006). Consistent with the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts ("Rules"), the court should conduct a preliminary review of the motion. See Rule 4. The court may then order the respondent to answer the motion and may authorize the parties to conduct discovery; the court may also direct the parties to expand the record as necessary to properly assess the validity of the motion. See Rules 5, 6, & 7. Once these steps are completed, the court must review the answer, transcripts, records of prior proceedings, and any other materials submitted to determine whether an evidentiary hearing on the motion is warranted. See Rule 8(a). If the movant is clearly unable to state a claim that entitles him to relief, the court may deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970). Furthermore, "vague and conclusory allegations contained in a § 2255 petition may be disposed of without further investigation by the District Court." United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
As indicated, Peterson's claims are based on alleged instances of constitutionally deficient performance by his attorney. These claims assert violations of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees every criminal defendant "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). Under Strickland, a criminal defendant can prove ineffective assistance of counsel by meeting the requirements of a two-pronged test. Id. at 687. The defendant carries the burden of satisfying both prongs of the test, and "a failure of proof on either prong ends the matter." United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 404 (4th Cir. 1994).
First, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below anobjective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. When evaluating counsel's performance under the first prong of Strickland, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The "court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance ... [and] that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Counsel's performance should be assessed with "a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel's perspective at the time." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). A counsel's trial strategy devised after investigating the law and facts is "virtually unchallengeable." Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 1995)....
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