Peterson v. Wiggins
| Decision Date | 20 March 1911 |
| Docket Number | 302 |
| Citation | 230 Pa. 631,79 A. 767 |
| Parties | Peterson, Appellant, v. Wiggins |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 11, 1911
Appeal, No. 302, Jan. T., 1910, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Phila. Co., June T., 1904, No. 2,488, for defendants non obstante veredicto in case of Matilda Peterson v. John R. Wiggins et al. copartners, trading as John R Wiggins & Company. Affirmed.
Trespass to recover damages for death of plaintiff's husband. Before WILLSON, P.J.
At the trial defendants made the following offer:
Mr Bracken offered in evidence record in the case of Matilda Peterson v. Lewis G. Shoemaker and Thomas C. Satterthwaite, copartners, trading as Lewis G. Shoemaker & Company, court of common pleas No. 5, December Term, 1903, No. 719.
Mr. Bracken: In connection with the record I also offer in evidence the admission made by the plaintiff, to wit, that she is the plaintiff in the suit against Shoemaker & Company and made a settlement with Shoemaker & Company in that suit, wherein she received from them the sum of $500 and gave to them an order to mark the said suit discontinued, settled and ended, the claim in that suit being based upon the same accident which is the basis of the present suit.
Mr. Scott: As to the admission, I do not see how that can be offered in evidence.
As to the record, I object to it, because it is absolutely immaterial and irrelevant.
The Court: This is intended to lay the basis of a claim on the part of the defendants that one of two tort feasors made a settlement, and that that enures to the benefit of the other.
Mr. Bracken: Yes, sir. That he cannot make a settlement with one man and hold him responsible and turn around and sue somebody else.
Objection overruled.
Exception noted for plaintiff by direction of the court. [1]
The plaintiff's statement of claim in the suit of Matilda Peterson v. Lewis G. Shoemaker et al. was the same, except as to the name of the defendants, as in the present suit.
Verdict for plaintiff for $3,500. Subsequently the court entered judgment for defendants non obstante veredicto.
Errors assigned were (1, 2) in entering judgment for defendants n.o.v.; (3) ruling on evidence, quoting the bill of exceptions.
Judgment affirmed.
Henry J. Scott, for appellants, cited: Thomas v. R.R. Co., 194 Pa. 511; Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 29 W.N.C. 87; McCully v. Clarke, 40 Pa. 399; Kay v. Penna. R.R. Co., 65 Pa. 269; Penna. R.R. Co. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. 142.
F. B. Bracken, of Loughlin & Bracken, for appellees. -- The case is ruled by Seither v. Phila. Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397.
Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
If it be a fact appearing in the case that the present action was brought against defendants for a joint trespass with another and that that other having made compensation for the injury had been released from liability, then the case was rightly ruled in the court below, and the judgment non obstante must be sustained; for it is a settled rule that whenever satisfaction has been received from one of several joint tortfeasors all are thereby discharged. The contention of the appellee here is that this rule, which is admitted, applies only as between established joint tort feasors, so that when one is separately sued for the trespass alleged -- in the present case it was negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's husband -- he can avail himself of the rule only as he shows that the party who was released was in fact a joint trespasser with himself. For the sake of the argument we may concede that this is so. The position taken is not without authorities supporting it, though authorities to the contrary are even more numerous. The case in hand calls for no opinion as to which rest on the better reason, for if any such burden rested on these defendants it was met and discharged. There appears on the record of this case the following admission by the plaintiff's counsel: "I will admit that the plaintiff, in this case, in addition to the present suit, brought a suit against Shoemaker & Company, and that Mr. Wylie representing Shoemaker & Company, in that case, paid her $500 for an order to discontinue, settle, and end the suit of Matilda Peterson v. Lewis G. Shoemaker and Thomas C. Satterthwaite, copartners trading as Lewis G. Shoemaker &...
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Union of Russian Societies of St. Michael & St. George, Inc. v. Koss
...such injury, necessarily works a release of all others liable for the same injury and prevents further proceeding against them: Peterson v. Wiggins, 230 Pa. 631; Smith Roydhouse, Arey & Co., 244 Pa. 474; Mason v. Lavine, 302 Pa. 472. This is true even though it was intended, or the release ......
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McClure v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
...given for a satisfaction, actual or intended; was immaterial and irrelevant to the issue, and not a bar to plaintiff's recovery: Peterson v. Wiggins, 230 Pa. 631; Thomas v. R. Co., 194 Pa. 511. The release is conclusive only between the parties thereto, and parol evidence was admissible to ......
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Smith v. Falcone
...end." See also Mason C. Lewis v. Lavine, Inc., 302 Pa. 472 (1931); Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey & Company, 244 Pa. 474 (1914); Peterson v. Wiggins, 230 Pa. 631 (1911). The rule was applicable " even though it was or the release expressly stipulated, that the other wrongdoers should not thereby ......
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