Petit v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 07–1583 (RMU). |
| Citation | 756 F.Supp.2d 11 |
| Parties | Beth PETIT, et al., Plaintiffs,v.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark W. Mosier, Emily Johnson Henn, Covington & Burling, Schuyler William Livingston, Jr., Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.Michelle Renee Bennett, Tamra Tyree Moore, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Idea Claim; Denying the Plaintiffs' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment on the Idea Claim
This matter concerns a regulation promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education (“the Department”) that excludes cochlear implant mapping as a service covered under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“the IDEA” or “the Act”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. The plaintiffs, parents of children with cochlear implants , argue that the regulation violates the IDEA and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The court, having already granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiffs' APA claim, now turns to the parties' cross motions for summary judgment on the remaining IDEA claim. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denies the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' IDEA claim.
The IDEA entitles children with disabilities to special education and “related services” that are “designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1414(d). The IDEA defines “related services” to include
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including ... audiology services ... and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to state that “[t]he term [related services] does not include a medical device that is surgically implanted, or the replacement of such device.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(B) (the “medical device exception”).
Cochlear implants are surgically implanted hearing aids that are Compl. ¶ 18. Each implant has an external and an internal component. Id. ¶ 19. The external component consists of a microphone, speech processor and transmitter system. Id. The microphone, worn at ear level, detects sounds from the environment. Id. The pager-size speech processor then converts the sound detected by the microphone into electrical signals and then, with the help of the transmitter system, transmits the electrical signals to the internal component. Id.; Defs.' Supplemental Mem. in Support of their Mot. to Dismiss or Alternatively, for Summ. J. ( ) at 8. The internal component is a surgically implanted receiver connected to electrodes; the receiver “takes the radio waves from the transmitter system and stimulates the selected electrodes so that the brain receives” audio signals. Compl. ¶ 20.
A properly functioning cochlear implant stimulates the auditory nerve in a manner that allows the brain to process the electrical stimuli. Id. ¶ 21. A process known as “mapping” allows an audiologist to optimize the amount of stimulation to the auditory nerve. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Mapping requires that an audiologist connect the child's external speech processor to a computer that utilizes special software to measure a child's response to electrical stimulation. Id. ¶ 22. The software measures the characteristics of the implanted electrodes and adjusts “the parameters controlling the stimuli that will be delivered to the electrodes” within the implant. Id. The first mapping session typically takes place after the receiver is surgically implanted; the implant is then calibrated to the child's unique needs through subsequent mapping sessions. Pls.' Cross–Mot. for Summ. J. & Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or Alternatively, for Summ. J. ( ) at 5–6; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or Alternatively, for Summ. J. ( ) at 9.
After receiving numerous comments requesting clarification as to whether the IDEA covered cochlear implant mapping as a “related service,” Defs.' Supplemental Resp. Mem. ( ) at 9; see also 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,569 (Aug. 14, 2006), the Secretary of Education (“the Secretary”) promulgated a regulation on August 14, 2006 specifying that “[r]elated services do not include ... the optimization of [a surgically implanted] device's functioning (e.g., mapping).” 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(b)(1) (“the 2006 regulation”). The 2006 regulation states that “routine checking of an external component” of a cochlear implant, however, remains a “related service” under the IDEA. Id. § 300.34(b)(2)(iii).
The plaintiffs, parents of disabled children with cochlear implants, brought suit under the IDEA and the APA on September 6, 2007, alleging that the 2006 regulation excluding cochlear implant mapping from the definition of “related services” contravenes the IDEA, exceeds the Secretary's rulemaking authority and is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. Compl. ¶¶ 46–53. On December 13, 2007, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment. See generally Defs.' Mot. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit and that the IDEA does not create a private right of action against the federal government. Petit v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 578 F.Supp.2d 145, 151–53 (D.D.C.2008). Accordingly, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' IDEA claim. Id.
The court, however, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' APA claim after concluding that the Secretary had acted reasonably in interpreting the definition of “related service” under the IDEA so as not to include cochlear mapping. Id. at 153–60. Because the parties' did not fully address the merits of the plaintiffs' IDEA claim, the court declined to rule on the defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to that claim, and ordered the parties to provide additional briefing on the issue. Minute Order (July 14, 2009). With the parties' supplemental briefing now complete, the court turns to the parties' arguments and the applicable legal standards.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are “material,” a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A “genuine issue” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.
The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations made in a sworn affidavit if he “support[s] his allegations ... with facts in the record,” Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993)), or provides “direct testimonial evidence,” Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, for the court to accept anything less “would defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant the expense of a jury trial.” Greene, 164 F.3d at 675.
The defendants argue that, pursuant to the Department's 2006 regulation, cochlear implant mapping is not a required service under the IDEA. Defs.' Suppl. Mem. at 13–25. The plaintiffs counter that the 2006 regulation violates the IDEA and is thus void. Pls.' Supplemental Mem. in Support of their Mot. for Summ. J. ( ) at 1–7.
The Secretary's authority to promulgate regulations is governed by 20 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a)(b), which state as...
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Petit v. United States Dep't of Educ.
...the IDEA. The District Court rejected Appellants' claims and granted summary judgment to the Department. See Petit v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 756 F.Supp.2d 11 (D.D.C.2010); Petit v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 578 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.D.C.2008). Appellants now appeal. We conclude that the phrase “audiolo......