Petition of Mich. State Highway Commission, Canton Tp., Wayne County

• Decision Date: 19 August 1970
• Docket Number: No. 3,I--275,A,3
• Citation: Petition of Mich. State Highway Commission, Canton Tp., Wayne County, 178 N.W.2d 923, 383 Mich. 709 (Mich. 1970)
• Parties: Petition of the MICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION for Condemnation of Private Property for Highwayin the TOWNSHIP OF CANTON, WAYNE COUNTY, Michigan. pril Term 1970.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 923

178 N.W.2d 923

383 Mich. 709

Petition of the MICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION for

Condemnation of Private Property for Highway

I--275 in the TOWNSHIP OF CANTON, WAYNE

COUNTY, Michigan.

No. 3, April Term 1970.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 19, 1970.

Travis, Warren, Nayer & Burgoyne, Harry M. Nayer, Bert Burgoyne, Frederick D. Steinhardt, Detroit, for respondent-appellee, The American Oil Co.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, John M. Roche, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

T. M. KAVANAGH, Justice.

The Michigan State Highway Commission filed its petition for acquisition of certain properties located along Ford Road, in Canton township, Wayne county, Michigan. Petitioner alleged that on the 20th day of November, 1968, a declaration of taking was made by the petitioner, Michigan State Highway Commission, declaring a certain highway improvement to be necessary for the use and benefit of the public, to wit, the laying out, establishing and opening of Highway I--275 in and through Canton township, Wayne county, Michigan, as a limited access highway with necessary grade separations and interchanges.

The petition was made and filed under the provisions of P.A.1966, No. 295, as amended, ¹ and where applicable P.A.1941, No. 205, as amended, ² to acquire private property and property rights set forth in detail in the declaration of taking. The petition alleged that each parcel of property involved a partial taking, that is, that only a relatively small portion of each owner's total property was required for right-of-way purposes.

The petition set forth that the public improvement for which this right-of-way was being taken from the parcels involved was the construction of an interchange between Highway I--275 and Ford Road and that such interchange would be in the immediate vicinity of the remainder of these parcels.

Petitioner claimed there would be an enhancement in value to the remainder of each of these parcels by virtue of the construction and opening of this interchange and that the value of the property remaining to each of the owners would exceed the value of his total parcel before the right-of-way taking. The declaration of taking attached to the petition and made a part thereof described the parcels of land, the portions to be taken, and concluded that the estimated just compensation for each parcel was the sum of $100.

The American Oil Company, respondent-owner of one of the parcels involved, filed an answer in which it admitted the execution of said declaration of taking, but denied the validity thereof for the reason a good faith offer to purchase the property had not been made as required by P.A.1966, No. 295, § 6(1), as amended (M.C.L.A. § 213.366; Stat.Ann.1970 Cum.Supp. § 8.261(6)), and further asserted that the amount of compensation estimated by petitioner for the taking of said property as stated in the declaration of taking was inadequate.

Respondent admitted the allegations of the petition that the highway improvement was necessary for the use and benefit of the public and the taking of the private property described in the declaration of taking was necessary for the use and benefit of the public.

Respondent prayed that the court enter an order quashing the petition, setting aside the declaration of taking theretofore filed, and dismissing the action.

The trial judge at the conclusion of oral arguments on the motion questioning the court's jurisdiction entered the following order on April 9, 1969:

'This matter having come on for hearing on the jurisdictional objections set forth in the answer of respondent, The American Oil Company, a Maryland Corporation, and the court having considered the pleadings and the arguments and submissions of counsel, and the court being fully advised in the premises,

'NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DETERMINED that the good faith written offer to purchase required by § 6(1) of Act 295 of the Public Acts of 1966, as amended (M.S.A. § 8.261(6); M.C.L.A. § 213.366) was not made to respondent The American Oil Company and that the offer made to respondent The American Oil Company was a mere token offer;

'IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND DETERMINED that the same situation prevails with respect to each of the other parcels in this cause;

'IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.'

Petitioner filed its claim of appeal from the trial court's order with the Court of Appeals on April 10, 1969, and on April 18, 1969, filed its application with this Court requesting bypass of the Court of Appeals. Application to bypass was granted by this Court on October 16, 1969.

Respondent states the question involved as follows:

Is it lawful for the condemning State agency to take into consideration enhancement in value to the remainder of a parcel of property for purposes of making the good faith written offer to purchase required by section 6, Act 295, P.A.1966, as amended?

Petitioner asserts that a competent, qualified appraiser has reported that present valuations before the taking are as follows:

Parcel C--242 $26,700.00

Parcel C--243 21,000.00

Parcel C--248 38,200.00

Parcel C--249 11,300.00

Parcel C--250N 15,900.00

and that after the taking, considering immediate enhancement in value caused by the planned public improvement, the valuation would be:

Parcel C--242 $40,000.00

Parcel C--243 38,000.00

Parcel C--248 50,000.00

Parcel C--249 25,600.00

Parcel C--250N 22,700.00.

Petitioner admits that it took into consideration enhancement in value in arriving at the consideration to be used in the good faith offer to purchase.

Respondent concedes that enhancement in value may be taken into consideration at the time of trial on the issue of just compensation where properly authorized by statute. ³ But it contends that such benefits may not be considered in making the good faith offer required by section 6(1) of the statute ⁴ because the section does not authorize consideration of enhancement.

Const.1963, art. 10, § 2, provides as follows:

'Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record.'

Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Legislature adopted P.A.1966, No. 295, which is entitled, as amended by P.A.1967, No. 206:

'An act to provide for the purchase and condemnation of property for public purposes by cities, villages, boards of county road commissions and the state highway commission.'

In construing section 6(1) and section 28 of this act, we observe certain well known rules. The fundamental rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature; courts are bound, whenever possible, so to construe statutes as to give them validity and a reasonable construction; seeming inconsistencies in the various provisions of a statute should be reconciled, if possible, so as to arrive at a meaning which gives effect to all parts of the statute; a construction leading to an absurd consequence should be avoided. Evans Products Co. v. State Board of Escheats (1943), 307 Mich. 506, 12 N.W.2d 448, and cases therein cited. See, also, Bloomshield v. City of Bay City (1916), 192 Mich. 488, 491, 158 N.W. 1043, and In the...