Petition of Runyan
| Decision Date | 20 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 58672-1,59175-0,58777-9,s. 58672-1 |
| Citation | 121 Wn.2d 432,853 P.2d 424 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Debbie RUNYAN, Petitioner. In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Brian KELLY, Petitioner. In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Stephen Elliot GRAHAM, Petitioner. En Banc |
Carney, Badley, Smith & Spellman, James E. Lobsenz, Barbara J. Van Ess, Seattle, for petitioner Runyan.
Nance, Iaria & Gimbiner, Michael Nance, Seattle, for petitioner Kelly.
Scales & Associates, P.S., Sean A. Ayres, Seattle, for petitioner Graham.
Christine O. Gregoire, Atty. Gen., John M. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, C. Danny Clem, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Pamela B. Loginsky, Deputy County Prosecutor, Port Orchard, Seth R. Dawson, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Seth Aaron Fine, Deputy County Prosecutor, Everett, Jeffrey Sullivan, Yakima County Prosecutor, Bruce Hanify, Deputy County Prosecutor, Yakima, for respondent.
John Midgley, Seattle, on Behalf of Evergreen Legal Services and Institutional Legal Services Project, Robert C. Boruchowitz, Seattle, on Behalf of Washington Defender Association, Allen R. Bentley, Seattle, on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Scott J. Engelhard, Seattle, on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amici curiae for petitioners.
These three factually unrelated personal restraint petitions (PRPs) challenge the constitutionality of RCW 10.73.090 et seq. (the statute) which, with certain exceptions, require postconviction petitions for collateral relief to be filed within 1 year after the conviction becomes final. The petitioners argue that this time limit acts to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in violation of article 1, section 13 of our constitution. They also argue that the statute violates the equal protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions. Alternatively, petitioners urge that, regardless of the statute's constitutionality, the time limit does not apply to their petitions because they did not receive proper notice of its terms as required by the statute. We reject petitioners' constitutional arguments and further hold that the notice provided by the Department of Corrections (Department) was sufficient under the statute.
An explanation of the procedural history of each of these PRPs is necessary in order to understand the effects of the statute and the various contentions of each of the petitioners. Petitioner Debbie Runyan was convicted of three counts of first degree statutory rape and two counts of indecent liberties in Kitsap County. She appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction. State v. Runyan, cause 52 Wash.App. 1004 (1988). Her petition for review was denied by this court on November 29, 1988, and the mandate from this court was issued on December 29, 1988. Runyan is incarcerated at the Washington Corrections Center for Women.
On March 21, 1991, Runyan filed a PRP in the Court of Appeals, alleging both ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest and prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Runyan filed a motion in this court for discretionary review of this dismissal. 1 Additionally, Runyan has raised a claim that she never received notice of the statute, as required by RCW 10.73.120. The State has submitted affidavits showing that such notice was given on or after October 31, 1989, by posting administrative bulletins explaining the statute on inmate bulletin boards at the Washington Corrections Center for Women. Although Runyan acknowledges the existence of a bulletin board in her CCU unit, she does not recall ever seeing any legal notice posted on such bulletin board.
Appeals initially returned the PRP because it believed that the PRP was time barred by operation of RCW 10.73.090 and RCW 10.73.100. Runyan resubmitted the PRP on April 11, 1991, along with a letter explaining why the PRP was not time barred. On June 27, the Court of Appeals accepted the PRP for filing. However, in an order dated October 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals once again dismissed the PRP as untimely
Brian Kelly pleaded guilty to first degree robbery in Snohomish County Superior Court on February 1, 1991. In computing his offender score, the sentencing judge used Kelly's five previous convictions. 2 Kelly filed a PRP on July 19, 1991, challenging the use of the three earliest convictions, stating that he had not been advised of his right to remain silent and that his guilty pleas in those cases were constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP, holding that Kelly had failed to show why he had not filed his PRP challenging those prior convictions within the time period mandated by the statute.
Kelly attests that he was on parole from March 11, 1988, until December 11, 1990, and that he regularly reported to his parole officer. The State contends that on December 5, 1989, a copy of the Attorney General's memorandum regarding the law, a Spanish language translation thereof, and a copy of the statute was sent to each community corrections office and work release center supervisor, with directions that the notice and translation be posted in their office or at the facility so it would be readily accessible to all offenders. The State attests to the fact that this notice remained posted in most offices and facilities until they moved or remodeled, and that as of May 1, 1992, four community corrections offices and one work release center still had these notices posted.
Stephen Graham 3 pleaded guilty to first and second degree statutory rape in Yakima County Superior Court on July 11, 1988. He signed a statement of defendant on plea of guilty which informed him that the maximum sentence for first degree statutory rape was "not less than 20 years", but which also informed him that the standard sentence for his crime was "at least 41 months and not more than 54 months" and that the prosecuting attorney would recommend that he receive 54 months to run concurrently with his second degree statutory rape term. Brief of Petitioner, Court of Appeals, exhibit 1. Because Graham's crimes occurred before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), RCW 9.94A.010 et seq., took effect, the judge sentenced Graham to a minimum term of 54 months with a maximum term of life on his first degree statutory rape charge. Graham's attorney told him that the judge was "not sentencing [Graham] to a specific time but is making a recommendation to the prison authorities, the prison parole board, as to what [his] time [would] be, and it may not be 54 months." Report of Proceedings (RP) (Sept. 13, 1988), at 8. The sentencing judge also told Graham that he did not know how long Graham was going to be in prison and Graham filed a PRP in the Court of Appeals on September 30, 1991. He maintains that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not properly informed about the possible consequences of such a plea. Alternatively, he asks that his plea bargain be specifically enforced. He also claims that he was not notified by prison officials as to the existence and effect of RCW 10.73.090 as required by the statute, and that he did not learn of the statute until August 1991 when informed of it by his attorney. In its initial briefing to the Court of Appeals, the State conceded that it "[did] not believe it [could] demonstrate that notice was given to Mr. Graham...." Response to Personal Restraint Petition, at 4. However, in its briefing to this court, the State has produced the affidavit of Janet Barbour, Superintendent of the Twin Rivers Correction Center, in which she states that she had copies of the Attorney General's notice regarding this law distributed to each inmate, as well as posted on bulletin boards, sometime after November 6, 1989.
that there was "a range of months that's been discussed, and that's going to be determined later as you're going through." RP (Sept. 13, 1988), at 9. Graham contends that he did not realize that he could serve more than 54 months until he got to prison. He has been serving his term at the Twin Rivers Corrections Center
The underlying contention of all three petitioners is that any time limit on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus acts as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. Our constitution secures for citizens of this state the right to petition for the writ. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety requires it." Const. art. 1, § 13. The writ referred to in this clause (hereinafter the suspension clause) is generally acknowledged to be the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is a writ issued pursuant to a petition, directing an official who is detaining another to show the cause of that person's confinement, and why he or she In 1976, this court adopted Rules of Appellate Procedure 16.3-16.15, which provide a unitary postconviction remedy and replaced the former miscellaneous postconviction procedures, including most petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. See Toliver, at 610-11, 746 P.2d 809. In 1989, the Legislature enacted a new law which attempts further to streamline collateral review of judgments and sentences. This statute reads, in relevant part:
should not be released. Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wash.2d 607, 609, 746 P.2d 809 (1987). This court must now decide whether the limitations imposed by RCW 10.73.090 suspend this privilege
No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
RCW 10.73.090(1). 4
The 1-year time limit for filing is not a blanket limitation. Broad...
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