Petition of Russell Bros. Towing Co.

Citation199 F. Supp. 442
PartiesPetition of RUSSELL BROS. TOWING CO., Inc., and Newtown Creek Towing Company, as charterer and owner respectively of THE tug RUSSELL 19, for exoneration from, or limitation of liability.
Decision Date03 November 1961
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Alexander, Ash & Schwartz, New York City, for petitioner; Edward Ash, Sidney A. Schwartz, New York City, Jay H. Kisloff, New York City, of counsel.

Burlingham, Hupper & Kennedy, New York City, Krusen, Evans & Byrne, Philadelphia, Pa., for Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.; Eugene Underwood, Kenneth H. Volk, New York City, of counsel.

McGOHEY, District Judge.

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., whose vessel S.S. Mormacpride was involved in the collision out of which this proceeding arises, moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that it "was filed in this Court contrary to the mandate of Admiralty Rule 54 28 U.S.C.A. and therefore this Court is without jurisdiction."

The collision which occurred in the Delaware River on May 7, 1961, was between the Mormacpride and a flotilla consisting of the tank barge Pittston 2 and the tug Russell 19. The barge is owned by Forty-Nine Transfer Corp. The tug is owned by Newtown Creek Towing Company and on May 7 was under bareboat charter to Russell Bros. Towing Co., Inc.

On July 17, Moore-McCormack Lines filed a libel in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, naming as respondents the tug, the barge, Newtown Creek Towing Co. and Forty-Nine Transfer Corp. A copy of that libel was received by mail in New York by counsel for Newtown Creek on July 18. On July 19, the instant petition was filed and an order was entered restraining prosecution of the Pennsylvania suit.

Rule 54 provides that if a vessel has been "libeled" or her owner "sued," the owner's petition for limitation "shall be filed" emphasis supplied in the district where the vessel was "libeled" or, if that has not occurred, in the district where her owner was "sued."

The tug Russell 19 has not been attached, nor has any claim or stipulation for value been filed, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

The petitioners urge and I agree that, for a vessel to be "libeled" within the meaning of Rule 54, it must be seized and taken into control of the court. "The control of the res by the court is what the rules manifestly intend." 3 Benedict, Admiralty section 507, at 462 (6th ed. 1940). Judge Learned Hand regarded "libeled," used in this connection as meaning "arrested." See Algoma Cent. & H. B. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Transit Corp.1 The tug Russell 19 was not "libeled."

Newtown Creek urges that it has not been "sued" as required by Rule 54, since it has not been served with the libel in the Pennsylvania suit. Although actual control of the vessel is required in order that it be "libeled," it does not follow that actual jurisdiction of the person must be obtained by service of process in order that it be "sued" within the same Rule. The requirement of control of the vessel arises from the fact that the court's in rem jurisdiction to be effective at all must be exclusive.2 This is not true of in personam jurisdiction. It seems enough, for compliance with Rule 54, that a suit be commenced, by the filing of a libel, in a district in which the owner is amenable to process. Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 680n (1957). This is apparent from the language of the rule itself, which later seems to equate "sued" with the commencement of suit. Newtown Creek does not challenge its amenability to suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I hold, therefore, that it has been "sued" in Pennsylvania, and that its petition for limitation should have been filed there.

This is not true, however, of Russell Bros. Towing Co., the charterer. It was not named in the Pennsylvania suit nor had it been sued elsewhere prior to the filing of the petition. Moore-McCormack argues that the commencement of its suit against the owner, Newtown Creek, in Pennsylvania also confined Russell Bros., the charterer, to that district, since the restrictions of Rule 54, by its terms, become operative when "the owner" is sued. This I think is a misreading of the Rule. A charterer is deemed the owner of a vessel within the meaning of the limitation statute, 46 U.S.C.A. § 186, and its right to petition for limitation is independent of the right of the actual owner. Thus although a joint petition was filed here, the charterer and owner could have filed separate petitions. See, for example, Petition of National Bulk Carriers, Inc.3 Rule 54 speaks in terms of a single owner and a single petition; it can only be intended to restrict the venue choice of the "owner" who has been sued, without affecting the independent rights of others who may be deemed "owners." Since Russell Bros. had not been sued in any district, its petition was rightly filed here, the district in which, it alleged,...

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