Petrarca v. Quidnick Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1905
• Citation: 61 A. 648,27 R.I. 265
• Parties: PETRARCA v. QUIDNICK MFG. CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

61 A. 648

27 R.I. 265

PETRARCA

v. QUIDNICK MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 17, 1905.

Trespass on the case by Luigi Petrarca against the Quidnick Manufacturing Company. On petition of defendant for new trial. Denied.

Argued before DOUGLAS, C. J., and DUBOIS and PARKHURST, JJ.

Irving Champlin, John A. Tillinghast, and Martin T. Birmingham, for plaintiff. Vincent, Boss & Barnefield and Alexander L. Churchill, for defendant

DUBOIS, J. The plaintiff has sued the defendant corporation to recover damages for injuries received by him, while in its employ, through the negligence of the defendant in furnishing a cotton-carding machine which he alleges was defective in three particulars: First, by reason of having a loose driving belt that would automatically shift, slip, and creep from the loose pulley to the tight one, and start the machine; secondly, on account of having a defective and dangerous pulley that in some way, not alleged, would assist the automatic action of the belt, hereinbefore described, in starting the machine; and, thirdly, in not being provided with a belt shipper. He also alleges that the defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence might have known, of these defects, and should have instructed and warned him of the dangers and risks attendant upon such a condition of affairs, which it failed to do; in consequence of all of which doings, actions, and neglect the plaintiff, while in the exercise of due care, was injured.

The plaintiff testified that while a certain cotton-carding machine belonging to the defendant was stopped, and while its driving belt was in the proper place to keep it stopped, namely, upon the loose pulley, the plaintiff attempted to clean the machine, in the line of his employment, by removing cotton waste from the bearings of its cylinder; that while so engaged, and doing his work in the usual and proper manner, the machine started up of itself, without assistance from any one, drawing his arms into the machine, and causing him severe and permanent injury. The jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $13,308, with three special findings, as follows: "First. That the driving belt on carding machine No. 4, on which the plaintiff was injured, did automatically shift from the loose to the tight pulley, thereby starting the machine while the plaintiff was working upon it. Second. That the belt and pulleys on the machine in question had not operated properly up to the time of the accident Third. That the belt and pulleys on the machine in question did not continue to operate in a proper manner, without alteration, repairs, or adjustment, for a period of about two years subsequent to the accident." The defendant corporation has petitioned for a new trial upon the following grounds: "(1) Because said verdict is against the law and the evidence and the weight thereof. (2) Because the testimony fails to show any negligence on the part of the defendant. (3) Because the testimony shows that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. (4) Because the court erred in permitting the witnesses Walker, Richardson, and McKeon to be examined by the plaintiff as to the inspection of the machine, lack of inspection not being charged in plaintiff's declaration. (5) Because the special finding of the jury that the belt and pulleys on the machine in question had not operated properly up to the time of the accident is against the evidence. (6) Because the special finding of the jury that the belt and pulleys on the machine in question did not continue to operate in a proper manner without alteration, repair, or adjustment for a period of about two years after the accident is against the evidence."

The burden of proof imposed upon the plaintiff to satisfy the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident and injury through which he suffered were results of the negligence of the defendant while he was in the exercise of due care was sustained by his evidence that the machine started automatically, without fault upon his part. Cox v. Providence Gas Co., 17 R. I. 199, 21 Atl. 344; Murray v. Pawtuxet Valley Street Railway Co., 25 R. I. 209, 55 Atl. 491; McCabe v. Narra. Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 427, 59 Atl. 112; Reynolds v. Same, 26 R. I. 457, 59 Atl. 393; Laforrest v. O'Driscoll, 26 R. I. 547, 59 Atl. 923; Edwards v. Manufacturers Building Co., 27 R. I. 248, 01 Atl. 646. The court was not in error in permitting the witnesses Walker, Richardson, and McKeon to testify concerning inspection or noninspcction of the belt and pulleys of the machine. The declaration sufficiently negatives inspection in the allegation that the defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence might have known, of the defects charged. If the defects existed, and the...