Petrone v. Town of Foster
Decision Date | 13 April 2001 |
Citation | 769 A.2d 591 |
Parties | Helen PETRONE et al. v. The TOWN OF FOSTER, R.I. by and through its Treasurer et al. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Paul L. Foster, Lincoln, for plaintiff.
Michael DeSisto, Providence, Michael J. Farley, East Providence, for defendant.
After subdividing their property without planning-board approval, the plaintiffs, Helen Petrone, Christine Petrone, and the Estate of Benjamin Petrone, claimed that the defendants, the Town of Foster (town) and certain of its officials, unlawfully deprived them of their property rights and taxed them improperly. As a result, they filed suit against the town, by and through its treasurer, Carl Saccoccio — both individually and in his capacity as the town's building official — and against Pamela Fontaine, individually and in her capacity as tax collector.1 The plaintiffs have appealed from the Superior Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. A single justice of this Court directed both parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. Because no cause has been shown, we proceed to resolve the appeal at this time.
In 1986, plaintiffs Helen Petrone and her late husband, Benjamin Petrone (the Petrones), bought a thirty-acre parcel of land in the town. Thereafter, in February 1987, they subdivided the property into ten lots by deed. After doing so, they recorded the deeds in the town's land-evidence records, and the town's tax assessor assessed them as ten separate lots. Nevertheless, the town took the position that plaintiffs' subdivision of their property violated the town's planning-board ordinance because they had not obtained prior approval from the planning board to do so. Thereafter, plaintiffs contend, they were unable to sell the lots because the town refused to recognize them as ten separate buildable lots. Eventually, when plaintiffs failed to pay their taxes on these lots, the town sold them at a tax sale.
On July 5, 1996, plaintiffs sued, claiming that the The plaintiffs also alleged that the town's actions deprived them of all economically beneficial use of their property in violation of the Takings Clause of both the United States and Rhode Island constitutions.
In due course, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued that plaintiffs' claim of excessive taxation was improper because plaintiffs had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of G.L. 1956 § 44-5-26 to pursue such a claim. They also asserted that the town's refusal to recognize plaintiffs' property as ten separate buildable lots did not constitute a taking under either the United States or Rhode Island constitutions because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust any of their administrative remedies in addressing this situation. The defendants also contended that, even if there had been a taking, plaintiffs were barred from bringing suit because the matter was not timely filed pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-25. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted their motion and entered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In grantingdefendants' motion for summary judgment, the motion justice reasoned that plaintiffs' remedy, if any, was an administrative one. She did not address any of the substantive issues raised by the parties.
On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the motion justice erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in the absence of any supporting evidence. They argue that genuine issues of fact existed that precluded the granting of a summary judgment motion. They contend that a material question of fact existed about when they were notified by the town that the ten subdivided lots were not buildable in accordance with the town's ordinance. They also assert that the town implicitly authorized and approved the subdivision when the town clerk accepted the deeds for recording and when the town thereafter taxed the subdivided lots on an individual basis.
711 A.2d at 631-32. The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of facts in dispute, and if the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmovant must adduce evidence showing a disputed issue of material fact. See id. Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I.1998).
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs did not seek approval from the planning board before unilaterally subdividing their property. General Laws 1956 § 45-23-27(b) provides:
Section 45-23-64 provides that no plan or plat for a subdivision shall be recorded unless it has been approved by the planning board. Specifically, § 45-23-64 provides in pertinent part as follows:
In accordance with § 45-23-27(b)(1), the Foster Planning Board ordinance provides that:
"The Building Inspector of the Town of Foster shall not authorize construction of any building where land has been divided in any manner unless a registered survey of the land so divided has been approved by the Foster Planning Board and is recorded with the Town Clerk of the Town of Foster." Foster Planning Board Ordinance, Section V, Art. A-1.
Article A-2 provides that "[t]he Town Clerk of the Town of Foster shall not accept for recording any deed which conveys less than the entire tract of contiguous land owned by the grantor * * * unless the requirements of Article A.1 `Surveys' of this Ordinance have been complied with."
These two planning-board ordinances required prior approval by the planning board before any plat of land could be subdivided and accepted for recording by the town clerk. This accords with §§ 45-23-27(b) and 45-23-64, which also require that a...
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