Petroplex Int'l v. St. James Parish

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Petroplex Int'l v. St. James Parish, 158 F.Supp.3d 537 (E.D. La. 2016)
• Decision Date: 22 January 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-140
• Parties: Petroplex International et al v. St. James Parish et al

158 F.Supp.3d 537

Petroplex International et al

v.St. James Parish et al

CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-140

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

Signed January 22, 2016

Filed January 25, 2016

Christine S. Keenan, Kullman Firm, Baton Rouge, LA, Alysson L. Mills, Brent Bennett Barriere, Rebecca Sha, Fishman Haygood, New Orleans, LA, for Petroplex International et al.

Ernest Paul Gieger, Jr., Andrew A. Braun, Jonathan S. Ord, Tara Elizabeth Clement, Gieger, Laborde & Laperouse, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for St. James Parish et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Constitutionality of St. James Parish Ordinance 14-03 (Doc. 60). For the following reasons the Motion is GRANTED IN PART .

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case have been outlined at length in the Court's earlier Order and Reasons. The Court will, therefore, only review the facts relevant to the instant motion. In 2007, Plaintiffs¹ purchased land in St. James Parish fronting the West Bank of the Mississippi River for the purpose of building a petroleum tank farm. Plaintiffs began the process of acquiring necessary state and federal permits in 2008. While this process was ongoing, St. James Parish was developing and implementing a comprehensive land use plan for the Parish.

In 2013, as Plaintiffs were nearing the end of the planning process, the Parish adopted a parish-wide Master Land Use Plan (the “Land Use Ordinance”), under which the tank farm was not a permissible use of the property. Plaintiffs' Complaint mounts a challenge to, inter alia, the validity of the Land Use Ordinance under both state and federal law.² Defendants filed the instant Motion, seeking partial summary judgment that the Land Use Ordinance is permissible and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims attacking its validity.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”³ A genuine issue of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”⁴

In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor.⁵ “If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”⁶ Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.”⁷ “In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party's claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”⁸ “We do not...in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”⁹ Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”¹⁰

LAW AND ANALYSIS

This Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims attacking the validity of the Land Use Ordinance. Initially, the Court will address the claims arising under federal law, as they are unquestionably within its jurisdiction. The Court will then address its jurisdiction to entertain the state law claims.

I. Federal Claims

Plaintiffs' Complaint mounts two constitutional challenges to the Land Use Ordinance. First, they argue in Count 2 of the Complaint that the Land Use Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Federal Constitution. Second, they assert in Count 3 that the Land Use Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious, thereby asserting a violation of substantive due process. The Court will address these claims in turn.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, in making their constitutional arguments, Plaintiffs cite the Court to various Louisiana state court cases. These citations, however, ignore the standard of review applicable to federal constitutional challenges of land use plans. Federal review of land use decisions is “quite different from the review to which they may be subjected in state court.”¹¹ Violations of state law do not necessarily give rise to a cognizable federal constitutional claim.¹² “Indeed, ‘[c]onverting alleged violations of state law into federal...due process claims improperly bootstraps state law into the Constitution.’ ”¹³ Accordingly, the Court considers only those claims based in federal constitutional law.

A. Vagueness Claims

Plaintiffs assert that the Land Use Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Federal Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the maps adopted lack sufficiently detailed boundaries and that the Land Use Ordinance provides insufficient standards to guide the establishment of buffer zones, allowance of nonconforming uses, and establishment of conditions on nonconforming uses.

Under federal law, “[a] civil statute that is not concerned with the First Amendment is only unconstitutionally vague if it is so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule at all or if it is substantially incomprehensible.”¹⁴ A Court should uphold such a challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.¹⁵ “A provision need not...be cast in terms that are mathematically precise; it need only give fair warning of the conduct proscribed, in light of common understanding and practices.”¹⁶ “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”¹⁷

Plaintiffs concede that federal courts rarely invalidate zoning ordinances for vagueness and have cited to only one district court case where a federal court did so.¹⁸ In that case, however, the ordinance the court struck down was an uncodified road policy that gave the planning commission unfettered discretion to grant exemption to the policy on an ad hoc basis.¹⁹ Here, unlike the policy at issue in Everett, the Land Use Ordinance provides sufficient guidelines to the planning commission in considering the establishment of buffer zones, the allowance of nonconforming uses, and the establishment of conditions on nonconforming use of the property. With regard to buffer zones, the ordinance directs the planning commission to establish buffer zones “based on the nature of the use for which the buffer zone is established, and shall be based on commonly recognized regulatory, trade group, or manufacturing and industrial standards.”²⁰ With regard to approval of nonconforming uses of property, the Land Use Ordinance directs the planning commission to consider approval “where there is a compelling public benefit, when the use is compatible with surrounding uses and adverse impacts of the use are inconsequential; or where required to as a matter of constitutional imperative or other vested legal right superior to this ordinance.”²¹ With regard to the establishment of conditions on nonconforming uses, the ordinance provides that such conditions may be established that “minimize adverse impacts and [are] beneficial to the public.”²² The Court finds that these standards are sufficient. Accordingly, the Land Use Ordinance provides sufficient standards to indicate what conduct is proscribed. The Land Use Ordinance is therefore not impermissibly vague in this regard.

Plaintiffs' arguments regarding deficiencies in the maps referenced by the ordinance are likewise not persuasive. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs themselves were well aware that the Petroplex property fell under residential grown and agricultural categories. The ordinance is, therefore, necessarily not vague in all of its applications, as required to render it excessively vague under federal law.²³ Furthermore, the maps attached to the ordinance are illustrative, scaled-down versions of parcel level maps that the Parish can provide to any interested party. Plaintiffs' vagueness challenges therefore fail under federal law and are dismissed with prejudice.

B. “Arbitrary and Capricious” Substantive Due Process Challenges

In Count 3 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the Land Use Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious in violation of federal substantive due process protections. Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on a master plan to implement a parish-wide zoning ordinance. Plaintiffs further argue that the designation of large swaths of the Parish's downriver land for either “Residential Growth” or “Agriculture” is unreasonable and without justification.

Before they can be declared unconstitutional, however, zoning ordinances must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and have no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.²⁴ Such regulations are presumed valid and are upheld unless the plaintiff can show that the legislation bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.²⁵ Put differently, the standard of review of zoning ordinances is “limited to the question [of] whether the action is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.”²⁶ Requirements of substantive due process are met “if there [is] any conceivable rational basis for the zoning decision.”²⁷ “An attack against a zoning decision can succeed only with a showing that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true...