Petrucci v. Barnhart, CIVIL ACTION No. 01-10682-DPW (D. Mass. 7/23/2003), CIVIL ACTION No. 01-10682-DPW.
| Decision Date | 23 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 01-10682-DPW. |
| Parties | WAYNE PETRUCCI, Plaintiff, v. JO ANNE BARNHART,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
In this case, Claimant Wayne Petrucci appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying his application for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. I conclude Petrucci fails to meet his burden of demonstrating the SSA decision was not based upon substantial evidence. Accordingly, I affirm that decision.
Petrucci is a fifty-seven year old United States Army veteran who sustained shrapnel wounds to the right calf in 1966, while serving in Vietnam. On August 1, 1998, shortly before filing for SSDI benefits, he underwent a right knee arthroscopy and drainage. Id. In Petrucci's medical record, attending physician Dr. M. Bradley noted Petrucci's report of twenty year history of pain, swelling and stiffness of the right knee with decreased range of motion. Upon physical examination of Petrucci, the doctor observed no ligamentous laxity of the right knee and a full range of motion. In addition, Dr. Bradley found that after the procedure, Petrucci was independent with crutches and safe with flat surfaces and stairs. He was discharged on the night of operation in stable condition.
The medical record prior to 1998 covered only the period 1994-1997 and was inconsistent with Dr. Bradley's findings. Writing on January 13, 1995, Dr. Joseph McCarthy, an orthopedic surgeon reported that bilateral tibial osteotomies were performed on Petrucci on May 31, 1994 in an effort to treat advanced osteoarthritis of both knees, a function of the 1966 wound. McCarthy stated Petrucci had been totally disabled since the operations and would require total knee replacement at some point in the future.
On September 27, 1995, Dr. John C. Molby of the Department of Veterans Affairs reported that Petrucci suffered from advanced degenerative arthritis of both knees. Dr. Molby noted that Petrucci had a limited range of motion of both knees, was unable to stand for more than thirty minutes, and could not walk for more than fifty yards without stopping. He concluded that Petrucci had been totally disabled from any gainful employment since May of 1994 and will be disabled indefinitely.
In a Veterans Affairs Rating Decision dated May 19, 1997, Petrucci was granted individual unemployability from September 21, 1994, based on a permanent and total service-connected disability.
In addition to this medical evidence, Petrucci asserts that he has been totally disabled since 1966, suffering not only from physical infirmities, but also from mental impairments, ranging from post traumatic stress disorder to "confrontational paranoia and distrust."
Petrucci's Social Security Earnings Record indicates that between 1968 and 1974, his yearly income ranged from $5,475 to $9,971. While working for Metro Enterprises, his earnings were around $8,600 in 1982, $4,300 in 1983, and $22,600 in 1984. As self-employed sole owner of Wayne's Painting and Remodling, Petrucci posted income of $14,100 in 1993 and $6,800 in 1994.
On August 26, 1998, Petrucci filed an application for SSDI benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging a period of disability commencing on September 21, 1994. On August 31, 1998, the SSA denied Petrucci's application on the basis that his insured status had expired in 1980, well before the purported onset of his disability. Petrucci timely appealed the SSA's decision, amending the application to include an onset date of 1966. On April 30, 1999, the SSA again denied the application on the grounds that Petrucci had engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") after the alleged onset of his impairment, and was thus not considered disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act.
On June 30, 1999, Petrucci sought review of the SSA's decision by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ affirmed the decision of the SSA, noting that "the claimant was not under a `disability' as defined in the Social Security Act at any time through the date of this decision." On August 28, 2000, Petrucci filed a request with the Appeals Council for review of the ALJ's holding. The Appeals Council formally denied the petition on March 15, 2001.
Petrucci brings this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asserting that the decision of the ALJ was not supported by "substantial evidence." In particular, he contends that (1) the ALJ failed to consider the claim that his reported income was not from SGA, and (2) the ALJ cannot conclude that he did not have severe impairment without a medical determination.
This court may enter a judgment "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 28 U.S.C. § 405(g). Where the SSA has denied a claimant's application for SSDI benefits, its decision is binding, unless the court concludes the Commissioner committed legal or factual error in examining the claim. Manso-Pizarro v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner's findings of fact are controlling if supported by "substantial evidence." In explaining this standard, the Supreme Court has noted that substantial evidence is " " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). As a consequence, a court may not reverse or remand the Commissioner's decision where "the record could arguably justify a different result." Rawls v. Apfel, 998 F. Supp. 70, 72 (Mass. 1988). As noted in Rams v. Chater, 989 F. Supp. 309 (Mass. 1997), "[t]he role of the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is to determine whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support the decision of the commissioner, and not to re-weigh the evidence or try the issues de novo." Id. at 313; see also Geoffroy v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 663 F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1981) ()
To obtain SSDI benefits under the Social Security Act, a Claimant must establish that he (1) has insured status, and (2) is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (D); see Rawls, 998 F. Supp. at 72-73. Under criterion (1), a claimant enjoys insured status where he has satisfied an earnings requirement, having "worked for a statutorily defined period of time before applying for benefits." Rawls, 998 F. Supp. at 73 citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(A), (B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1302 ().
It is uncontested that Petrucci maintained insured status through December 31, 1980. While Petrucci no longer satisfied the earnings requirement in 1998 when he filed his application with the SSA, he could nevertheless recover SSDI benefits if he qualified for a "period of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.320; see Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 38 (2nd Cir. 1989); Cruz Rivera v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 818 F.2d 96, 97 (1st Cir. 1986). Specifically, Petrucci was eligible for benefits in 1998 if he had been disabled for "a continuous period," commencing before the expiration of his insured status on December 31, 1980, and ending no less than one year before he submitted his application to the SSA (August 26, 1997). 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.320.
As a means of evaluating whether a claimant is under a disability pursuant to criterion (2) of the eligibility standard, the SSA has developed a five step sequential test. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Goodermote v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982); McDonald v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 795 F.2d 1118, 1120 (1st Cir. 1986). It bears emphasizing that "all five steps are not applied to every applicant, as determination may be concluded at any step along the process." Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 2001).
First, the agency asks whether the claimant is working. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is employed and engaged in SGA, i.e. "work activity that involves doing physical or mental activity . . . for pay or profit," (20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a) — (b)), he is automatically deemed not disabled, "regardless of [his] medical condition . . . age, education, and work experience." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); see Goodermote, 690 F.2d at 6; Torres v. Barnhart, 249 F. Supp.2d 83, 91 (Mass. 2003).
Second, the SSA inquires as to whether the claimant has a severe impairment that "significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have such an infirmity, he is considered not disabled. Id.; see McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1120.
Third, the agency evaluates whether the claimant's impairment is equivalent to an infirmity on a list contained in the regulations' Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If there is a correlation, the claimant is considered disabled. Id; see McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1120.
Fourth, the SSA examines whether the claimant's impairment prevents him from engaging in the kind of work he has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If no, he is not under a disability. Id.; see McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1120.
Fifth, the SSA assesses whether the claimant's infirmity prevents his from performing all other forms of work. 20 C.F.R. §...
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