Petruska v. Reckitt Benckiser, LLC

• Decision Date: 26 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 14-03663(CCC)
• Parties: JOSEPH PETRUSKA, Plaintiff, v. RECKITT BENCKISER, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

JOSEPH PETRUSKA, Plaintiff, v. RECKITT BENCKISER, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 14-03663(CCC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 26, 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

CECCHI, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Reckitt Benckiser, LLC, ("RB" or "Defendant") to dismiss the First Amended Complaint of Joseph Petruska ("Plaintiff") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court has considered the submissions made in support and in opposition to the instant motion.¹ The Court decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Based on the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint and granted without prejudice as to the remaining counts. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days in which to file an Amended Complaint that cures the pleading deficiencies discussed below.

II. BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of Defendant RB's alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. ("ADEA") and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A 10:5-1 et seq. ("NJLAD"). (Am. Compl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was employed by RB from September 1, 1994 through January 31, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) His position as Senior Project Engineer was part of RB's Packaging Development, Engineering and HSE Department, managed by Sreenivas Rao since September 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 25.) Plaintiff alleges that he received strong ratings in his 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 performance evaluations, as well as performance-based bonuses in 2011 and 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 32-34.)

RB is a subsidiary of Reckitt Benckiser Group, PLC. (Id. ¶ 12.) In January 2012, RB group of companies reorganized its geographic areas, which led to the previously separated North American and European areas becoming part of the same geographic area. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Following the reorganization, RB eliminated the central engineering role. (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff alleges that RB initially decided to eliminate two positions, and that later three more positions were added to the elimination list, including Plaintiff's and another engineer, Gerry Syrek's, positions. (Id. ¶¶ 40-42, 46, 48-49.)

In December 2012, management notified Plaintiff that his position was being eliminated and that his last day of employment was to be January 31, 2013. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff was 56 years old when he was laid off by RB. (Id. ¶ 35.) On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff was given a severance proposal and 21 days to accept or reject it. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleges that Gerry Syrek was also informed that Ms employment would be terminated effective January 31, 2013 and that Mr. Syrek was also offered a severance package. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that when Mr. Syrek met with Mr. Rao around this time, Mr. Rao told Mr. Syrek that "it was now the time at RB for new personnel" or words to that effect. (Id, ¶ 60.) Plaintiff claims that the statementwhen taken in context was age-biased to Mr. Syrek. (Id. ¶ 62.) Through conversations with employees in RB's Human Resources unit and RB's in-house counsel, Plaintiff discovered that neither the Human Resources unit nor in-house counsel had reviewed the layoff decisions, and were not aware that Plaintiff and Mr. Syrek had been included in the layoff. (Id. ¶ 79-87.)

Plaintiff alleges that in mid-December 2012, RB presented Mr. Syrek with a second severance offer. (Id. ¶ 94.) The second severance offer gave Mr. Syrek the choice of continued employment at RB's Belle Meade facility, or voluntary separation with one year's severance pay. (Id. ¶ 97.) Working at the Belle Meade facility would add an additional 37 miles to Mr. Syrek's already 104 mile commute. (Id. ¶¶ 99-101.) Plaintiff alleges that the offer was a subterfuge, so that RB would be able to claim that Mr. Syrek quit. (Id. ¶103.) By considering Mr. Syrek "retained" the average age of those retained was 42.0 and the average age of those released was 52.3 (id. ¶ 115), whereas when Mr. Syrek was considered "released," the average age of those retained was 41.0 and the average age of those released 54.4. (Id. ¶ 114.)

Plaintiff alleges that on December 17, 2012, RB provided him with a second severance proposal, accompanied by age and job related data about the positions being eliminated in packaging. (Id. ¶¶ 120-122, Ex. B.) Plaintiff alleges that the data provided to him mistakenly reported Mr. Rao's age as 49 (when a later affidavit reported it was 43), and falsely reported that Mr. Syrek had been "retained." (Id. 123-124.) The second severance offer stated the "[t]he criticality of the positions to the Company's operations was the determining factor in identifying jobs subject to elimination." (Id. ¶ 127.) Plaintiff alleges that the offer did not define "criticality," nor did the employee handbook, nor had any previous evaluations or communications to Plaintiff about his job. (Id. ¶¶ 129-131.) RB reported to the EEOC that it has used "criticality" as "thedetermining factor" in nine other layoffs within its U.S. operations within the past several years. (Id. ¶ 183.)

Plaintiff alleges that his duties were taken over by Gary Topoleski, despite the fact that Mr. Topoleski did not have the skills Plaintiff had as an industrial engineer skilled in packaging systems. (Id. ¶¶ 143-144, 152-153.) Mr. Topoleski was 48 years old at the time of the layoff, around 8 years younger than Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 156-157.) Plaintiff further alleges that Kevin Brincat, Plaintiff's younger supervisee, was not laid off. (Id. ¶¶ 164.) Mr. Brincat was 52 years old at the time of the layoff, around 4 years younger than Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 163-164.)

Plaintiff tiled suit in this Court on June 6, 2014. On August 29, 2014, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.⁵ Nor does a Complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's claims are for violations of the ADEA and the NJLAD. The ADEA prohibits an employer from, among other things, discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1). Under the NJLAD, it is unlawful "[f]or an employer, because of the ... age ... of any individual ... to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire, unless justified by lawful considerations other than age, from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment ..." N.J.S.A. §10:5-12(a).

Plaintiff brings three counts under the ADEA and four counts under the NJLAD. Defendant seeks to dismiss the Amended Complaint, in its entirety, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court addresses each count in turn.

A. Count I and Count II

Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint are claims of direct evidence of age bias in violation of the ADEA and the NJLAD, respectively. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 184-194.) Defendant asserts that Count I and Count II of the Amended Complaint fail as a matter of law because the Plaintiff alleges no direct evidence of age discrimination. (Def.'s Mot. 10-14.) The Court agrees.

A plaintiff may establish a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA and the NJLAD through either direct or circumstantial evidence.² Direct evidence must demonstrate that "thedecision makers placed substantial negative reliance on [the plaintiff's age] in reaching their decision," and thus a plaintiff seeking to prove his case through direct evidence confronts a "high hurdle." Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989); see also Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2002). Direct evidence of discrimination is "evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of the fact in issue without inference or presumption." Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Evidence is not direct "where the trier of fact must infer the discrimination on the basis of age from an employer's remarks." Id. at 829 (emphasis in original). See e.g., Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F. 3d 335, 339 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding statement that supervisor was "looking for younger single people," and that as a consequence, the plaintiff, "wouldn't be happy [at the company] in the future" was direct evidence of age bias).

Plaintiff alleges that the following is direct evidence of Defendant's age discrimination: (1) Mr. Rao's statement to Mr. Syrek that "it's time for new personnel" (Am. Compl. ¶ 185); (2) the 13.4 year difference between the ages of those employees "retained" and those "not retained" (id. ¶ 186); and (3) Defendant listing Mr. Syrek as "retained" in the information sheet provided to Plaintiff along with the second severance offer, in an attempt to conceal the fact...