Pettiford v. Davis
| Decision Date | 03 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1:10-cv-1324-SEB-TAB |
| Parties | KEVIN PETTIFORD, Plaintiff, v. JENNIFER (GARZA) DAVIS, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS Supervisor, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Kevin Pettiford alleges that the defendants, Jennifer Davis,1 Richard Little, and Chad Stewart violated his constitutional rights while he was on house arrest. His claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pettiford alleges he was denied medical care for a tooth abscess, denied his right to practice his religion and denied privileges such as job search and educational opportunities. In addition, Pettiford alleges he was denied the opportunity to shop and therefore maintain personal hygiene and cleanliness, or to have enough food. No state law claims are asserted.
The defendants, employees of Delaware County Community Corrections ("Community Corrections"), deny that they violated Pettiford's constitutional rights and argue that the restrictions placed on Pettiford were reasonable and justified by his repeated failure to abstain from illegal drugs and follow program rules. The defendants seek resolution of the claims alleged against them through the entry of summary judgment.
For the reasons explained below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment [54] is granted.
The motion for summary judgment in this civil rights action, as with any such motion, must be granted Αif the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no Αgenuine@ dispute. Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
ΑIn evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute.® Harney, 526 F.3d at 1104 (internal citations omitted). Αif the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party.® Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
The following statement of facts is not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and the disputed evidence are presented in the light reasonably most favorable to Pettiford as the non-moving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Immaterial facts, legal arguments, statements made without citation to the record, or statements supported by inadmissible evidence were disregarded because Αa party's failure to comply with summary judgment evidentiary requirements is traditionally remedied . . . by excluding the non-conforming submission . . . .@ Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing cases). See also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); and Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (). There is no reason to stray from the traditional remedy in this case.
On August 22, 2006, Pettiford was charged with Burglary, as a Class C Felony, and Theft, as a Class D felony, with an additional count seeking a habitual offender enhancement. On September 1, 2006, Pettiford was charged in an unrelated case with two counts of Burglary, as Class C felonies, and two counts of Theft, as Class D felonies, with an additional count seeking a habitual offender enhancement. On August 8, 2007, Pettiford pled guilty to one count of Burglary in each case, each as a Class C felony. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run consecutively. Pettiford v. State, 942 N.E.2d 925 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).
On June 25, 2009, Pettiford filed a Motion for Alternative Placement, requesting placement with Community Corrections. The Delaware Circuit Court No. 4 granted Pettiford's petition for alternative placement on August 26, 2009, allowing him to serve the remainder of his sentence by electronically-monitored home detention. Pettiford was apprised of the requirements of home detention, which included completing a substance abuse treatment program, abstaining from the use of alcohol or illicit drugs, submitting to drug testing, and remaining in his home unless authorized to leave by his case manager. Pettiford, 942 N.E.2d at 925. An offender on home detention "is responsible for providing food, housing, clothing, medical care, and other treatment expenses." IND. CODE ' 35-38-2.5-9.
Although Pettiford's motion for alternative placement was granted August 26, 2009, he was placed on probation daily reporting until a home detention monitoring device became available. On November 9, 2009, Pettiford began the in-home detention program authorized by IND. CODE ' 35-38-2.5-1, et seq. Pettiford signed agreements for release of confidential information and for payment of court-approved fees for the program, and of all Community Corrections home detention rules, initialing each one, as required of all persons before being placed on the home detention program. The rules were agreed to and signed by him and by Jennifer Davis on behalf of the program.
A person on home detention is confined to their residence, which is monitored by an electronic device which they are to wear at all times; it sends a signal to the program office, while the client is at or near his home, but outside of that range Community Corrections has no way to tell where the clients are or what they are doing. Any time the client is out of the range of his home, unless he is at a place either previously approved by his case manager, or responding to a personal medical emergency, he would be in violation of the agreement and rules.
Pettiford did have a landline telephone at his home while he was on the program, but he did not have a car. He traveled by bicycle.
Home detention clients are strictly forbidden from alcohol and drug use. Pettiford knew that the program required complete abstinence from drugs and alcohol. A single verified occasion of drug and alcohol use merits immediate dismissal from the home detention program and return to the Indiana Department of Correction. When Community Corrections does not opt to immediately petition for revocation of home detention, drug and alcohol violations automatically result in the revocation for thirty (30) days of all personal time, such as scheduled appointments outside the house, for any reason. The purpose of this rule is to prohibit (to the extent possible) the drug or alcohol abuser from intermingling with the public where he might procure additional drugs and alcohol. The 30-day revocation of personal time is consistent with Community Corrections' Standard Violations Sanctions (see dkt 58-8) and Special Time Out Guidelines. These guidelines were developed in early 2009 for the purposes of making administration of the rules and guidelines as uniform as possible and for giving the program flexibility to work toward rehabilitation of clients.
Pettiford was on the home detention program for a total of 78 days. Because of his multiple rule violations (detailed below) Pettiford's personal time outside of his home was restricted.
Based on Pettiford's rule violations, the State filed a petition to revoke Pettiford's home detention on January 27, 2010. A warrant was issued the same day. On March 31, 2010, after an evidentiary hearing, the Delaware County Circuit Court No. 4 trial court revoked Pettiford's home detention and ordered him to serve the rest of his sentence with the Indiana Department of Correction. Specifically, the court found that Pettiford violated the terms of his electronically monitored home detention by testing positive for Cocaine on January 19, 2010, January 12, 2010, November 30, 2009, and November 16, 2009. See Original Image of Appellate Brief of Kevin T. Pettiford (August 19, 2010), available at 2010 WL 3621467, p. 8 of 15.
Pettiford appealed the revocation of his home detention. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that:
Pettiford tested positive for use of cocaine on November 9, 16, and 30, 2009, and again on January 12 and 19, 2010. The November 9 test also revealed that he had used marijuana, and the November 16 test revealed use of alcohol. Pettiford admitted that he had used those substances on each occasion. On November...
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