Pettis v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 19 November 1970
• Citation: 91 Cal.Rptr. 263,12 Cal.App.3d 1029
• Parties: Kenneth M. PETTIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the VALLEJO JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Defendant, PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 27994.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 263

91 Cal.Rptr. 263

12 Cal.App.3d 1029

Kenneth M. PETTIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the VALLEJO JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DefendantPEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Civ. 27994.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 19, 1970.

Paul Ligda, Public Defender, Solano County, Vallejo, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Derald E. Granberg, Gloria F. DeHart, Deputy Attys.Gen., San Francisco, for respondent and real party in interest.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

AppellantKenneth M. Pettis, 18 years old and charged with burglary, was proceeded against by way of preliminary examination in the municipal court.He moved to have the case certified to the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 604.This section as it applies to minors of ages 18 through 21 states:

'(b) Whenever a case is pending in any court upon an accusatory pleading and it appears to the satisfaction of the judge that the person charged is under the age of 21 years, the judge May certify the case to the juvenile court of his county * * *.'(Italics added.)

The magistrate denied the motion after stating (as alleged by Kenneth--no transcript was made available to this court) that the accused 'may very well be suited for treatment by the Juvenile Court, but that until the delays in processing referral cases were eliminated, it would no longer certify any case for consideration, regardless of the situation.'

Kenneth then sought to prevent further preliminary proceedings by 'Petition for Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus' in the superior court.Upon reading and considering the petition that court by a written order summarily denied relief.It is from that order that the appeal is taken.

On his appeal Kenneth repeats the contentions of the points and authorities which accompanied his petition to the superior court.He recognizes that if held to answer for trial before the superior courthe will have a right to move that court for certification to the juvenile court.But he insists that he has a Right to twice move for such certification.He argues: 'Because the law permits the motion for certification to be made at any time, it is clear that in a felony case such as petitioner's, there is the potential for making a motion for certification to the Juvenile Court once before the Municipal Court and once again before the Superior Court.* * * When one of those courts imposes a blanket rule of exclusion, one of those two opportunities to have the motion considered is lost.The fact the motion might again be made is only a partial remedy because, by any standard the possibility of a favorable ruling on the motion has been halved.'

As we have indicated, Kenneth's appeal is from the superior court order denying relief by way of prohibition or mandate.The issuance of such writs is said to be within the sound discretion of the court.(Dickenson v. Municipal Court, 162 Cal.App.2d 85, 88, 328 P.2d 32;Barnard v. Municipal Court, 142 Cal.App.2d 324, 326, 298 P.2d 679;Ertman v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal.App.2d 143, 148, 155 P.2d 908, 156 P.2d 940.)They will be denied if the applicant has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.(Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1086,1103;Providence Baptist Church of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.2d 55, 59--60, 251 P.2d 70;Barnard v. Municipal Court, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d p. 326, 298 P.2d 679.)And the burden is on the petitioner to show that he does not have such a remedy.(Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 366, 217 P.2d 951.)

The superior court concluded that Kenneth did not have any Right to twice move, in different courts, for certification to the juvenile court or at least that he had not been prejudiced by a denial of such claimed right by the municipal court.Further the court considered that Kenneth had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by moving for certification in the superior court in the event he be held to answer.In the order denying Kenneth's petition it was stated:

'A preliminary examination now is scheduled to be held on petitioner's case in Municipal Court on February 18.At the close of such hearing, petitioner would either be discharged or bound over to this court for further proceedings.While applicant now seeks to arrest such proceedings, the fact remains that entertainment of his application here and now would of itself protract and delay his case, to the detriment of and additional expense to the real parties in interest, the general public of our State.

'Respondents in this proceeding are entitled to advance notice of hearing on the application.Certainly a substantial period, probably some months, would elapse before final...