Pettit v. State
Decision Date | 13 November 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 978S196,978S196 |
Citation | 396 N.E.2d 126,272 Ind. 143 |
Parties | James William PETTIT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Webster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a trial by jury of Unlawful Dealing in a Controlled Schedule I Substance (heroin) in violation of Ind.Code 35-24.1-4.1-2 (Burns
1975), for which he was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and fined two thousand dollars. On appeal he presents the following issues:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing witnesses for the State to testify concerning previous narcotics sales by the defendant.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in allowing segments of a tape recording to be played to the jury.
(3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing defendant's tendered instruction on intoxication, as a defense to the crime charged.
(4) Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's Motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case in chief.
(5) Whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
(6) Whether the defendant was convicted by an impartial jury.
The evidence when viewed most favorably to the State discloses that, on the evening of February 11, 1977, three members of the Richmond Police Department met with two informants, Michael and Karen Boatman, who were husband and wife. The Boatmans were strip-searched and a sound transmitting device was placed and concealed within the clothing of Karen Boatman. The Boatmans were transported to the 200 block of South 12th Street in Richmond, at which point they exited the vehicle and walked to defendant's residence at 231 South 12th Street. The police officers remained in the vehicle and recorded the conversations received from the transmitting device. The defendant allowed the Boatmans to enter his residence and sold them a "quarter-bag" of heroin for forty dollars.
Defendant's first contention is that the trial court erred in allowing the Boatmans to testify that they were both narcotic addicts with substantial habits, that they had regularly purchased heroin from the defendant and that he was their only source of the drug.
Generally, evidence of other criminal activity is inadmissible on the question of guilt. Cobbs v. State, (1975) 264 Ind. 60, 338 N.E.2d 632. "However, such evidence may be admitted to show intent, motive, purpose, identification, or common scheme or plan." Cobbs, id. at 62, 338 N.E.2d at 633.
The defendant argues that none of these exceptions are applicable to the case at hand, but we hold that the evidence of the defendant's other drug transactions are admissible because it tended to prove his common scheme and plan of heroin distribution. See, Manuel v. State, (1977) Ind., 370 N.E.2d 904; Miller v. State, (1975) Ind.App., 338 N.E.2d 733. See also, United States v. Bloom, (5th Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 704; United States v. Conley, (8th Cir. 1975) 523 F.2d 650. The State offered testimony of the pre-existing relationship between the defendant and the Boatmans in order to lend credibility to their testimony and to show that the defendant had the intent to engage in an illegal act and a common plan or scheme to distribute heroin. We see no error in the admission of such evidence under the circumstances of this case.
State's Exhibit 5 is a tape recording made on February 11, 1977. It consists of three segments. The first segment is a telephone conversation between paid informant, Michael Boatman, and the defendant. The second segment is a recording of the actual drug transaction a sale of heroin by the defendant to the paid informants, Michael and Karen Boatman. The sale occurred at the residence of the defendant and was recorded by means of the sound transmission device previously mentioned. The third segment is a recording of a conversation between the Boatmans, as they left the defendant's residence. Preceding and following each segment of the tape is commentary by the police detective in charge of the drug investigation; however, these comments were deleted from that "THE COURT: * * * In fact the only part of that tape that is very audible is the telephone call that was made before they went. Well, aren't these people that made this buy aren't they going to be witnesses?
which the jury was allowed to hear. Prior to trial, a hearing was held upon the defendant's motion to suppress this tape; and, after listening to the tape, the trial court made the following comments and ruling:
The case proceeded to trial, and the paid informants and the three narcotics officers (who had listened to and recorded the conversation in a nearby police car) related to the jury the statements made during the drug buy. After these five had testified, the trial court reversed its earlier ruling and, over timely objection, allowed all three segments of the tape to be played to the jury. The record contains no explanation as to why the court reversed its pre-trial ruling. Thereafter, the State rested; the defense called no witnesses.
The defendant contends that the audio quality of the tape does not meet the standard set out in Lamar v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 504, 282 N.E.2d 795, 800, wherein this Court stated that, to be admissible, a tape recording must be of "such clarity as to be intelligible and enlightening to the jury." The reason for this rule was stated as follows:
Id., 258 Ind. at 511, 282 N.E.2d at 799.
Lamar stands for the additional proposition that the court of appellate review may listen to the tape and make an independent determination of its clarity, and "justice demands that we substitute our judgment, if different from that of the trial judge." Id., 258 Ind. at 512, 282 N.E.2d at 800.
After having listened to the tape recording, we conclude that its audio quality falls The State responds, however, that any such error was harmless:
far short of the standard set out in the Lamar case. Far from being of such clarity so as to be intelligible and enlightening to the jury, segments 2 and 3 of the tape recording are of a very poor audio quality due, at least in part, to large amounts of static and background noise. It was error to play a recording of such poor quality to the jury.
We think there is merit to the State's argument. The evidence of the defendant's guilt was direct and overwhelming. Furthermore, five prosecution witnesses described in detail the secretly recorded conversation which accompanied the drug sale. Their descriptions were substantially the same. Thus, the danger of jury speculation the harm sought to be curtailed by our holding in the Lamar case, was of less significance in the case at bar. Accordingly, we do not believe that the defendant in the instant case was put in a position of grave peril as characterized the situation in Lamar, and we are satisfied that the error was harmless. However, in so holding, we emphasize that the courts should not tolerate sound recordings of such inferior quality. This does not mean that Every recorded word must be intelligible. This cannot be expected, anymore than one would expect the jury to...
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