Petty v. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 18 July 1924
• Citation: 264 S.W. 353,150 Tenn. 292
• Parties: PETTY ET AL. v. PH×NIX COTTON OIL CO.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

264 S.W. 353

150 Tenn. 292

PETTY ET AL. v. PH×NIX COTTON OIL CO.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 18, 1924

Error to Circuit Court, Henderson County; N. R. Barham, Judge.

Action by H. J. & O. F. Petty against the Ph nix Cotton Oil Company.From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiffs bring error.Affirmed.

Jno.F.Hall, of Lexington, for plaintiffs in error.

T. A Lancaster, of Lexington, for defendant in error.

McKINNEY J.

If the uniform sales statute, chapter 118 of the Public Acts of 1919, is valid, then it is conceded that the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.

This was a suit to recover damages for the violation of a parol contract for the sale of cotton seed in an amount exceeding $500.

The defendant pleaded the statute of frauds set forth in subsection 1 of section 4 of the above act, which is as follows:

"A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of the five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold, or sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf."

This plea was sustained by the trial court, and the suit dismissed.

In the first place, it is said that the body of the act is broader than its caption, in that it undertakes to regulate many matters not referred to in the caption.

The title of the act is as follows:

"An act to be entitled an act regulating the sales of goods and to make uniform the law of sales of goods."

Under this head it is first insisted that the title includes all sales, regardless of the amount, while the body excepts sales under $500, which exception is not referred to in the title.

This court has repeatedly held that, where the title is broad and general, such exceptions do not invalidate the act.Swift & Co. v. Haley,142 Tenn. 390, 219 S.W. 1039.

In the second place, it is said that the act deals with "negotiable paper" and "with attachments."

The act does deal with "negotiable documents of title," and provides that the holder of such a document shall have precedence over an attaching creditor; that is, the right to the goods, of the holder of such a document, shall be superior to the right of an attaching creditor.

These matters are germane to the subject of the act, and deal with the sale of goods, or with that which amounts to the same thing, viz. the hypothecation of the goods as security for debt, or by transfer of title by the negotiation of such document.

Where the subject of a statute is sufficiently stated in the title the manner, modes, means, or instrumentalities of its enforcement, administration, or accomplishment may be embraced in its body, though not recited or stated in the title.State v. Yardley,95 Tenn. 553, 32 S.W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656;State v. Brown, 103 Tenn. 456, 53 S.W. 727;Peterson v. State,104 Tenn. 131, 56 S.W. 834;Railroad v. State,110 Tenn. 617, 75 S.W. 730;Railroad v. Byrne,119 Tenn. 299, 104 S.W. 460;Knoxville v. Gass,119 Tenn. 438, 104 S.W. 1084;Rhinehart v. State,121 Tenn. 434, 117 S.W. 508, 17 Ann. Cas. 254;State ex rel. v. Persica,130 Tenn. 55, 168 S.W. 1056.

The generality of the title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover for legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection with the subject of legislation expressed in the body of the act.Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 519.

So long as the subject-matter of the body of the act is germane to that expressed in the title, there is an obedience to the mandate of the Constitution, whether the body enlarges or restricts the title.Garvin v. State, 13 Lea, 162;Railroad v. Byrne, supra.

When the act in question is considered as a whole, its purpose, to regulate the sales of goods, is apparent, and every matter dealt with therein can be referred to the title.

It would be a useless consumption of time to review in this opinion the decisions of this court upon this question, since they have been collated in the recent case of House v. Creveling,147 Tenn. 589, 250 S.W. 357, in which Chief Justice Green concluded his discussion of this question with the following statement:

"Our uniform statutes, the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Sales Law, the Partnership Law, and others, are of the widest range. and cover a multitude of matters, and yet their validity is not doubted."

The act in question appears upon the statute books of most of the states of the Union, and yet we have found no case in which the contention here made has been raised.

In the next place, it is said that section 4 of the act violates article 11, section 8, of our Constitution, and is class legislation, in that it excepts all contracts of sale under $500, and includes all those in excess of $500, and that such a classification is unwarranted, arbitrary, and unreasonable.

In this position we cannot agree with learned counsel.Under the police power of the statethe Legislature has a right to regulate professions, trades, occupations, and contracts in the interest of the public welfare.12 Corpus Juris, 1123.

This provision of the act is substantially the same as the seventeenth section of the English statute of frauds, which has been on the statute books of many of the states for years, and its validity does not seem to have been questioned, with the exception to which we shall refer later.The limitation as to amount differs in the various states, but the substance of all of the enactments is the same.

A list of the states having such statutes will be found in 12...