Petzold v. Jones, CIV-06-1317-HE.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV-06-1317-HE.,CIV-06-1317-HE. |
| Parties | Stefen D. PETZOLD, Petitioner, v. Justin JONES, Director, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Howard R. Haralson, Oklahoma City, OK, for Petitioner.
Diane L. Slayton, Donald D. Self, Preston Saul Draper, Attorney General's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondent.
Petitioner Stefen D. Petzold, a state prisoner, filed a pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking federal habeas relief from his state court convictions. Consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Robert E. Bacharach. After appointing petitioner counsel, conducting an evidentiary hearing, and accepting closing remarks for the hearing in writing, Judge Bacharach issued his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [Doc. # 63] recommending that the court deny habeas relief as to petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Judge Bacharach's subsequent Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 66] further recommends that the court deny habeas relief as to petitioner's Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claims.
Petitioner filed an objection to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reasserting his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and arguing that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged inadequacy of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).1 This court reviews de novo objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
"The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied by the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution to which they are entitled." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quotation and citations omitted). "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Also, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "[I]n order to satisfy the `prejudice' requirement, the [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366.
Petitioner, represented by retained counsel, confessed to kidnapping, armed robbery, and larceny of an automobile, entered a blind guilty plea, and was sentenced to a total of 47 years imprisonment on six felony counts. After sentencing, petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his plea, appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw plea, and then sought post-conviction relief which was denied by the district court. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.
As an initial matter, the court declines to adopt petitioner's first, second, and fourth proposed findings of fact. The court finds that all three lack adequate evidentiary support in the record. Petitioner's third proposed finding of fact is moot. The Magistrate Judge's proposed finding of fact # 18 already states that petitioner's trial attorney, Ms. Rebecca Schneider, would have proceeded differently in the case if she had realized that petitioner's original confession could have been suppressed.
Petitioner's primary objections center on Ms. Schneider's failure to file a motion to suppress his initial confession and waiver for search of his vehicle and room and her subsequent decision to allow petitioner to make further admissible statements to investigators. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly addressed petitioner's "failure to file a motion to suppress" ineffective assistance claim. For substantially the same reasons set out in the Proposed Findings of Fact, the court agrees that even if Ms. Schneider had filed the motion to suppress, ample evidence of petitioner's participation in the crime would have remained and it is likely that petitioner would still have pled guilty. Thus, petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency on Ms. Schneider's part. Further, Ms. Schneider made a tactical choice to allow her client to make voluntary statements to the police. Even assuming the validity of petitioner's assertion that his attorney provided deficient legal representation by presenting him to the police for further questioning,2 the evidence does not support the conclusion that, but for this alleged error, petitioner would have opted to proceed to trial instead of pleading guilty.
Petitioner's remaining objection reiterates his "failure to investigate" ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This issue was thoroughly and appropriately addressed in the Proposed Findings of Fact. The court adopts the Magistrate Judge's conclusions and recommendations for substantially the same reasons.
Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [Doc. # 63] and the Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 66]. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIMS
The Petitioner, Mr. Stefen Petzold, is a state inmate seeking federal habeas relief based in part on a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in State Custody at p. 7 (Nov. 28, 2006) ("Petition"). The Court should deny relief on the double jeopardy claims.1
In state court, Mr. Petzold pled guilty to three counts of kidnapping, two counts of robbery with a firearm, and one count of larceny of an automobile.2 In state court, the Petitioner unsuccessfully argued that the multiple convictions constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.3 Mr. Petzold reasserts the claims as grounds for federal habeas relief.
Because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA") addressed the merits of the double jeopardy claim,4 the federal district court bears a "secondary and limited" role. See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir.1998). For legal issues like those involved here, the federal court considers only whether the OCCA's conclusions were "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The threshold issue is whether federal law clearly establishes the constitutional protection underlying the Petitioner's claim. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir.2008) (). Id. at 1016-17 (footnote & citations omitted). For this purpose, Supreme Court holdings "must be construed narrowly and consist only of something akin to on-point holdings." Id. at 1015. In the absence of Supreme Court precedents, "a federal habeas court need not assess whether a state court's decision was `contrary to' or involved an `unreasonable application' of such law." Id. at 1017.
If Supreme Court precedents do establish the underlying constitutional right, the federal district court must ask whether the state court decision was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. These circumstances may exist when the state court had:
• applied a rule that conflicted with governing Supreme Court holdings or
• reached a conclusion different from the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (citation omitted).
If these circumstances are absent, the federal district court must determine whether the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedents. See supra p. 1148. Application of Supreme Court precedent is considered "unreasonable" when the state court unreasonably extends, or refuses to extend, prior decisions. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir.2008).
Mr. Petzold alleges that his convictions violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy because the crimes had involved a single transaction. Petition at p. 7; Brief of Petitioner at pp. 25-29, Petzold v. State, Case No. C-2003-955 (Okla.Crim.App. Apr. 1, 2004) ("Petitioner's Certiorari Brief").5 The OCCA rejected this claim on the merits,6 and this determination did not conflict with Supreme Court precedents.
In part, the federal double jeopardy clause prohibits "`multiple punishments for the same offense.'" Warnick v. Booher, 425 F.3d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989)). When the issue involves multiple punishments, the federal district court must determine whether the sentencing court imposed greater punishment than the legislature intended. See id. And the federal court is "`bound by a state court's determination of the legislature's intent." Burleson v. Saffle, 292 F.3d 1253, 1255 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Birr v....
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