Peyton v. Fields
| Decision Date | 25 April 1966 |
| Citation | 147 S.E.2d 762,207 Va. 40 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | C. C. PEYTON, Superintendent, etc., v. James E. FIELDS. |
Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for plaintiff in error.
William D. Martin, III, Bedford, for defendant in error.
Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO and GORDON, JJ.
On July 1, 1964, James E. Fields, sometimes hereinafter referred to as defendant, filed in the court below a petition for a writ of Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in which he claimed that he was being unlawfully detained by C. C. Peyton, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary. He made the customary and often abused claim for relief, i.e., that he was denied due process of law because he was not afforded effective assistance by his court-appointed counsel when he was tried, convicted and sentenced for statutory burglary and escape on July 7, 1959. At the conclusion of a plenary hearing had on the petition, the trial court ordered that the writ be granted, remanded Fields to the custody of Peyton, and gave the Commonwealth's attorney 30 days within which to elect whether to retry him or to 'release him from the burden of the judgment as imposed on July 7, 1959'. As a result of the entry of this order we granted Peyton a writ of error.
The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the court erred in issuing the writ of Habeas corpus on the ground that defendant Fields was not effectively represented by his court-appointed counsel.
The record discloses that on June 25, 1959, Fields was serving a sentence in State Convict Camp No. 24 in Bedford county imposed by the Circuit Court of Giles County for a conviction of statutory burglary. On that day he escaped from custody and was apprehended approxiamtely an hour later. He was subsequently indicted for the escape and for statutory burglary committed while he was at large. On June 26, Fields was taken to the Bedford county jail where he remained until July 7, the day of his trial. While he was in jail no one discussed with him the offenses for which he was charged nor did any law enforcement official attempt to obtain a statement from him.
On July 7, Fields was brought before the court to stand trial upon the indictments for escape and statutory burglary. Before the trial commenced the court ascertained from the defendant that he was not represented by counsel and appointed Lacey E. Putney, a local attorney, to defend him. According to the court's order, after private consultation with Putney, Fields stated to the court that 'he was ready for trial and desired to be tried' on that day. He then waived arraignment and tendered in person a plea of guilty to both indictments. The court, after being satisfied that he understood the nature and effect of the pleas, heard the evidence, found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him to serve a term of three years on each indictment.
Here, defendant challenges only the validity of the statutory burglary conviction.
According to Fields, about ten to fifteen minutes elapsed from the time that Putney was appointed to the time that the trial itself commenced. Fields remained in the courtroom during this period. He talked with Putney 'on a bench' in the courtroom and did not see Putney talk with anyone else. Putney did not question him concerning 'the facts in the offense' with which he was charged (statutory burglary), and he did not ask if he was guilty. Putney advised him what the maximum punishment was 'for the offense involved', told him that 'he thought * * * the Commonwealth would recommend a three year sentence on a plea of guilty', and informed him that he 'thought it was advisable' to enter such a plea. When asked 'What else did he (Putney) say', Fields replied: 'Actually, I don't remember it has been so long, he asked me if I wanted to plead guilty.'
Fields admitted on cross-examination, however, that he had had previous 'experience with the Courts,' that at the time he talked with Putney he understood the nature of the two charges against him; that he knew or no witnesses who could be called in his behalf; that he was aware of his constitutional rights 'as far as a jury trial was concerned and matters of that kind', and that he knew that he could enter a plea of not guilty.
David Bagby, a co-defendant, testified that he was present in the courtroom on the day Fields was tried. He was asked:
On cross-examination he stated that he did not know of any witnesses who could have been called to testify at the trial on behalf of Fields and that '* * * I ain't got no recollection of time.'
Putney testified that at the time of Habeas corpus hearing he had been a member of the House of Delegates of the General Assembly of Virginia since 1962; that he had been practicing law in Bedford county for seven and a half years, and that prior to his appointment to represent defendant he had represented felons on both a retained and an appointed basis. He stated that he was 'sure' that he had made notes on the Fields case but that he was unable to locate them because his office had been moved twice since the trial. He also stated that although it had been about five years since he had been appointed to represent Fields, he remembered 'the incident'.
In response to a question as to whether he had conversed with anyone other than Fields relative to the case prior to the trial, Putney said that in every case in which he had been appointed to represent an accused he had discussed 'the matter' with the sheriff or the investigating officer; that in this case he was 'pretty sure' that he talked with the sheriff; that he always talked with the Commonwealth's attorney and reviewed the file 'as to previous records,' etc., and that he did not recall ever representing a defendant when he did not 'go over' the case with him and ascertain 'his educational background, family connections and things of this type.' He said: 'I do it in all cases and I (am) certainly sure that I did it in this one.'
Putney further testified that he did not recall Fields requesting that a continuance be granted; that his 'recollection' was that Fields was not able to provide a defense to the charges in the indictments, and that no defense was available 'as far as I was concerned.'
Putney was asked on cross-examination whether he discussed 'the facts involved with Mr. Fields in this particular case'. He replied, 'I don't recall going over the facts in detail with Mr. Fields as far as talking to him in this room or here in the Courtroom as he testified or any particular place, I do know that I talked to him about the case.' He was also questioned as to whether he asked defendant 'for his story of what happened'. He said, 'I can only answer by saying that I have never represented an accused without asking him to relate to me what happened and then talk to the officers and get their version of it.'
The court's order awarding Fields a writ of Habeas corpus provided in part:
'* * * (T)he total amount of time which elapsed from appointment of counsel to the actual sentencing of the Petitioner amounted to fifteen or thirty minutes and the Court doth further find that positive evidence offered in the case and unrefuted indicates that the sole person talked to by Court appointed counsel for the Petitioner was the Commonwealth's Attorney who prosecuted the case and the Court doth further find that other positive evidence indicates that the only conference held between Petitioner and his court appointed counsel occurred on the day of trial just prior to the trial in the Court room while Court was in session.'
Peyton, the appellant, contends that Fields did not adduce evidence of any defense which could have been presented to the court during his trial; that he 'failed to show any prejudice in connection with his trial', and that the court's finding that fields had been ineffectively represented by counsel was without sufficient evidence to support it.
Fields, on the other hand, says that he 'has borne the burden of proving his allegations of ineffective representation'; that Putney's representation did not amount to sufficient professional assistance to enable him to intelligently decide whether or not to tender a plea of guilty, and that prejudice to him is apparent from the record.
"It is well settled that the right of an accused to have effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution and the Virginia Bill of Rights.' Morris v. Smyth, 202 Va. 832, 833, 120 S.E.2d 465, 466, and ...
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Walker v. Forbes
...“by habeas corpus on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of proving the charge made.” Peyton v. Fields , 207 Va. 40, 44, 147 S.E.2d 762, 766 (1966). Because “[t]he right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the right to counsel itself,” Howard v. War......
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Blowe v. Peyton
...opportunity to investigate and prepare a case prejudice results, and the burden of proving lack of prejudice is shifted to the State. In the Fields case, the court disagreed with our findings in Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E.2d 762. We have condemned the appointment of counsel too s......
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Peyton v. Ellyson
...effective assistance, there must be some showing of prejudice to the defendant before a conviction will be overturned. See Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E.2d 762; Yates v. Peyton, 207 Va. 91, 147 S.E.2d 767, and cases there In the case at bar, there has been no showing that defendant'......
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Russell v. Peyton
...in diligence and competence that he accused is without representation and the trial is reduced to a sham. Peyton v. Fields, supra, 207 Va. at p. 45, 147 S.E.2d at p. 766; Yates v. Peyton, 207 Va. 91, 98, 147 S.E.2d 767, 772 (1966). Compare Webb v. Peyton, 345 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1965); Snide......