Peyton v. King

• Decision Date: 05 September 1969
• Citation: 169 S.E.2d 569,210 Va. 194
• Parties: C. C. PEYTON, Supt., etc. v. Billy Wayne KING.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 569

169 S.E.2d 569

210 Va. 194

C. C. PEYTON, Supt., etc. v. Billy Wayne KING.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 5, 1969.

Gerald L. Baliles, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for plaintiff in error.

Dean MacD. Greiner, Bristol, for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON and HARRISON, JJ.

CARRICO, Justice.

The important question for decision in this case is whether an accused who is convicted upon a plea of guilty is entitled to appeal his conviction to this court.

The question arose when Billy Wayne King, the petitioner, filed in the court below a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against C. C. Peyton, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, the respondent. The petition alleged that on September 12, 1967, the petitioner was convicted in the lower court of attempted rape and was sentenced to a term of three years in the penitentiary. It was further alleged that the petitioner had been denied the right to appeal his conviction.

The trial court ¹ held a plenary hearing on the habeas corpus petition and ruled that the petitioner had been denied the right to appeal his conviction. The writ of habeas corpus was awarded, and we granted the respondent a writ of error to review the action of the trial court.

The record of the petitioner's criminal proceeding and the evidence at the habeas corpus hearing show that the petitioner, represented by assigned counsel, entered a plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with the attempted rape of a fourteen-year-old girl and that his conviction was based upon such plea. Before accepting the plea, the trial judge conducted an extensive examination of the petitioner concerning the voluntariness of the plea and the petitioner's understanding of the nature and effect thereof. No objection or complaint was made when the conviction was entered or when sentence was imposed.

Following his commitment to the penitentiary, the petitioner requested a copy of his trial transcript and notified the trial court that he wanted to appeal his conviction. The former judge of the court entered an order denying 'application for such transcript' and stating that the petitioner was 'not entitled to the relief prayed for.' The habeas corpus petition was thereafter filed.

The petitioner concedes, refreshingly, that 'the decision was his alone as to the plea of guilty.' He does not question the trial court's finding, which is fully sustained by the evidence, that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered. He claims no defect in the criminal court's jurisdiction, and he makes no complaint about the validity of his sentence. He rests his case upon the bald proposition that he was entitled to appeal his conviction notwithstanding his plea of guilty.

The Attorney General concedes that a plea of guilty does not foreclose an appeal where, unlike the present case, there is involved a question of jurisdiction or a claim that a sentence exceeds that authorized by law. In all other cases, however, the Attorney General contends, an appeal will not lie from a conviction in a court of record where the defendant enters a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty.

We agree with the Attorney General. His position finds support in the earlier opinions of this court.

In Cooper v. Town of Appalachia, 145 Va. 861, 134 S.E. 591 (1926), the accused entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor before a mayor and then sought to appeal his conviction to the circuit court. We held that the appeal was barred by the guilty plea. We stated that 'ordinarily an appeal will not lie from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case rendered upon a confession of guilt.' 145 Va., at 863, 134 S.E., at 592.

In Dickerson, Etc. v. Commonswealth, 162 Va. 787, 173 S.E. 543 (1934), we overruled the holding in the Cooper case and ruled instead that a plea of guilty in a court not of record did not bar an appeal to a court of record. We said this was because of the language of the statute making such an appeal a matter of right and providing that the trial in the court of record should be de novo. However, and of importance here, we recognized the 'rule applied in Cooper v. Appalachia (as) the rule that is applied generally in criminal cases where an appeal from or writ of error to a judgment of a court of record is provided for.' 162 Va., at 795, 173 S.E., at 547.

That general rule applies to appeals to this court in criminal cases, and its logic becomes apparent when the nature and effect of a plea of guilty are considered. In Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340 (1948), we said:

'A plea of guilty, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a conviction of the offense to which it is directed, the effect of which is to authorize the imposition of the punishment prescribed by law on a verdict of guilty of the offense admitted. * * * It waives all defenses other than that no offense is charged.' 187 Va., at 296, 46 S.E.2d, at 342.

See also Arey v. Peyton, 209 Va. 370, 375--376, 164 S.E.2d 691, 695 (1968); Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 912, 15 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1941); Granger v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 212, 213--214 (1883).

Thus, a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty by an accused is, in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law. It is a waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional, effective as such not only in the lower court but as well in this court. Where a conviction is rendered upon such a plea and the punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free of jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to appeal. To take any other view would give recognition to an empty right and permit frivolous appeals for the mere sake of delay.

But, says the petitioner, Code § 19.1--282 ² provides that a 'writ of error shall lie in a criminal case' and 'shall lie in any such case for the accused.' The petitioner then argues that by use of the language 'any such case,' the legislature intended the right of appeal to include every criminal case whether or not the conviction is...