Peyton v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 July 2022
• Docket Number: 18-CF-582
• Citation: 278 A.3d 713
• Parties: Davon L. PEYTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

278 A.3d 713

Davon L. PEYTON, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 18-CF-582

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 18, 2020

Decided July 21, 2022

Stefanie Schneider, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam, Public Defender Service, was on the brief, for appellant.

Michael E. McGovern, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu, Washington, United States Attorney at the time, and Elizabeth Trosman, Washington, John P. Mannarino, Katherine Earnest, and Jennifer Fischer, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Glickman, Associate Judge, and Fisher and Thompson, Senior Judges.^*

Glickman, Associate Judge:

Early on the morning of November 13, 2015, appellant Davon Peyton shot and killed his friend Ray Harrison after Harrison punched him in the face during a confrontation on the steps of Peyton's apartment building. A grand jury returned an indictment charging Peyton with second-degree murder while armed,¹ possession of a firearm during a crime of violence,² and unlawful possession of a firearm.³ At trial, Peyton testified the shooting was an accident that occurred as he was struggling to defend himself from Harrison after being punched. In light of that testimony, at the government's request, the trial judge instructed the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter⁴ as lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder. The jury acquitted Peyton of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter while armed. It also convicted him of the two firearm offenses.

In this appeal, Mr. Peyton presents two claims of instructional error. First, he argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to convict him of involuntary manslaughter based on the accidental discharge of his firearm while he was using non-deadly force in self-defense. In such circumstances, appellant contends, accident is a complete defense. We disagree. The trial judge properly instructed the jury that accident is no defense to involuntary, criminal-negligence manslaughter if the defendant's conduct was a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care that created an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury. Second, appellant argues that the judge erred by instructing the jury that he could not "rely upon the right of self-defense to justify his use of force" against Harrison if he was the aggressor or if he had reason to believe his actions would provoke Harrison's violence against him. He primarily contends that this instruction does not apply to claims of self-defense in the home. We do not reach the merits of that contention because it would not entitle appellant to relief even if it is correct. Appellant did not rely on self-defense to justify his killing of Harrison, and the jury's finding (which the evidence supported) that appellant was criminally negligent meant the prosecution proved him guilty of involuntary manslaughter regardless of whether he was justified in using non-deadly force to defend himself. The first aggressor/provocation instruction therefore did not prejudice appellant.

I. The Evidence at Trial

The tragic events giving rise to this case occurred at around 2:20 a.m. on November 13, 2015, when Ray Harrison drove with his girlfriend and a third person to appellant's apartment building to purchase marijuana from him. Harrison, who had been drinking and was under the influence at the time,⁵ had not arranged this visit beforehand. According to his girlfriend, he did not think his showing up unannounced at appellant's apartment so late at night would be "a problem," because he had done it before. Appellant had met Harrison and his girlfriend a few months earlier and had been giving them marijuana in exchange for rides. In his testimony at trial, appellant said he had a "business relationship" with Harrison but also acknowledged they had socialized and were "friends."

Appellant lived in a first-floor apartment with his girlfriend and their seven-year-old daughter. When Harrison arrived, he could not go directly to appellant's apartment to knock on his door because the entrance to the building was locked. Instead, to get appellant's attention, Harrison banged on one of the windows to appellant's apartment.

Appellant testified that he awoke to a "loud, consistent banging" and feared someone was attempting to break into the apartment through the window in the bedroom where his daughter was sleeping. Grabbing his handgun, which was already loaded, appellant "took the safety off of it" and "cocked it back" so that he could fire it quickly if need be. He then went to the window and looked out. By this time the banging had stopped and appellant saw no one. He did, however, notice a parked car with its headlights on. Appellant then left his apartment with his girlfriend, walked "two steps" to the front door of the building, and opened the door. Standing at the threshold and holding his gun in his right hand at his side, appellant called out, "who is it?" In response, Harrison appeared out of the darkness, identified himself as "Ray," and walked up to appellant at the door. Harrison was alone; his two companions were waiting in the parked car.

Appellant testified that he was "a little relieved" upon seeing Harrison, but he also was confused. He testily asked Harrison why he was "knocking on my daughter's window at two-something in the morning." Harrison answered, "why you trying to carry me[?]" or "why you carrying me like that?"⁶ Appellant responded dismissively, telling Harrison he was "just my Uber driver," and (as his girlfriend recalled) "we're not friends like that." According to both appellant and his girlfriend, Harrison did not take appellant's remark well and started punching appellant and pushing his girlfriend aside. Appellant "tried to push him off," and the cocked pistol, which he was still holding in his right hand, discharged. A single shot was fired; it hit Harrison in his chest from close range. Appellant testified he did not mean for the gun to go off; it was an accidental firing as he grappled with Harrison. All this happened in a matter of seconds.

After being shot, Harrison staggered away and collapsed on the sidewalk. Appellant ran to him, tried to hold his head up and keep him awake, said he was sorry, and repeatedly asked "Why did you do that" or "Why did you come at me?" He yelled for someone to call 911. After that was done, and before the police or an ambulance arrived, appellant left the scene. The police arrested him the following week and recovered his gun at that time.

II. The Instruction on Involuntary, Criminal-Negligence Manslaughter

At trial, appellant's defense was that he was lawfully defending himself from Harrison's assault with non-deadly force when the gun he was holding accidentally discharged and fatally wounded Harrison. At appellant's request, the trial judge instructed the jury on his defense as follows:

The defense contends that Mr. Peyton did not intentionally shoot Mr. Harrison. The defense contends that Mr. Harrison was assaulting Mr. Peyton at the time of the gunshot and that Mr. Peyton was acting in self-defense when the firearm accidentally went off. The defense contends that the Government has not satisfied their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm did not go off by accident while Mr. Peyton was acting in self-defense.

Appellant contends that the trial judge's instructions relating to the charge of involuntary manslaughter prejudiced this defense by erroneously suggesting that such an accident was not a complete defense to the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Whether the instructions properly articulated what the prosecution needed to prove to convict appellant of involuntary manslaughter is a question of law as to which our review is de novo.⁷

The judge instructed the jury on what is commonly referred to as involuntary, criminal-negligence manslaughter. As this court explained in Comber v. United States ,⁸ involuntary manslaughter is an "unintentional or accidental" killing committed without justification or excuse.⁹ "Unintentional or accidental" is shorthand; the words mean that the killing was not committed (or not proved to have been committed) with the mental state required to prove second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, i.e., with an intent to kill or do serious bodily injury, or with a conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury.¹⁰ Thus, accident, connoting the absence of such mens rea , is generally a defense to murder and voluntary manslaughter.¹¹ But accident is not per se a defense to involuntary manslaughter; rather, it is the possible predicate for such a charge. Under common law principles, "where a person [unintentionally or accidentally] kills another in doing a ‘lawful act in a lawful manner ,’ the homicide is excusable"¹² (meaning it does not result in criminal liability). "As this phrase implies, two categories of unintentional [or accidental] killings were not excused and thus were manslaughter: killings in the course of lawful acts carried out in an unlawful, i.e., criminally negligent, fashion, and killings in the course of unlawful, i.e., criminal, acts."¹³ In this jurisdiction, these two categories of unintentional or accidental homicides have been refined and have evolved into what we refer to as involuntary, criminal-negligence manslaughter and involuntary, misdemeanor manslaughter.

For present purposes, we need only discuss the requirements of the former category of involuntary manslaughter.¹⁴ Under District of Columbia law, the charge of involuntary, criminal-negligence manslaughter incorporates a gross negligence standard to evaluate an unintentional or accidental killing: to secure a conviction the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant caused the death of the decedent; (2) the conduct that caused the death was a gross deviation...