Pfaff v. Bender
Decision Date | 05 December 1929 |
Docket Number | No. 19500.,19500. |
Citation | 38 F.2d 642 |
Parties | PFAFF v. BENDER, Collector of Internal Revenue. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Panama Canal Zone |
Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., and Monte M. Lemann, both of New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.
T. M. Logan Bruns, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New Orleans, La., and W. H. Trigg, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, of Washington, D. C., for defendant.
This suit is for the recovery of $1,348.50, paid under protest as the result of a deficiency assessment on plaintiff's income return for 1927. Plaintiff and his wife lived under the regime of the matrimonial community established by the Louisiana law, and accordingly made separate returns, each for one-half of the total income of the year in question. They were married in this state, and have continued to reside here at all times. All of their revenues were from community sources. The government refused to accept payment upon the basis claimed, but required the plaintiff to pay the taxes upon the whole as his individual income, with the result that the amount was increased by the sum which he now seeks to recover.
The jury has been waived and the matter submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, which now presents for decision only a question of law; that is, as to whether under the law of Louisiana the plaintiff and his wife were joint owners of the income, and entitled to make returns as such for the taxes levied by the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 9). It therefore becomes necessary to review the statutory provisions of the state as well as the interpretation placed thereon by its court of last resort to determine the extent of the interest of the wife in the community property and income. These are to be found in the Louisiana Civil Code, arts. 2399 to 2437, inclusive, which primarily have their origin in the Spanish law. I quote some of the most pertinent provisions as follows:
It is thus seen that, in the absence of a prenuptial agreement that there shall be no community, the law conclusively presumes its existence, and not only does the property acquired through the joint and individual efforts of the spouses, regardless of the name in which it is taken, thereafter fall into the partnership, but also all profits and revenues arising from whatever may be brought into the marriage or may be received by either during its existence, except such as comes to the wife from her paraphernal property separately administered by her. While the relation is referred to as a partnership, it does not possess all of the characteristics of a commercial firm, but has some features resembling that status. So long as there exists no occasion for invoking by the wife of certain remedial provisions for her protection, the husband manages and disposes of the community property and income without having to obtain the consent of his wife, subject to the limitations hereinafter discussed. However, he can However, if he does so in fraud of the wife, she may at his death "have her action" against his heirs for reimbursement of her half thereof.
When the marriage is dissolved, either by death or divorce, the property, consisting both of what has been earned and acquired during its existence and of the profits from their separate estates, save those which arise from the paraphernal property of the wife separately administered by her, is divided into two equal parts, which vests, either in the heirs of the deceased and the survivor, respectively, or the spouses, as the case may be, in absolute ownership. It is an interest of which the wife and her heirs cannot be deprived by the husband. But they are protected from his mismanagement in that, if the community is involved, they may accept the same under the law with what is called "benefit of inventory." This means that there must be an administration of the estate under the probate powers of the court, resulting in a marshaling of the property or assets and payment of the community debts, and a distribution of the residue, if any, one-half to each of the beneficial interests. In this way the wife or her heirs escape personal liability for the debts of the community, in event it proves insolvent. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has construed these provisions of the Code as vesting in the wife during marriage the title to one-half of the community property and not as constituting a mere expectancy. See Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584, and authorities therein reviewed and analyzed. It is there pointed out that the interest does not come to the wife solely as a result of the dissolution of the marriage, but exists at all times, subject only to the administration of the husband; that it is not in the nature of an inheritance, and neither she nor her heirs can be deprived thereof by any act of the husband. In Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 191, 23 Am. Dec. 478, the Supreme Court of the state, through Justice Porter, pointed out the difference between the views expressed by the French commentators as to the nature of the wife's interest in community property and the law of Louisiana, and in doing so said:
See, also, Theall v. Theall, 7 La. 226, 26 Am. Dec. 501, wherein it was held that the will of the husband conveying "one-half of all (his property) to my wife" transmitted only one-half of his half of the community, and not the other half, for the reason that the wife took the...
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