Pfaff v. Petrie

• Decision Date: 22 January 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29748.,29748.
• Citation: 71 N.E.2d 345,396 Ill. 44
• Parties: PFAFF v. PETRIE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

396 Ill. 44

71 N.E.2d 345

PFAFF

v.PETRIE et al.

No. 29748.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rock Island County; A. J. scheineman, judge.

Action by Mary M. Pfaff against Lex Petrie and another to cancel a quitclaim deed. From a judgment dismissing the complaint for want of equity, the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Ben A. Stewart, of Rock Island, for appellant.

Murphy & Murphy, of Rock Island (Myron Murphy, of Rock Island, of counsel), for appellees.

WILSON, Justice.

The plaintiff, Mary M. Pfaff, filed her complaint in the circuit court of Rock Island county seeking the cancellation of a quitclaim deed executed by her on January 14, 1944, in favor of the defendants, Lex Petrie and Madge Petrie, his wife. The master in chancery to whom the cause was referred recommended that the deed be set aside. The chancellor sustained defendants' exceptions, and entered a decree dismissing the complaint for the want of equity. Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.

On January 14, 1944, and for a number of years prior thereto, Mary M. Pfaff was the owner in fee simple of a parcel of real estate improved with a six-room, two-story, stucco dwelling, a barn and several sheds, in the city of Rock Island. Plaintiff was then a widow, seventy-four years of age, not strong physically, and somewhat lame as the result of a stroke suffered a few years earlier. Totally blind in her left eye, plaintiff possessed such limited vision in her right eye as to necessitate the use of a magnifying glass to enable her to read. Beyond the bare legal title, plaintiff had nothing more than a small equity in the property. Sometime earlier, defaults on a mortgage indebtedness had resulted in foreclosure proceedings being instituted. Pursuant to a decree of foreclosure, the property was sold at a master's sale on December 28, 1943, to Alex Handelman and Louis Wiesman for $5800, and a certificate of purchase issued to them. In addition, the property was subject to unpaid taxes for the years 1938 to 1943, totaling $620.89, and to three judgments, two entered in 1938, and the third in 1941, aggregating $1891.73.

Plaintiff and Madge Petrie first met early in 1938. Plaintiff and Lex Petrie did not meet until November, 1939. Both before and after the death of plaintiff's husband, in May, 1938, Madge Petrie called on plaintiff at her home in the capacity of a prospective purchaser. Because defendants were not interested in buying at plaintiff's then asking price of $10,000, their dealings did not, at that time, proceed beyond the stage of preliminary inquiries. The meetings did result, however, in a friendship between the two women and thereafter they visited each other at intervals of irregular frequency.

During the winter of 1939-1940, plaintiff's property was again the subject of negotiations between the parties. Madge Petrie's brother, Joseph McGinnis, an attorney, participated in some of the conferences. A plan was advanced whereby plaintiff and defendants were to become the owners of the property in joint tenancy; the defendantsto pay $4000 and have the use and occupancy of the house, while plaintiff was to satisfy the mortgage debt, which was in excess of $3000, pay all back taxes, and to have the barn on the rear of the lot remodeled into a three-room dwelling for herself at her own expense. Other than the foregoing, all the testimony relating to the transaction is in hopeless conflict. Each side charged the other with initiating the proposal. Plaintiff testified that defendants attempted to force the plan upon her and that she refused to go through with it. Lex Petrie testified that he refused to go through with the deal when he learned of the judgments outstanding against the property.

Immediately after the master's sale on December 28, 1943, Albert Dockterman, a real-estate broker, called on plaintiff and offered $1000 for her right of redemption. His testimony does not disclose whether the offer was made with knowledge of the existing judgment liens. The relator was closely followed by defendants. As the result of several meetings in the early part of January, 1944, the parties concluded an oral agreement leading up to the execution of the disputed quitclaim deed. According to the testimony of plaintiff, defendants engaged to redeem from the master's sale, to satisfy all other liens and charges against the property, and to support her for the rest of her life, the consideration moving to the defendants being the right to move into the premises and live there with her, and a conveyance of the property, subject to a life estate in plaintiff. Defendants' version of the oral agreement differs in two material respects. They testified, first, that they only promised to furnish plaintiff with food and a room until the expiration of the fifteen-months' period of redemption and, secondly, that they were to receive a quitclaim deed. Pursuant to defendants' view of the contract, Madge Petrie appeared at plaintiff's home on January 14, 1943, accompanied by Fred Hauerwas, a notary public. Plaintiff then executed the deed and it was duly notarized.

Toward the end of January 1944, defendants, together with their thirteen-year-old daughter and all their household furnishings, moved in with the plaintiff. The parties have since resided together. During the year, defendants bought up all existing judgments against the plaintiff, paying therefor the sum of $1570. Defendants paid back taxes of $620.89, and expended roughly $300 for repairs and minor improvements, exclusive of six hundred hours Lex Petrie testified that he spent in cleaning up the house and yard. Living together, the parties did not get along well and a series of quarrels ensued. Because of the strained relations, plaintiff spent much of her time at the home of a friend and neighbor, Mrs. Laura Schmid. In August, 1944, plaintiff ceased to take her meals with defendants. Thereafter, she spent her entire day with Mrs. Schmid, ate with her, paid a proportionate share of the cost of the means and returned home at hours varying between seven o'clock in the evening and midnight.

In December, 1944, defendants sought to borrow $6000 secured by a mortgage on the premises so that they could redeem from the master's sale. The loan had progressed to the stage where the mortgage had been executed and recorded when plaintiff refused to sign a disclaimer required by the prospective mortgagee and the loan fell through. The twelve-months' redemption period expired on December 28, 1944, the property remaining unredeemed. Subsequently, defendants entered into a contract with Alex Handelman and Louis Wiesman to acquire the master's certificate of purchase for $6500. This agreement was nullified, however, when Marie E. Kaufman obtained judgment by confession against plaintiff for $518.21, and redeemed from the master's sale by paying $6235 on March 28, 1945, the last day on which creditors could redeem. May 17, 1945, this action was instituted. At the execution sale on June 18, 1945, defendants bid in the property for $9900, and received a certificate of purchase from the sheriff. This, they assigned as security for sums advanced by Alex Handelman and Louis Wiesman with whom they have a land contract for a deed to the premises. After all proper distributions, there remained in the hands of the sheriff a surplus of $2943.29. Within the space of a few days, plaintiff assigned all her interest in these funds to her counsel as security for legal fees and the sheriff filed an interpleader herein. The surplus was then turned over to the clerk of the court to await the outcome of this litigation.

By her complaint, plaintiff seeks cancellation of the deed on the two principal grounds of fraud in the execution and undue influence resulting from a relationship of trust and confidence. Plaintiff alleges that she signed a paper on January 14, 1944, which she was unable to read because of her infirmities, upon the strength of defendants' representations that it was the oral contract reduced to writing, and that she did not discover until a later date that the purported contract was actually a quitclaim deed. The determinative findings made by the master were that (1) no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties; (2) defendants did not obtain the deed by fraud, duress or undue influence; (3) plaintiff was mentally incompetent at the time of the execution of the deed; (4) there was no meeting of the minds as to the terms of the oral contract of which the deed constituted only a part, and (5) there was such a failure on the part of defendants to furnish meals and to redeem the premises as to require a court of equity to set aside the conveyance. The master recommended that the deed be cancelled and that an accounting be taken. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Neither did she make objections nor file exceptions to the master's report. Defendants interposed exceptions to the master's last three findings. The chancellor adopted the findings of the master that no fiduciary relationship was proved, and no fraud in the execution shown, and overruled the findings with respect to plaintiff's mental competency, mutual mistake and defendants' breach of contract. The chancellor expressed the opinion that the three issues last stated were not properly presented by the pleadings but held that, in any event, the findings were against the weight of the evidence. A decree was entered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and directing the clerk of the court to distribute to defendants the surplus moneys arising from the sheriff's sale. In view of the fact that the broadly drawn complaint contains certain allegations relating to mental weakness, mutual mistake and breach of contract and since both the master and the chancellor ruled on the merits of all five of plaintiff's theories of the case, we proceed on the assumption that these issues are properly raised by the complaint.

Plaint...