Pfannstiel v. City of Marion

• Decision Date: 12 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-5619,89-5619
• Citation: 918 F.2d 1178
• Parties: Samuel L. PFANNSTIEL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF MARION, et al., Defendants, Doyle Elliot and James A. Pearce, Mike Earl, Harvey Faulkner and Waldon Boecker, etc., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1178

918 F.2d 1178

Samuel L. PFANNSTIEL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF MARION, et al., Defendants Doyle Elliot and James A. Pearce, Mike Earl, Harvey Faulkner and Waldon Boecker, etc., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 89-5619.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 12, 1990.

W. Reed Lockhoof, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants-appellants.

Douglas M. Becker, Gray & Becker, Austin, Tex., for Earl, Faulkner & Boecker.

Dan R. Rutherford, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and KING, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Chief Judge:

This civil rights action arises out of incidents that occurred in Marion, Texas on July 31, 1985. Plaintiffs Samuel Pfannstiel ("Pfannstiel"), David Vizza, Roy Vizza, and Victor Garza, Jr. ("Garza") sued Michael Earl ("Earl"), Harvey Faulkner ("Faulkner"), Waldon Boecker ("Boecker"), Doyle Elliot ("Elliot"), James Pearce ("Pearce"), P.L. Montgomery ("Montgomery"), J. Sam Smelser ("Smelser"), R.W. Skelton ("Skelton"), J.M. Simons ("Simons"), the City of Marion, Texas, Southern Pacific Transportation Company, Inc. ("the Railroad"), and the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission ("TABC") alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Earl is the Chief of Police of Marion, and Faulkner and Boecker are Marion police officers. Elliot is Assistant Supervisor of TABC, and Pearce, Montgomery, and Smelser are TABC agents. Skelton and Simons are security officers employed by the Railroad.

The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints against Smelser and Montgomery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court also dismissed TABC based on Eleventh Amendment Immunity. All remaining defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the summary judgment motion filed by Skelton, Simons, and the Railroad against David Vizza, but denied all other motions. Earl, Faulkner, Boecker, Elliot, and Pearce appeal the district court's denial of their motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. As to these defendants, we reverse.

I. Background Facts.

The incidents in question occurred on and around a vacant tract of land in Marion known as "the Lot." The Railroad owns this gravel and dirt area located between the railroad tracks and the main street of Marion which is also a state highway. During the day, customers of businesses located across the main street use the Lot for parking. In the evenings, especially after Marion's weekly Wednesday night rodeo, people congregate and socialize at the Lot. From time to time, Marion officials have received complaints that underage persons consume alcohol at the Lot and that persons congregating there throw bottles and rocks at passing trains and commit vehicular violations.

On the evening of July 31, a group of between thirty and sixty people were socializing at the Lot, and many had been drinking beer. A "No Trespassing" sign had been posted before they arrived. Chief of Police Earl, several police officers, TABC representatives, and the Railroad's agents approached the group, announced that the Lot was private property, and asked the group to leave. Plaintiff David Vizza, who was seated in a chair, requested identification from the officials and protested that the Lot had always been used for socializing. David Vizza was subsequently pulled out of his chair and arrested for criminal trespass.

Plaintiff Roy Vizza became upset upon seeing his brother arrested, and he expressed his feelings to the officials. He was instructed to leave the Lot, but he moved to the center of the highway and continued to express his feelings. He claims that several officers brandished their weapons at him and shouted "get him." Roy Vizza then ran from the street and the officers ran after him. The officers eventually caught and arrested him in an alley.

Plaintiff Pfannstiel heard that the officers had chased Roy Vizza into the alley, and he decided to investigate the situation. As he approached the area where Roy Vizza was being arrested, defendant Elliot ordered Pfannstiel to leave the area and words were exchanged. Pfannstiel eventually proceeded toward the Lot. He claims that Elliot followed him on his right and Earl followed on his left. Earl and Elliot claim that Pfannstiel followed them. Pfannstiel claims that Earl "backhanded" him across the face without reason and explained that he was swatting a fly. Pfannstiel asked Skelton why he was being forced to vacate the Lot, told Skelton that the Lot had been used for socializing for years, discussed the "No Trespassing" sign, and exchanged words with Skelton. At this point, Garza had arrived on the scene. Pfannstiel spoke to him about the events which were taking place. Pfannstiel turned from speaking to Garza and confronted Marion police officers. Earl and Pearce put Pfannstiel in a headlock and placed him under arrest.

While Earl and Pearce were arresting Pfannstiel, plaintiff Garza confronted the arresting officers and words ensued. Pearce and others arrested Garza and put him in a police vehicle with Pfannstiel. Earl then drove the vehicle to the Guadalupe County jail. Pfannstiel and Garza claim that Earl drove the vehicle at approximately seventy miles per hour and applied the brakes suddenly and without reason. The sudden braking caused Pfannstiel, who was sitting forward on the rear seat, to strike his face against the metal screen separating the front and rear seats. Pearce and Montgomery transported Roy Vizza to the Guadalupe County jail, and Smelser transported David Vizza there.

Upon arrival, Pfannstiel, Garza, and Roy Vizza claimed that they were injured and requested medical attention. The requests were denied. Pfannstiel, Garza, Roy Vizza, and David Vizza were released after posting bond approximately three hours later. Upon release, all four plaintiffs went to the hospital, but David Vizza felt that he did not need medical attention.

All four plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated section 1983 by: (1) falsely arresting them, (2) using excessive force, (3) denying them medical care, and (4) conspiring to violate their civil rights.

II. Qualified Immunity.

A. Jurisdiction.

Generally, only final judgments of the district court are appealable. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. The Supreme Court has held, however, that an order denying a motion for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity claim is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine "to the extent that it turns on an issue of law." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Plaintiffs argue that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because it contains disputed factual issues material to immunity. They cite Feagley v. Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir.1989) wherein we stated that "if disputed factual issues material to immunity are present, the district court's denial of summary judgment sought on the basis of immunity is not appealable." Id. at 1439. The district court here denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment because plaintiffs alleged that defendants acted with intent to injure. The district court reasoned that this allegation raised a disputed issue of material fact. We disagree.

To maintain the strict limits of interlocutory appealability, the disputed fact issue must be material to the defendants' qualified immunity claims. In Feagley, parents of an involuntarily committed child brought a wrongful death action against state school officials who claimed qualified immunity. The school officials argued that their conduct was merely negligent. The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. We held that the order was not appealable because the defense of negligence raised a material issue of fact--the defendants' scienter. See id. at 1441-42.

In today's case, however, scienter is not material to qualified immunity. In cases involving intentional conduct by public officials, the Supreme Court has eliminated the subjective component of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The appropriate standard for determining qualified immunity is "the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law...." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that "an allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). It is therefore irrelevant whether the defendants in this case acted with intent to injure as long as their conduct was objectively reasonable. The district court erroneously applied a subjective standard to the qualified immunity issue.

B. Legal standards.

All of the defendants who appeal are public safety officials who are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. See Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 559 (5th Cir.1986), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 L.Ed.2d 764 (1987). The qualified immunity defense has two primary effects. Procedurally, it allows defendants to appeal interlocutory orders which deny motions for dismissal or summary judgment that raise the defense. The rationale for permitting such interlocutory appeals is to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

Substantively, qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions "from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107...